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"LAST CHANCE" STATE JUDICIAL REVIEW IN
CRIMINAL CASES-ILLINOIS' COLLATERAL ATTACK
REMEDIES: A CALL FOR A PRINCIPLED
JURISPRUDENCE
John F. Decker*
INTRODUCTION
A number of post-conviction remedies are available to a defendant after
a judgment of conviction has been entered in an Illinois criminal case.
Where a defendant has entered a plea of guilty to a charge and the court
has entered judgment thereon, the defendant can move to vacate the plea
at the trial court level within thirty days of sentencing' on grounds that
the plea was not voluntary and intelligent. 2 Moreover, where the judgment
of conviction follows a trial, the defendant may challenge his conviction
under one or more of the Illinois post-trial motions.3 If the trial court did
not have jurisdiction over the matter in question, the defendant must file
in the trial court a post-trial "motion in arrest of judgment" within thirty
days following entry of the verdict. 4 If some type of procedural irregularity
tainted the verdict, the defendant must file a "motion for a new trial" at
the trial court level within thirty days of entry of the verdict., In addition,
* Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law; J.D., 1970, Creighton Univer-
sity; LL.M., 1971, New York University; J.S.D., 1979, New York University. Professor
Decker is the author of ILLINOIs CRIMINAL LAW: A SURVEY OF CRanrs AND DEFENSES (1986).
Professor Decker gratefully acknowledges the outstanding and substantial contribution of
Gayle Erjavac in the researching, writing, and editing of this Article. Ms. Erjavac served as
Professor Decker's Research Assistant from May, 1987 to December, 1988, and currently is
an Associate with Jenner & Block, Chicago, Illinois.
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 604(d) (1987).
2. See, e.g., People v. Ryant, 41 111. App. 3d 273, 354 N.E.2d 395 (5th Dist. 1976)
(where defendant was not properly advised of his right to counsel prior to entry of plea, his
lack of understanding of his rights was waived by guilty plea which provided basis for motion
to vacate plea). Compare McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769-70 (1970) (plea of guilty
upheld where plea not proven to be less than voluntary and intelligent).
3. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 116-1 (1987) (motion for a new trial).
4. Id. at para. 116-2. Jurisdictional problems arise either where the charging instrument
does not charge an offense, id. at para. 116-2(b)(1), or where the trial "court is without
jurisdiction of the cause." Id. at para. 116-2(b)(2).
5. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 116-1 (1987). The motion for a new trial can be based
on many grounds, encompassing both factual and legal issues. The motion for a new trial
can raise pre-trial irregularities, e.g., People v. Miller, 131 Ill. App. 2d 212, 268 N.E.2d 213
(1st Dist. 1971) (failure to provide defense attorney resulted in a continuance); juror mis-
conduct during voir dire selection procedures, e.g., People v. Witte, 115 Ill. App. 3d 20, 449
N.E.2d 966 (2d Dist. 1983) (remand for hearing on motion for new trial required where
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if the evidence did not warrant a jury's guilty verdict, a "motion for
judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict," based upon an insuf-
ficiency of evidence claim, should be advanced in the trial court.'
Assuming the defendant's conviction withstands attack at the trial court
level, the defendant may also directly attack his conviction on appeal.7
Where the defendant has entered a plea of guilty and filed an unsuccessful
motion to vacate the plea, he can appeal the trial court's decision not to
set aside the plea.' Where the defendant has been found guilty at trial, he
also has a right to appeal. 9 The defendant can raise on appeal any error
that occurred at the trial court level, whether pre-trial,10 trial, 11 or post-
defendant alleged that juror during voir dire concealed friendship with members of local
police force); evidentiary problems at trial, e.g., People v. Eddington, 129 Ill. App. 3d 745,
770-71, 473 N.E.2d 103, 120-21 (4th Dist. 1984) (admission of hearsay and other errors
required reversal for new trial); improper cross-examination by prosecution, e.g., People v.
Hawkins, 61 111. 2d 23, 329 N.E.2d 221 (1975) (repeated cross-examination of alibi witness
concerning her presence at an earlier juvenile court proceeding in which other witnesses
testified to a different alibi required new trial); government witness misconduct, e.g., People
v. Cornille, 95 Ill. 2d 497, 448 N.E.2d 857 (1983) (witness' false testimony about his
qualifications as expert chemist required new trial); improper jury instructions, e.g., People
v. Santiago, 108 Ill. App. 3d 787, 439 N.E.2d 984 (1st Dist. 1982) (failure of trial judge to
instruct jury on lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter during murder trial
required new trial); judicial misconduct during jury deliberations, e.g., People v. Santiago,
108 II. App. 3d 787, 439 N.E.2d 984 (1st Dist. 1982) (coercing verdict from deadlocked jury
required new trial); and newly discovered evidence that comes to light after trial, e.g., People
v. Hughes, 11 Ill. App. 3d 224, 296 N.E.2d 643 (2d Dist. 1973) (newly discovered evidence
of accomplice that tended to exonerate defendant from burglary charge warranted new trial).
6. People v. Van Cleve, 89 Il. 2d 298, 432 N.E.2d 837 (1982) (after trial court denied
defendant's motion for directed verdict at close of the evidence and jury found defendant
guilty, trial court properly granted defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal notwith-
standing verdict even though motion was not explicitly provided for by statute since it was
similar in substance to statutory motion for directed verdict and state cannot appeal trial
court's acquittal that was based on insufficiency of evidence).
Of course, the motion for judgment of acquittal (commonly referred to as a motion for
directed verdict), ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-4(k) (1987), is most likely to be granted
at the close of the state's evidence or at the close of all evidence. See People v. Alfano, 81
Ill. 2d 434, 401 N.E.2d 554 (1980) (following defendant's successful motion for judgment of
acquittal after state failed to present evidence supportive of charges, judgment of acquittal
not appealable by state).
Another possible post-trial motion is the motion to vacate a conviction which arose out
of the same physical act as a greater offense of which the defendant was convicted. See
People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 551, 561, 363 N.E.2d 838, 844 (1977) (dicta); People v. Pearson,
108 111. App. 3d 241, 439 N.E.2d 31 (4th Dist. 1982) (because criminal damage to property
conviction arose out of same physical act as reckless conduct conviction, court must vacate
former conviction).
7. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. lI0A, paras. 604-06 (1987).
8. Id. at paras. 604(d), 605(b).
9. Id. at paras. 605(a), 606.
10. See, e.g., People v. Weaver, 90 I1. App. 3d 299, 412 N.E.2d 1353 (2d Dist. 1980)
(state's failure to comply with discovery order reversible error).
11. See, e.g., People v. Massie, 137 I1. App. 3d 723, 484 N.E.2d 1213 (2d Dist. 1985)
(admission of defendant's prior adjudications of delinquency for purpose of impeaching
defendant's testimony reversible error).
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trial.'2 These errors could involve state or federal constitutional issues,"3
statutory rights, 4 or evidentiary problems. 5 In any event, it is incumbent
that the appeal be filed within thirty days of sentencing.' 6
Assuming the defendant did not appeal in timely fashion or failed to
raise specific issues in his appeal, his last possible opportunity for review
of potential errors in the Illinois courts lies in the various collateral attack
remedies: statutory habeas corpus, 7 statutory coram nobis,' 8 and the Post-
Conviction Hearing Act.' 9 But, in spite of these remedies, a perusal of the
Illinois case law addressing collateral attacks reveals the existence of a
complex labyrinth of rules and, in effect, barriers to meaningful relief
through collateral attack. Indeed, the granting of collateral relief to defen-
dants is a rarity. More significant, however, is the inconsistent use of these
collateral attack vehicles by the Illinois courts. And, most troublesome, is
the lack of well developed principles and standards that would have the
effect of offering clear guidance to practitioners and courts entertaining
such claims as to where and when collateral relief is appropriate. The
purpose of this Article is to examine the maze that the Illinois courts have
created in this connection, criticize the jurisprudence (or lack of it) that
surrounds these so-called remedies, and offer suggestions that might elevate
this law from the complex quagmire in which it now resides.
Specifically, Parts I, II, and III of this Article discuss and criticize the
Illinois courts' interpretation and application of statutory habeas corpus,
statutory coram nobis, and the Post-Conviction Hearing Act respectively.
12. See, e.g., People v. Smothers, 70 Ill. App. 3d 589, 388 N.E.2d 1114 (5th Dist. 1979)
(trial judge's consideration of defendant's lifestyle and prior arrests not resulting in conviction
was error and, accordingly, sentence reduced to time served).
13. See, e.g., People v. Wagner, 89 Il. 2d 308, 433 N.E.2d 267 (1982) (sentence for
delivery of non-controlled, harmless look-alike substance that exceeds sentences available for
delivery of controlled substance violative of Illinois due process protections requiring reversal);
People v. Shinkle, 160 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 513 N.E.2d 1072 (1st Dist. 1987) (eavesdropping
violative of right to privacy protections contained in state statute and ILL. CONST. art. I, §
6 constitutes grounds for reversal on appeal); People v. Cummings, 7 11. App. 3d 306, 287
N.E.2d 291 (2d Dist. 1972) (failure of trial judge to personally admonish defendant about
the nature of the charge and constitutional rights waived as consequence of guilty plea
violative of due process and Illinois Supreme Court rules which, accordingly, requires
reversal).
14. See, e.g., People v. Sutherland, 128 I11. App. 3d 415, 470 N.E.2d 1210 (4th Dist.
1984) (failure to personally admonish defendant about consequences of guilty plea violative
of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402 and requires reversal); People v. Weaver, 90 I1. App.
3d 299, 412 N.E.2d 1353 (2d Dist. 1980) (state's failure to comply with rules of discovery
requires reversal).
15. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 68 I1. App. 3d 836, 386 N.E.2d 642 (1st Dist. 1979)
(repeated reference to out-of-court witness identification constituted hearsay and created
reversible error).
16. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. IIOA, paras. 604(d), 605(a), 606(b) & (c) (1987).
17. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 10-101 to -137 (1987).
18. Id. at para. 2-1401.
19. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 122-1 to -8 (1987).
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Part IV suggests jurisprudential doctrines and principles that the Illinois
courts should use in collateral attack decisions to guide trial court judges,
petitioners, and their attorneys. Part V recommends that the Illinois leg-
islature replace the three existing Illinois collateral attack remedies with
one enactment addressing post-appeal remedies for those convicted of
criminality. The Article concludes by offering a single, comprehensive post-
conviction collateral attack statute for consideration.
I. HABEAS CORPUS
Illinois habeas corpus is a constitutionally guaranteed right2" which is
statutorily preserved and governed by the Illinois Habeas Corpus Act (the
"Habeas Act"). 2' The Habeas Act operates as a post-conviction collateral
attack on original court judgments and provides a remedy to individuals
who are unlawfully imprisoned or deprived of their liberty.22 The only
remedy available to a successful petitioner, found unlawfully restrained, is
immediate release from custody. 23 Although one of the major purposes of
federal habeas corpus2 4 is to release individuals unlawfully detained,25 the
basis for such a determination is considerably broader than under Illinois
habeas corpus. While federal habeas corpus protection as originally enacted
concentrated solely on whether the confinement was a result of a conviction
in a court that had no competent jurisdiction, 26 in 1915 the United States
Supreme Court ruled that the writ of habeas corpus would lie where "the
judgment under which the prisoner is detained is shown to be absolutely
void for want of jurisdiction in the court that pronounced it, either because
such jurisdiction was absent at the beginning or because it was lost in the
course of the proceedings."127 Accordingly, if a prisoner could demonstrate
that his constitutional rights were infringed during the judicial proceedings,
the writ of habeas corpus would issue since the "court's jurisdiction at the
beginning" was "lost" during the trial proceedings.28 Examples of such a
"loss" of jurisdiction have included cases where a trial judge tolerated a
20. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 9.
21. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 10-101 to -137 (1987).
22. Id. at para. 10-102.
23. People ex rel. Burbank v. Irving, 108 I1. App. 3d 697, 700, 439 N.E.2d 554, 556 (3d
Dist. 1982).
24. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-55 (1987).
25. Id. See generally Rosenn, The Great Writ-A Reflection of Societal Change, 44 OHo
ST. L.J. 337 (1983) (historical analysis of expansion and contraction of federal habeas corpus
relief over time as influenced by social change); Saltzburg, Habeas Corpus: The Supreme
Court and the Congress, 44 Onro ST. L.J. 367 (1983) (discussing scope of federal habeas
corpus).
26. See Note, Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV.
1038, 1042-45 (1970).
27. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 327 (1915) (emphasis added) (claim of mob domi-
nated trial considered and rejected).
28. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938).
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mob dominated atmosphere surrounding the trial in violation of due proc-
ess,29 or where the judge failed to provide the accused appointed counsel
at his federal trial in violation of the sixth amendment.30 Thus, by stretching
the jurisdictional question to 'fictional extremes, '"' 31 the Court trans-
formed federal habeas corpus into a vehicle that would recognize not only
true jurisdictional problems, but also "those exceptional cases Where the
conviction has been in disregard of the constitutional rights of the ac-
cused .... ,,12 Accordingly, today, this federal collateral attack remedy is
available to an individual who shows that the original judgment resulting
in imprisonment violates the laws of the United States or the Constitution.,3
Federal habeas corpus, therefore, operates as a remedy to state prisoners
who successfully attack the constitutionality of their custody.34 In contrast,
although the Illinois Habeas Corpus Act lists seven causes for which a
state prisoner may be released from custody,3 Illinois case law holds that
29. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
30. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
31. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMNAL PROCEDURE § 27.3, at 1025 (1985). See also Bator,
Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HAv. L. REv.
441, 495 (1963) (Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942), dispensed with "fiction" of
jurisdiction as the only basis for a habeas corpus petition).
32. Waley, 316 U.S. at 105.
33. Id. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 157 n.5 (1982); Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1979); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 426 (1963).
34. See Remington, State Prisoner Access To Postconviction Relief-Lessening Role for
Federal Courts; An Increasingly Important Role for State Courts, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 287
(1983).
35. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 10-124 (1987), in part, provides:
If it appears that the prisoner is in custody by virtue of process from any court
legally constituted, he or she may be discharged only for one or more of the
following causes:
1. Where the court has exceeded the limit of its jurisdiction, either as to the
matter, place, sum or person.
2. Where, though the original imprisonment was lawful, nevertheless, by some
act, omission or event which has subsequently taken place, the party has become
entitled to be discharged.
3. Where the process is defective in some substantial form required by law.
4. Where the process, though in proper form, has been issued in a case or under
circumstances where the law does not allow process to issue or orders to be
entered for imprisonment or arrest.
5. Where, although in proper form, the process has been issued in a case or
under circumstances unauthorized to issue or execute the same, or where the
person having the custody of the prisoner under such process is not the person
empowered by law to detain him or her.
6. Where the process appears to have been obtained by false pretense or bribery.
7. Where there is no general law, nor any judgment or order of a court to
authorize the process if in a civil action, nor any conviction if in a criminal
proceeding. No court, on the return of a habeas corpus, shall, in any other
matter, inquire into the legality or justice of a judgment of a court legally
constituted.
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this remedy is available only to an individual who successfully shows that
either: 1) the original judgment resulting in incarceration is void, that is,
rendered by a court lacking personal or subject matter jurisdiction over
the defendant; or, 2) something has occurred since the original lawful
incarceration that entitles the prisoner to release.36 Unlike federal habeas
corpus, therefore, the Illinois remedy is not available to a state prisoner
who alleges that the original court judgment deprived him of his consti-
tutional rights.3 7
A. Grounds For Illinois Habeas Corpus Relief
The limited scope of Illinois habeas corpus review is demonstrated by
the Illinois courts' interpretations of the statute, which have designated
only the two previously stated reasons for granting relief-jurisdictional
defects rendering the original judgment void and subsequent events war-
ranting release from custody. Moreover, the narrow scope of the remedy
becomes more apparent when one examines the case law to determine
exactly what facts a court will consider sufficient to demonstrate the
existence of such a jurisdictional defect or subsequent event. The case law
clearly demonstrates that petitioners very rarely obtain relief under Illinois
habeas corpus and, accordingly, it becomes quite obvious just what alle-
gations are not considered jurisdictional defects or subsequent events. These
court decisions, however, do not provide the same degree of clarity or
definitiveness as to what allegations will meet the statutory grounds for
release from custody.
1. Jurisdictional Defects Resulting in a Void Judgment
a. Defective charging instrument
The existence of a defective charging instrument is one of the few
situations where Illinois courts may find a resulting lack of trial court
jurisdiction to render a judgment. A defective indictment or one containing
false information is considered void and, therefore, any judgment based
on such a defective charge is also found to be void, that is, rendered by a
court lacking personal or subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant.3"
Accordingly, a petitioner incarcerated following a void judgment is a proper
candidate for state habeas corpus relief.
The mere technical insufficiency of a charging instrument, however, will
not render the instrument, and thus the judgment, void. Technical insuf-
ficiencies are considered by the courts to be merely formal and not juris-
36. People ex rel. Lewis v. Frye, 42 I1. 2d 311, 312-13, 247 N.E.2d 410, 411 (1969);
People ex rel. Castle v. Spivey, 10 Ill. 2d 586, 593, 141 N.E.2d 321, 325 (1957).
37. People ex rel. Shelley v. Frye, 42 111. 2d 263, 264, 246 N.E.2d 251, 252 (1969).
38. See People ex rel. Brown v. Brantley, 7 Ill. App. 3d 558, 559, 288 N.E.2d 92, 93
(4th Dist. 1972).
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dictional defects. Accordingly, such insufficiencies are not appropriate for
consideration under habeas corpus proceedings.3 9 Moreover, the Illinois
courts have read this technicality exception quite broadly. For example, in
People ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 40 the petitioner was indicted for murder,
incarcerated, and subsequently filed a petition for habeas corpus relief.
The petitioner claimed that his incarceration was unlawful because the
indictment was void. The indictment did not state that the deceased was
an "individual" or a "human being." The court held that where the
indictment states the name of the person killed, it implies that the deceased
was a human being and that the specific words "individual" or "human
being" are not necessary. 4' Accordingly, the court found that this indict-
ment was not defective and the petitioner was not entitled to habeas corpus
relief.42
Similarly, in People ex rel. Goznelli v. Brantley,'3 the petitioner was
convicted for forgery, imprisoned, and sought habeas corpus relief. The
petitioner alleged that the indictment charging him was void because it
violated an Illinois statute requiring that the relevant criminal statute be
cited in the indictment. The court, however, held that the indictment was
sufficient to charge an offense even though it did not cite the specific
statutory provision violated." The court reasoned that this defect was
merely a technical and not a jurisdictional defect which would entitle the
petitioner to habeas corpus relief. 45
More limiting were the applications in People ex rel. Palmer v. Twomey, 4
and People ex rel. Skinner v. Randolph,'47 where the court refused to even
address the petitioners' claims of defective indictments. In Palmer, the
petitioner had been convicted of theft and sentenced to the penitentiary.
He charged in his petition that his imprisonment was unlawful because two
of the three counts of the indictment were not signed by the grand jury
foreman 4' and he also alleged various constitutional violations. The court,
however, rejected these violations as a whole, without ever specifically
addressing the claim of a defective charging instrument.4 9 In Skinner, the
petitioner had been convicted of murder. He challenged the conviction,
39. See People ex rel. Totten v. Frye, 39 I11. 2d 549, 552, 237 N.E.2d 709, 711 (1968).
40. 2 I1l. App. 3d 757, 277 N.E.2d 151 (3d Dist. 1971).
41. Id. at 759, 277 N.E.2d at 153.
42. Id. See also Brantley, 7 Il1. App. 3d at 559, 288 N.E.2d at 93 (charging instrument
was not void because it did not state.that a "human being had been killed" and in addition,
resulting allegation of void judgment was frivolous).
43. 49 I1. 2d 383, 275 N.E.2d 396 (1971).
44. Id. at 385-86, 275 N.E.2d at 398.
45. Id.; People ex rel. Totten v. Frye, 39 II1. 2d 549, 551-52, 237 N.E.2d 709, 710-11
(1968).
46. 53 I1. 2d 479, 292 N.E.2d 379 (1973).
47. 35 11. 2d 589, 221 N.E.2d 279 (1966).
48. People ex rel. Palmer v. Twomey, 53 11. 2d 479, 481, 292 N.E.2d 379, 380 (1973).
49. Id. at 481-84, 292 N.E.2d at 381-82.
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alleging that the indictment was defective and claiming various constitu-
tional violations as well.50 The court simply held that these allegations were
not appropriate for determination in a habeas corpus proceeding."
Finally, the Illinois Supreme Court has shed further light on the breadth
of the technicality exception in the area of appeals. In People v. Gilmore, 2
the court stated, in a case on direct appeal, that the Illinois "statutory
scheme shows clearly that failure to charge an offense does not . . . serve
to deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction.""3 Rather, the court held that
jurisdiction was conferred by section 9 of article VI of the Illinois Consti-
tution which provides the circuit courts with "original jurisdiction of all
justiciable matters." 5 4 The court explained that a defendant has the op-
portunity to move to dismiss the charge prior to trial under section 114-
I(a) of Chapter 38 on the ground that the charge does not state an offense,"
and the option of raising the same issue in a post-trial motion in arrest of
judgment under section 116-2 of Chapter 38.56 Failure to set out a charge
exactly in accordance with Illinois law, which requires 1) the name of the
offense; 2) a citation to its statutory provision; and, 3) a recitation of the
nature and the elements of the charge, 7 could not be raised for the first
time on appeal so long as the charge apprises the accused sufficient to
allow him to "[1)] prepare his defense and [2) plead] a resulting conviction
as a bar to future prosecution arising out of the same conduct." '58 In other
words, the precise statutory requirements regarding framing a charge against
a defendant usually will be waived unless raised at the trial court level. 9
Obviously, if the defendant cannot raise the sufficiency of the charge on
direct appeal unless the charge is so faulty that it creates problems in
raising a defense at trial or in post-conviction double jeopardy claims, it
is highly doubtful that a defendant could raise such issue in a post-trial
collateral attack. Indeed, in People ex rel. Dorsey v. Morris, 6 the Illinois
appellate court interpreted Gilmore as prohibiting state habeas corpus relief
where a theft indictment which failed to describe in any way the allegedly
stolen property "was adequate to apprise the accused of the nature of the
charge and to act as a bar to subsequent jeopardy." 61
In conclusion, the case law reveals that a charging instrument containing
a mere "technical" defect cannot be challenged on habeas corpus. The
50. People ex rel. Skinner v. Randolph, 35 Ill. 2d 589, 590, 221 N.E.2d 279, 280 (1966).
51. Id. at 590, 221 N.E.2d at 281.
52. 63 I1. 2d 23, 344 N.E.2d 456 (1976).
53. Id. at 27, 344 N.E.2d at 459.
54. Id. at 26, 344 N.E.2d at 458 (quoting ILL. CoNsT. art VI, § 9).
55. Id. at 28, 344 N.E.2d at 459 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 114-1(a) (1987)).
56. Id. (quoting ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 116-2 (1987)).
57. Id. at 29, 344 N.E.2d at 460 (quoting ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 111-3 (1987)).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 27-29, 344 N.E.2d at 459-61.
60. 37 Il. App. 3d 632, 347 N.E.2d 175 (3d Dist. 1976).
61. Id. at 635, 347 N.E.2d at 177.
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Gilmore doctrine suggests that a defect will be viewed as technical so long
as the charge apprises the defendant sufficiently to allow him to prepare
a defense and ward off possible subsequent prosecutions for the same
criminal activity. Dictum in these cases implies that, should the charging
instrument not forewarn the accused about the nature and elements of the
charge with enough specificity to allow him to offer a defense or attack a
successive prosecution, habeas corpus would be available. However, as the
case law reveals, this seldom occurs.
The differential treatment of defective charging instruments raised for
the first time before a reviewing court, where relief will not be granted so
long as the charge allows for preparation of a defense and successive
prosecution challenges, 6z and those raised in the trial court on a motion to
dismiss 6 or on a motion in arrest of judgment,6 where the state's argument
that the defendant's demand for "technical niceties" 65 regarding the charge
will be rejected and defense relief granted,66 has never been adequately
explained by the courts. In People v. Lutz,6' the Illinois Supreme Court
stated that claims regarding the inadequacy of a charging instrument raised
in a motion in arrest of judgment should not be evaluated under the
Gilmore test, which concentrates on the ability to prepare a defense and
defend challenges to successive prosecutions.68 Rather, strict pleading re-
quirements should be demanded since otherwise the statutory framework
will be "rendered meaningless or superfluous. ' 69 Furthermore, toleration
of lenient pleading requirements would be at odds with the "well settled
principles of law" that require "a criminal or penal statute ... to be
strictly construed in favor of an accused .... "o70 Why the principle of
strict statutory construction and the principle of lenity toward defendants
should have less operational effect before a court of appeal or in a court
entertaining a collateral attack has not been articulated.
b. Excessive sentence
Two early Illinois Supreme Court cases addressed the issue of whether
an original court judgment imposing an "excessive sentence" on a petitioner
62. People v. Gilmore, 63 11. 2d 23, 344 N.E.2d 456 (1976) (direct appeal); People v.
Pujoue, 61 111. 2d 335, 335 N.E.2d 437 (1975) (direct appeal); People ex rel. Vanco v. Morris,
37 Ill. App. 3d 631, 347 N.E.2d 118 (3d Dist. 1976) (habeas corpus).
63. People v. Williams, 80 III. App. 3d 963, 400 N.E.2d 532 (5th Dist. 1980); People v.
Taylor, 6 III. App. 3d 961, 286 N.E.2d 112 (4th Dist. 1972).
64. People v. Lutz, 73 11. 2d 204, 383 N.E.2d 171 (1978).
65. Id. at 209, 383 N.E.2d at 172.
66. Id. at 209-13, 383 N.E.2d at 172-74 (in part, quoting plaintiff's briefs).
67. 73 III. 2d 204, 383 N.E.2d 171 (1978).
68. Id. at 210-11, 383 N.E.2d at 173.
69. Id. at 212, 383 N.E.2d at 174 (quoting People ex rel. Barrett v. Barrett, 31 111. 2d
360, 364-65, 201 N.E.2d 849, 851 (1964)).
70. Id. at 213, 383 N.E.2d at 174 (quoting People v. Eagle Food Centers, Inc., 31 111.
2d 535, 539, 202 N.E.2d 473, 475 (1964)).
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is void, thereby entitling the petitioner to habeas corpus relief." These
decisions laid the basis for the excessive sentence law. In this context, an
"excessive sentence" appears to include only those sentences not permitted
by the sentencing provisions authorized by statute.
In People ex rel. Wakefield v. Montgomery,7 decided in 1937, the
petitioner was convicted of statutory rape and sentenced to the penitentiary
for an indeterminate period of one year to life. He sought habeas corpus
relief, alleging that his sentence was excessive because he should have been
sentenced to a determinate instead of an indeterminate term of imprison-
ment. The petitioner contended that the original court judgment was void
because the court had no jurisdiction to enter an indeterminate sentence
against him.7 The Illinois Supreme Court stated that the test to be applied
in determining whether an excessive sentence renders a judgment of con-
viction void is "whether or not the sentence is of a different character
than that authorized by law to be imposed for the crime of which the
accused has been found guilty." 7 4 The court found that, although the
petitioner was entitled to a determinate rather than an indeterminate term
of imprisonment, the sentence imposed was not different in character from
that to which he was entitled.7 The original judgment, therefore, was
merely erroneous and not void, and the petitioner was not entitled to
habeas corpus relief.7 6
The court, however, reached a somewhat different result in its 1926
decision, People ex rel. Carlstrom v. Eller.77 In that case, the petitioner,
having been convicted of the crime of libel, was imprisoned and fined in
violation of the statutory penalty which was a fine or imprisonment, but
not both. He had paid the fine and sought habeas corpus relief from the
unlawful imprisonment. The court held that the original judgments of
conviction and sentence were not void because the trial court had personal
and subject matter jurisdiction over the petitioner to render the verdict
and at least part of the sentence.'8 The court stated that the sentence was
"merely excessive" and not entirely erroneous. 9 Once the sentence which
legally could be imposed was served, however, the remaining portion of
the sentence was void.80 Here, the petitioner had paid the fine, his term of
71. People ex rel. Wakefield v. Montgomery, 365 Ill. 478, 6 N.E.2d 868 (1937); People
ex rel. Carlstrom v. Eller, 323 I1. 28, 153 N.E. 597 (1926).
72. 365 Ill. 478, 6 N.E.2d 868 (1937).
73. Id. at 479, 6 N.E.2d at 868.
74. Id. at 480, 6 N.E.2d at 869 (quoting People v. Kelly, 352 III. 567, 568, 186 N.E. 188,
189 (1933)).
75. Id. at 481, 6 N.E.2d at 869.
76. Id.
77. 323 Ill. 28, 153 N.E. 597 (1926).
78. Id. at 31-32, 153 N.E. at 599.
79. Id. at 32, 153 N.E. at 599.
80. Id. at 33-34, 153 N.E. at 599-600.
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imprisonment was rendered void, and he was entitled to habeas corpus
relief."'
In a more recent case, People ex rel. Starks v. Frye,8 2 the state's highest
court considered the propriety of extending habeas corpus relief where a
trial court had improperly imposed consecutive sentences and the defendant
had already served that portion of his sentence that was properly imposed.
The defendant had pleaded guilty to two indictments, each charging reckless
homicide, following a traffic mishap where two persons were killed. He
was sentenced to consecutive prison sentences even though Illinois law
disallowed consecutive sentences where the offenses arose out of the same
conduct. After he had served the minimum sentence on the first indictment,
he sought habeas corpus relief.83 The court held that, because the defendant
had already "satisfied the sentence which was legally imposed and the State
is in the posture of seeking what may be legally regarded as excessive
punishment," he was entitled to discharge. 4 In this case, as in Eller," the
court granted habeas corpus relief, not because the original judgment of
conviction was void, but because the remainder of the sentence, at the time
of the collateral attack, was not authorized by law and, hence, void. It
should be noted, however, that the court in Starks offered no explanation
as to why the defendant was entitled to release from custody after only
having served the minimum sentence in circumstances where the trial court
had ordered a minimum and maximum sentence, with the actual period of
confinement to be determined by the parole board.8 6
In conclusion, where a court enters a judgment of conviction and,
thereafter, imposes a sentence in excess of that authorized by the penal
code, neither the verdict nor the sentence are considered void and, conse-
quently, are not open to immediate collateral attack. In other words, the
sentence is not per se invalid, rather the legitimate portion of the sentence
remains valid and only the unauthorized part is "excessive" and, accord-
ingly, "void." Futhermore, Montgomery stresses that the excessive portion
of the sentence is not open to collateral attack until the legitimate portion
of the sentence has been satisfied. In effect, no portion of the sentence is
viewed as void until the legitimate part of the sentence has been served. It
would appear, then, that a sentence would be open to immediate collateral
attack only where it Was totally at odds with the sentencing provisions.
For example, if a trial court erroneously imposed a sentence of imprison-
ment where the appropriate punishment was by fine only, immediate dis-
charge obviously would be in order.
81. Id.
82. 39 I1. 2d 119, 233 N.E.2d 413 (1968).
83. Id. at 121, 233 N.E.2d at 414.
84. Id. at 122, 233 N.E.2d at 414.
85. People ev rel. Caristrom v. Eller, 323 11. 28, 153 N.E. 597 (1926).
86. 39 Ill. 2d at 121, 233 N.E.2d at 414.
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The Illinois courts' approach to excessive sentences can be criticized on
two grounds. First, where a judge imposes a sentence that exceeds the
court's statutory authority, that sentence is invalid. Creating a line of
demarcation as the courts have done between "void" sentences and "merely
excessive" sentences is largely a matter of semantics. If the sentence is
excessive, it is unauthorized. If it is unauthorized, it is invalid. If it is
invalid, it is void. And, if it is void, it should be open to attack at any
time. Second, it seems fundamentally unfair that a habeas corpus petitioner
and the petitioned court are deprived of the opportunity to correct an
erroneous sentence until after the petitioner has commenced to serve the
invalid portion of his sentence. If one considers the normal delays in filing
a petition for relief, affording the respondent state an opportunity to reply
to the petition, and the court's review and resolution of the matter, the
petitioner will likely remain incarcerated for some period of time wholly
unauthorized by law. It would be more logical if the petitioned court could
review an alleged invalid sentence immediately following its challenge and,
if warranted, rule the sentence invalid and order an immediate resentence.
In any event, .it should be understood that sentences prohibited by the
federal constitution's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
87
or by the Illinois constitution"s presumably will not be addressed under
state habeas corpus. Since the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act 9 was
designed to address substantial deprivations of federal and state constitu-
tional rights, claims of unconstitutional excessive sentences would be more
logically addressed under that enactment. Furthermore, because habeas
corpus relief entitles a defendant to immediate release, it will be unavailable
to a defendant who merely requests that his sentence be reduced.9
87. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (life
imprisonment without possibility of parole imposed on habitual criminal violative of eighth
amendment given type of criminality that gave rise to sanction); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584 (1977) (death penalty for crime of rape violative of eighth amendment).
88. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 11: "All penalties shall be determined both according to the
seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizen-
ship." See, e.g., People v. Dandridge, 9 Il1. App. 3d 174, 292 N.E.2d 51 (4th Dist. 1973)
(sentence violative of Ill. CONST. Art. 1, § 11).
89. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 122-1 to -7 (1987).
90. People v. Gersbacher, 4 11. App. 3d 948, 282 N.E.2d 243 (5th Dist. 1972) (habeas
corpus unavailable where petitioner claimed he was entitled to sentence credit, since if
successful, he would not be entitled to release). See infra notes 136-40 and accompanying
text for a discussion of People ex rel. Yoder v. Hardy, 116 Ill. App. 3d 489, 451 N.E.2d
965 (5th Dist. 1983) (holding that "good-time" credits should be counted in determining
whether sentence has expired). See also People ex rel. Stringer v. Illinois Prisoner Review
Bd., 163 Ill. App. 3d 1100, 517 N.E.2d 283 (3d Dist. 1987) (petitioner's parole revocation
by prisoner review board not cognizable under habeas corpus since parole status simply is
alternative sentence and not the equivalent of immediate discharge that follows granting of
habeas corpus relief); infra notes 141-45 and accompanying text (decision to grant parole is
not a subsequent occurrence warranting release from custody because sentence would not
have expired and petitioner would not be entitled to immediate release).
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2. Non-Jurisdictional Defects
Illinois courts frequently have denied habeas corpus petitions simply
because they did not allege jurisdictional defects in the original trial court
judgment.91 The courts usually have reasoned that judgments rendered by
courts with personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the defendants
were valid and, accordingly, that the petitioners were not entitled to habeas
corpus relief because their incarceration was not unlawful. 92 The results in
these cases, however, are not supported by indepth analysis or sound
doctrine.93 In fact, there does not appear to be any developed doctrine,
principle, or theory to explain these decisions.9 4 The opinions are most
often brief and to the point: the petitioner's claim simply does not raise a
jurisdictional defect rendering the original judgment void.9s
91. See, e.g., People v. Reese, 66 Il. App. 3d 199, 383 N.E.2d 759 (5th Dist. 1978)
(failure to admonish defendant about mandatory parole term before accepting his guilty plea
does not involve a jurisdictional question entitling defendant to habeas corpus relief).
92. See, e.g., id.
93. See, e.g., Hughes v. Kiley, 67 I1. 2d 261, 367 N.E.2d 700 (1977) (habeas corpus relief
unavailable where defendant challenged indictment on ground of prosecutorial misconduct
before grand jury). The Hughes court reasoned:
The remedy of habeas corpus is available in a limited number of situations
including obtaining the release of a prisoner incarcerated by a trial court without
subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction over the defendant or where
a post-conviction occurrence entitles a prisoner to release. A review of claims
which are nonjurisdictional in nature is not available by means of habeas corpus
even though a denial of constitutional rights is involved.
... When petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus from this court, the petitioner
has the responsibility for attaching all lower court records and other pertinent
materials that will fully present the issues of law as required by Supreme Court
Rule.... Thus our inability to ascertain whether Judge Porter fully examined
the due process issue raised by the defendant-petitioner must rest with the defen-
dant-petitioner. Regardless, his remedy beyond the hearing on the motion to
quash [the indictment) is not by way of habeas corpus but by way of direct
review.
Id. at 267-68, 367 N.E.2d 702-03 (citations omitted). In this case, the court makes no effort
to explain: 1) why constitutional claims are not cognizable under habeas corpus; and, 2) why
relief from defendant's claim of prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury which indicted
him was an issue that apparently could not be raised under any collateral attack vehicle.
94. See supra note 93.
95. See, e.g., Norman v. Elrod, 76 Il1. 2d 426, 394 N.E.2d 1043 (1979) (per curiam)
(failure to admonish defendant about mandatory parole term before accepting his guilty plea
does not entitle defendant to habeas corpus relief). The Norman court reasoned as follows:
Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he was incorrectly advised
at the time of his plea of guilty that there would be no mandatory parole term
following the expiration of his sentence. No claim is made that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter or over defendant's person, and habeas
corpus is not available. The motion by petitioner for leave to file a petition for
an original writ of habeas corpus is denied, without prejudice to the right of
petitioner to file a post-conviction petition in the trial court. Motion denied.
Id. at 427, 394 N.E.2d at 1043 (citations omitted). See also People ex rel. Lewis v. Frye, 42
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In any event, there are a number of different claims that the Illinois
courts categorically have determined are not of a jurisdictional nature. For
example, in People v. Goulet,96 the petitioner was convicted of robbery on
a negotiated guilty plea and sought habeas corpus relief, alleging that the
trial court did not have jurisdiction to convict him because of improper
venue. The court held that the Illinois legislature has drawn a distinction
between venue and jurisdiction in the Code of Criminal Law and Procedure
and in its Committee Comments and, therefore, venue is not a jurisdictional
matter.9 7 Accordingly, the original judgment of conviction was not void
and the petitioner was not entitled to habeas corpus relief."
Another case distinguishing between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional
matters is People ex rel. LaPlaca v. Sielaff.19 The petitioner in that case
was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder and filed for habeas corpus
relief, alleging that the trial court lost jurisdiction to enter a judgment and
sentence against him because the jury returned inconsistent verdicts as to
the petitioner and his co-conspirator. The indictment had charged both
defendants with murder and conspiracy to commit murder. Further, the
indictment alleged that only the co-conspirator had committed an overt act
in furtherance of the conspiracy. However, the jury found the petitioner
only guilty of conspiracy and the co-conspirator only guilty of murder.1°
The jury had returned blank verdict forms on the co-conspirator's charge
of conspiracy. The petitioner contended that even though the trial court
originally had personal and subject matter jurisdiction over him, the court
lost this jurisdiction on the conspiracy charge because the co-conspirator
was in essence acquitted of conspiracy which negated the existence of any
conspiracy.' 0' In other words, if the alleged co-conspirator was not guilty
of conspiracy, the petitioner was not guilty as well due to the bilateral
nature of a conspiracy. The court, however, held that even though the trial
court may have erred in entering a judgment against the petitioner, such
an error would not render the judgment void. 0 2 The trial court still had
jurisdiction to enter a judgment and sentence on a verdict that was based
on a valid charging instrument. 0 3 The petitioner was not unlawfully incar-
cerated and, thus, not entitled to habeas corpus relief. Therefore, while
inconsistent verdicts for co-conspirators may result in negating the existence
11. 2d 311, 247 N.E.2d 410 (1969) and People ex rel. Brown v. Brantley, 7 Ill. App. 3d 558,
288 N.E.2d 92 (4th Dist. 1972), for two illustrations of written opinions, which were not per
curiam, that disposed of habeas corpus claims in a single page of the Northeast Reporter,
Second Edition.
96. 52 Ill App. 3d 609, 367 N.E.2d 1045 (4th Dist. 1977).
97. Id. at 611, 367 N.E.2d at 1047.
98. Id. at 611, 367 N.E.2d at 1047-48.
99. 38 I11. App. 3d 760, 348 N.E.2d 516 (5th Dist. 1976).
100. Id. at 760-61, 348 N.E.2d at 517.
101. Id. at 761, 348 N.E.2d at 517-18.
102. Id. at 762, 348 N.E.2d at 518.
103. Id.
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of proof of all necessary elements of the crime charged, such a claim does
not allege a jurisdictional defect in the original court judgment.104
The court in People ex rel. Bassin v. Israel'0 also held that a petitioner
did not allege a jurisdictional defect in his habeas corpus petition. In that
case, the petitioner had negotiated a plea of guilty for attempt to commit
voluntary manslaughter and subsequently claimed that the trial court was
without jurisdiction to convict him because such a crime did not exist in
Illinois.' 6 The court, however, did not discuss why a conviction for a
nonexistent crime'07 was not a jurisdictional defect in the original court
judgment. The court simply explained that the petitioner was not entitled
to habeas corpus relief because he had pled guilty to a lesser offense and,
thus, "received the benefit of his bargain."' 0s
Finally, in People ex rel. Lewis v. Frye, 109 the petitioner alleged that he
was entitled to habeas corpus relief and that the trial court judgment
against him was void because he was denied a hearing to determine his
sanity, there was a bona fide doubt of his sanity, the state had not proved
his sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, and his counsel was incompetent.
The court simply recited the grounds under which a petitioner is entitled
to habeas corpus relief and held that these allegations were not jurisdictional
defects rendering the trial court judgment void." 0
3. Subsequent Events Warranting Release from Custody
In the habeas corpus claims discussed in the previous sections, the
petitioner alleging a jurisdictional defect in the original court judgment
against him is claiming that the judgment was null and void and that his
104. Id.
105. 31 111. App. 3d 744, 335 N.E.2d 53 (5th Dist. 1975).
106. Id. at 746, 335 N.E.2d at 54.
107. Cases decided before and after Bassin clearly hold that attempted voluntary man-
slaughter is not an offense in Illinois. People v. Reagan, 111 Ill. App. 3d 945, 444 N.E.2d
742 (3d Dist. 1982), aff'd, 99 II1. 2d 238, 457 N.E.2d 1260 (1983) (no attempted voluntary
manslaughter can legally exist where unreasonable self defense claim asserted by defendant);
People v. Weeks, 86 I1. App. 2d 480, 230 N.E.2d 12 (2d Dist. 1967) (no attempted
manslaughter can legally exist where defendant kills in heat of passion). While this author
has criticized these decisions since logically it appears such a crime could exist, see J. DECKER,
ILLINOIS CRMNAL LAw: A SuRvEY OF CRIMES AND DEFENSES 167-68 (1986), the Illinois courts'
definitive rejection of such reasoning raises serious questions about the integrity of Bassin.
108. 31 111. App. 3d at 748, 335 N.E.2d at 57.
109. 42 III. 2d 311, 247 N.E.2d 410 (1969).
110. Id. at 313, 247 N.E.2d at 411. In addition, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that
petitioner's allegations did not claim the occurrence of an event subsequent to conviction
that would warrant release from custody. Id. The court, similar to its finding that no
jurisdictional defect in the original court judgment was shown, did not give any rationale
for its decision.
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confinement is unlawful."' The petitioner claiming that there has been an
occurrence following his conviction and confinement warranting his release,
however, acknowledges that the trial court had personal and subject matter
jurisdiction to render its verdict and, thus, the resulting confinement was
lawful." 2 Such a petitioner, instead, is claiming that there has been some
occurrence subsequent to his lawful custody that now warrants his imme-
diate release. "13
In addressing this ground for release under the Illinois Habeas Corpus
Act, the courts over time and in very limited areas, have more consistently
and analytically presented their rationale for granting" 4 or denying'" relief.
The courts have held that there has been a subsequent event after lawful
custody entitling the petitioner to release from such custody in two clearly
articulated situations: 1) when a petitioner's sentence has been served;" 6
and, 2) when there has been an unwarranted delay in the execution of a
sentence." 7 Moreover, unlike cases addressing the validity of original judg-
ments, the courts have progressively developed these holdings to better
provide petitioners with guidance and notice as to when their claims will
be granted or denied.
In other areas the courts, similar to their findings related to jurisdictional
defects, have provided no meaningful guidance as to what constitutes a
subsequent event within the meaning of the Illinois Habeas Corpus Act.
For example, the petitioner in People ex rel. Swiderski v. Brierton"I was
released on parole after serving part of his sentence pursuant to a guilty
plea for armed robbery. He was subsequently reincarcerated for a parole
violation and filed for habeas corpus relief, alleging that he was not
admonished prior to pleading guilty that his sentence included a mandatory
111. See, e.g., People ex rel. LaPlaca v. Sielaff, 38 Ill. App. 3d 760, 348 N.E.2d 516 (5th
Dist. 1976) (claim that jury verdicts were inconsistent and, accordingly, trial court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to enter judgment considered and rejected as non-jurisdictional
claim); People ex rel. Bassin v. Isreal, 31 111. App. 3d 744, 335 N.E.2d 53 (5th Dist. 1975)
(claim that trial court's acceptance of plea of guilty to attempted "oluntary manslaughter
constituted plea to nonexistent crime and, accordingly, judgment of conviction was not
supported by court's subject matter jurisdiction considered and rejected as non-jurisdictional
claim).
112. See, e.g., People ex re. Titzel v. Hill, 344 III. 246, 176 N.E. 360 (1131) (prisoner's
discharge ordered where prisoner convicted and sentenced by trial court which had jurisdiction
but where prisoner had already served his sentence).
113. Id. at 251, 176 N.E. at 362-63.
114. See, e.g., id. ("[w]here a judgment of conviction is valid, a person imprisoned under
it is entitled to be set at liberty on habeas corpus if the judgment, by reason of any matter
ex post facto, has ceased to be operative").
115. See, e.g., Walker v. Hardiman, 116 Ill. 2d 413, 507 N.E.2d 849 (1987) (delay between
affirmance of conviction on appeal and arrest to begin serving sentence did not afford
defendants habeas corpus relief).
116. People ex rel. Castle v. Spivey, 10 111. 2d 586, 593, 141 N.E.2d 321, 325 (1957).
117. People ex rel. Millet v. Woods, 55 I1. 2d 1, 3, 302 N.E.2d 32, 33 (1973).
118. 65 Il1. App. 3d 153, 382 N.E.2d 628 (lst Dist. 1978).
1989] ILLINOIS COLLATERAL ATTACK REMEDIES 217
period of parole." 9 The court noted that the supreme court rule requiring
such an admonishment was enacted after the petitioner pled guilty and
thus did not apply in this situation. 20 The petitioner noted that two
subsequent federal court decisions had held it unfair to reincarcerate a
prisoner for parole violations without previous admonishment as to a
mandatory parole term.' 2' The petitioner claimed that these cases consti-
tuted an occurrence subsequent to his lawful confinement warranting habeas
corpus relief. 22 The court denied the petitioner relief and simply stated
that the federal cases were only advisory, were not similar to the case at
bar, and were not the type of subsequent occurrences that the Illinois
courts previously had considered under the Habeas Corpus Act. 2 1 Such
cursory reviews have limited the types of subsequent events sufficient for
habeas corpus relief to the two discussed above.
Having thus set forth the two types of subsequent events where the
Illinois courts have provided some meaningful guidance, it is helpful to
examine each more closely.
a. Expiration of lawful period of confinement
In People ex rel. Castle v. Spivey, 2 4 the Illinois Supreme Court held that
expiration of a petitioner's maximum sentence is the occurrence of a
subsequent event warranting release from lawful custody.' 25 In Castle, a
circuit court judge had discharged two state prisoners, sentenced to life
imprisonment, from custody pursuant to their habeas corpus petitions. The
Illinois Supreme Court held, however, that the prisoners had not served
their legal maximum terms of confinement and, thus, the circuit court
judge's orders for release were null and void.' 26 Nonetheless, had the
prisoners either served their full sentences or had the sentences been ter-
minated by law through, for example, a pardon or commutation, then
habeas corpus relief would have been appropriate. 27
The Castle holding has been extended to cases where petitioners have
sought release from custody while committed to the Department of Mental
Health and Developmental Disabilities. For example, in Raimondo v. Pav-
119. Id. at 153, 382 N.E.2d at 629.
120. Id. at 154, 382 N.E.2d at 629.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 154, 382 N.E.2d at 629-30. See also supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text
(court holds petitioner's claims are not jurisdictional defects or subsequent events and gives
no rationale for its decision).
124. 10 II1. 2d 586, 141 N.E.2d 321 (1957).
125. Id. at 593, 141 N.E.2d at 325. See also People ex rel. Titzel v. Hill, 344 I11. 246,
251, 176 N.E. 360, 362-63 (1931) (discharge ordered where accused already served sentence).
126. 10 111. 2d at 596, 141 N.E.2d at 326.
127. Id. at 592, 141 N.E.2d at 324; People ex rel. Gregory v. Pate, 31 111. 2d 592, 595,
203 N.E.2d 425, 427 (1964).
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kovic, 28 the petitioner was found not guilty of rape and armed robbery by
reason of insanity. The petitioner subsequently was committed to the
Department of Mental Health pursuant to the Unified Code of Corrections
and the Mental Health Code. 129 During his custody, both statutes were
revised and the petitioner alleged that his lawful period of confinement
had expired under any version of the statutes. 30 The court stated that if
this allegation was proved, then it was an event subsequent to the original
lawful confinement which would entitle the petitioner to habeas corpus
relief.' The circuit court, however, had entertained the petitioner's habeas
corpus petition by conducting a new sentencing hearing and applying the
revised statutes. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the circuit court
and remanded the case for a determination as to whether the petitioner
remained in lawful custody." 2
Similarly, the petitioner in Lee v. Pavkovic"I was found not guilty of
murder by reason of insanity and filed a petition for habeas corpus relief,
also alleging that his lawful period of confinement in the Department of
Mental Health had expired. The petitioner claimed that the trial court had
retroactively applied the revised Uniform Code of Corrections and the
Mental Health Code to calculate his term of confinement. The appellate
court held that the petitioner was within the Department of Mental Health's
lawful custody when he filed his petition and that the trial court properly
denied his petition for habeas corpus relief.1 4 Nonetheless, the court noted
that, had his term of original, lawful confinement expired, the petitioner
would have been entitled to release under the Illinois Habeas Corpus Act.'",
The Illinois courts' rule that expiration of a petitioner's lawful period
of confinement constitutes an occurrence subsequent to the confinement
which warrants habeas corpus relief, was further extended in People ex
rel. Yoder v. Hardy"' to include a petitioner's claim that his good-time
credits had been improperly revoked. In that case, the petitioner was serving
a four year prison term for aggravated battery and, although this initial
term had expired, he remained in custody because the Department of
Corrections Adjustment Committee extended his term and revoked two
years of his good-time credits for disciplinary reasons. 1 7 The court agreed
with the petitioner that the Department had violated its own administrative
regulations when it revoked the credits because it had failed to provide
128. 107 II. App. 3d 226, 437 N.E.2d 712 (1st Dist. 1982).
129. Id. at 227, 437 N.E.2d at 713.
130. Id. at 227-28, 437 N.E.2d at 713.
131. Id. at 229, 437 N.E.2d at 714.
132. Id. at 233-34, 437 N.E.2d at 716-17.
133. 119 III. App. 3d 439, 456 N.E.2d 621 (1st Dist. 1983).
134. Id. at 446, 456 N.E.2d at 627.
135. Id. at 444, 456 N.E.2d at 625.
136. 116 Ill. App. 3d 489, 451 N.E.2d 965 (5th Dist. 1983).
137. Id. at 490-91, 451 N.E.2d at 966.
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him an adequate hearing process.' 38 In response, the court ordered the
credits reinstated and applied to the petitioner's sentence. 3 9 This resulted
in the expiration of his sentence, entitling him to habeas corpus relief. °40
The major inquiry in all of these cases focuses on whether or not the
petitioner has served his legal term of confinement. If he has, then an
occurrence subsequent to his lawful custody exists within the meaning of
the Illinois Habeas Corpus Act and he is entitled to release from custody.
Based on this rationale, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief
simply because his request for parole is denied. In People ex rel. Burbank
v. Irving,141 for example, the court held that habeas corpus is not a proper
remedy for a prisoner whose request for parole has been denied, even if
such denial is unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. 4 2 The court based its
holding on the fact that a decision to grant parole is not a subsequent
occurrence warranting discharge from custody. 3 The court reasoned that,
even if parole had been granted, the petitioner's sentence would not have
expired because parole is "simply an alternative method by which he may
complete his sentence." 1" Granting parole, therefore, does not entitle a
petitioner to immediate discharge, which is the only relief available under
the Illinois Habeas Corpus Act. 41
The courts in Burbank and subsequent cases 4 6 also appear to have based
their holdings that parole decisions are not properly raised under the Illinois
Habeas Corpus Act, on the deference due to prisoner review board deci-
sions. The court in Burbank, for example, noted that the decision to grant
or deny parole to a prisoner is under the unreviewable discretion of the
138. Id. at 494-95, 451 N.E.2d at 968-69.
139. Id. at 495, 451 N.E.2d at 969.
140. Id. at 496, 451 N.E.2d at 969.
141. 108 Il1. App. 3d 697, 439 N.E.2d 554 (3d Dist. 1982).
142. id. at 701, 439 N.E.2d at 557.
143. Id. at 701, 439 N.E.2d at 556.
144. Id. at 702, 439 N.E.2d at 557. See also Newsome v. Hughes, 131 I1. App. 3d 872,
874-75, 476 N.E.2d 478, 480 (4th Dist. 1985) (petitioner challenging revocation of mandatory
supervised release not entitled to habeas corpus since under supervised release, sentence has
not expired and petitioner thus could not be released).
145. 108 I11. App. 3d at 701-02, 439 N.E.2d at 557.
146. See, e.g., Outlaw v. O'Leary, 161 I1. App. 3d 218, 222, 514 N.E.2d 208, 211 (3d
Dist. 1987) (Illinois Prisoner Review Board has great discretion in parole decisions and
judicial review of these decisions is narrow); People ex rel. Stringer v. Illinois Prisoner
Review Bd.. 163 I1. App. 3d 1100, 1102, 517 N.E.2d 283, 284 (3d Dist. 1987) (revocation
of prisoner's parole is not an occurrence subsequent to lawful custody warranting habeas
corpus relief and prison review board has authority to revoke parole and reconfine petitioner);
Newsome v. Hughes, 131 III. App. 3d 872, 874-76, 476 N.E.2d. 478, 480-81 (4th Dist. 1985)
(petitioner on mandatory supervised release not entitled to habeas corpus relief and statutory
law does not require specific charges accompany a warrant when supervised release revoked
and petitioner reincarcerated). See also People ex rel. Castle v. Spivey, 10 Il. 2d 586, 594-
95, 141 N.E.2d 321, 326 (1957) (in habeas corpus proceeding, the court will not substitute
its judgment or discretion for that of the parole board's officers).
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prisoner review board 47 and, therefore: "[flor a court to order a habeas
corpus discharge... on the basis of an erroneous or inequitable denial of
parole, would exceed its authority under the Habeas Corpus Act and
constitute an exercise of clemency, a function vested in the executive, not
judicial branch."' 48
With respect to this category of cases, it is important to recognize that
the court is not granting relief because the sentencing court imposed an
unauthorized or "void" sentence at the outset. Instead, relief is afforded
to meritorious defendants because some intervening circumstance followed
a lawful sentence that now warrants the petitioner's release. Thus, where
the petitioner has completed his lawful sentence, has been pardoned, or
enjoys the benefit of a retroactive change in the sentencing law, and, for
whatever reason, the correctional authorities continue custody, he is being
released because of this "subsequent event," not on "excessive sentence"
grounds.
b. Delay in execution of sentence
The Illinois courts have examined a number of factors to determine
whether a delay between pronouncing and imposing a petitioner's sentence
constitutes an occurrence subsequent to the lawful confinement warranting
habeas corpus relief. People ex rel. Millet v. Woods' 49 is the leading Illinois
case in this area and dealt with a petitioner who was convicted of voluntary
manslaughter, sentenced, and released on bond pending appeal. The ap-
pellate court affirmed his conviction and denied his motion for rehearing.5 0
The Illinois Supreme Court denied his petition for leave to appeal and for
reconsideration of this denial.' 5' Thereafter, five years passed between the
time the supreme court's mandate was issued to the appellate court and
the time the appellate court's mandate was spread of record in the trial
court.In The petitioner surrendered himself and then filed a petition for
habeas corpus relief, relying on the five year delay. The supreme court
noted that an unreasonable delay between pronouncing and imposing a
sentence may be an occurrence subsequent to the lawful sentence which
warrants relief under the Habeas Corpus Act.'53 The court stated that a
decision to grant such relief requires a case-by-case analysis, and the court
must consider the reasons for the delay. 1 4 Applying this test, the Millet
court considered the delay to be extraordinary and unexplained by the state
147. People ex rel. Burbank v. Irving, 108 Ill. App. 3d 697, 702, 439 N.E.2d 554, 557 (3d
Dist. 1982).
148. Id. at 702, 439 N.E.2d at 557.
149. 55 I1. 2d 1, 302 N.E.2d 32 (1973).
150. Id. at 2, 302 N.E.2d at 33.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 2, 302 N.E.2d at 33.
153. Id. at 3, 302 N.E.2d at 33.
154. Id. at 4, 302 N.E.2d at 34.
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because, until the state completed the process of spreading the appellate
court's mandate in the circuit court, the petitioner could not be held
responsible for any delay that occurred." The court also noted that the
petitioner had led a law-abiding and productive life since his conviction,
and "his incarceration ... would not well serve the principles of funda-
mental justice or [his] rehabilitation."" 6 Accordingly, the court concluded
that the petitioner was entitled to habeas corpus relief.
An Illinois appellate court was confronted with a similar set of facts in
People v. Ripa, 117 where a petitioner was convicted of various drug offenses,
sentenced, and released on bond pending appeal. His conviction was af-
firmed and he sought habeas corpus relief on the ground that there had
been an eighteen and one half month delay between the appellate court's
affirmance and the filing of the mandate with the trial court."8 The court
noted the similarities between the case at bar and Millet, stating that the
only difference was the length of the delay." 9 The court in Millet, however,
had not specified an acceptable length of delay and the appellate court
thus referred to Millet's directive to consider the circumstances in each
case when deciding whether to grant or deny habeas corpus relief. 60 The
court directed the petitioner's release from custody and, in reaching this
decision, appeared to consider one factor not discussed in Millet. Evidence
was presented to show that the petitioner was prepared to surrender himself
when he learned that his appeal was denied. His attorney, however, advised
him to wait until he was notified by the state.' 6' The court noted that this
was in keeping with local practice and that the state had not filed a motion
for an order directing the petitioner to surrender until the appellate court's
mandate was spread of record in the trial court. 62 In this proceeding,
moreover, the state had not suggested that the petitioner had an independent
obligation to surrender himself. 63
The court, in People v. Bartlett,'6 also addressed the petitioner's degree
of responsibility for surrendering himself to the authorities in considering
his petition for habeas corpus relief. In doing so, the Bartlett court limited
the rule in Ripa. In Bartlett, the petitioner presented evidence that showed
he was aware that he had lost his appeal, but that his attorney told him
he would "take it up further" and he was unaware that he should surrender
himself to serve his sentence. 65 The case, therefore, was factually similar
155. Id. at 4-5, 302 N.E.2d at 34.
156. Id. at 5, 302 N.E.2d at 34.
157. 115 I1. App. 3d 1, 449 N.E.2d 977 (2d Dist. 1983).
158. Id. at 2, 449 N.E.2d at 978.
159. Id. at 5, 449 N.E.2d at 979.
160. Id. at 4, 449 N.E.2d at 979.
161. Id. at 3, 449 N.E.2d at 978.
162. Id. at 2-5, 449 N.E.2d at 978-79.
163. Id. at 5, 449 N.E.2d at 979.
164. 123 111. App. 3d 172, 462 N.E.2d 956 (2d Dist. 1984).
165. Id. at 174, 462 N.E.2d at 957.
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to Ripa. The court, however, distinguished Ripa, noting that the attorney's
statement in Bartlett was not as definitive as Mr. Ripa being told to wait
until notification before surrendering. 66 The court also stated that waiting
for notification did not appear to be local practice in Bartlett's case and
that one of the petitioner's bail conditions was that he surrender himself
if his conviction was affirmed. 67 In reaching its decision to deny habeas
corpus relief, the court also noted that the petitioner's life style had not
changed to the same positive degree after his conviction as had the peti-
tioner's in Ripa.68 The court, however, did not offer specific comparisons
between these two life styles which would have provided guidance to future
petitioners as to how the courts will treat this factor in deciding whether
to grant or deny habeas corpus relief.
Finally, in the consolidated cases of Walker v. Hardiman and Stokes v.
Elrod,'6 the Illinois Supreme Court clarified both the issue of the peti-
tioner's responsibility for surrendering himself once his appeal has been
denied and the issue of when any delay in the process of spreading the
record is attributable to the petitioner. Walker was convicted of armed
robbery and burglary, his conviction was affirmed, and the appellate court's
mandate was spread of record in the circuit court within one month after
his petition for leave to appeal was denied. 70 Walker did not surrender
himself to the authorities, even though he was notified that his conviction
had been affirmed one month after the mandate was spread in the circuit
court. He was arrested four and one half years later so that he could begin
serving his sentence.' 7' Stokes was convicted of armed violence and at-
tempted murder, his conviction was affirmed, and the appellate court's
mandate was spread of record in the circuit court within one year after his
petition for leave to appeal was denied. 72 Stokes also did not surrender
himself, even though he was promptly notified of the court's decision, and
was arrested three years later. 7 1
The Court denied the petitioners' habeas corpus relief, holding that both
mandates were spread of record within a reasonable period of time. 74 The
court also stated that the Code of Criminal Procedure specifically directs
defendants on bail to surrender once their judgments are affirmed and that
the state is not responsible for notifying defendants that they must surren-
der: 7S "[w]e believe an affirmative duty is properly placed on the defendant
166. Id. at 175, 462 N.E.2d at 958-59.
167. Id. at 175-76, 462 N.E.2d at 959.
168. Id. at 175, 462 N.E.2d at 958.
169. 116 I11. 2d 413, 507 N.E.2d 849 (1987).
170. Id. at 414-15, 507 N.E.2d at 850.
171. Id. at 415-16, 507 N.E.2d at 850.
172. Id. at 417, 507 N.E.2d at 851.
173. Id. at 417-18, 507 N.E.2d at 851.
174. rd. at 421, 507 N.E.2d at 853.
175. rd. at 424, 507 N.E.2d at 854-55.
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who has had the privilege of remaining free on bond while his appeal is
pending.' ' 76 The court also held that the three year and four and one half
year delays between denial of the petitioners' leave to appeal and their
arrests were attributable to the petitioners: 77 "[w]e also believe that our
decision in this case will now make it clear that once the State moves to
have the appellate court mandate spread of record in the circuit court, and
the defendant is so notified, any delay in surrendering will be attributable
to the defendant."' 7 8
Both petitioners presented evidence supportive of the fact that they had
lived productive, law-abiding lives since their convictions. 79 The court did
not consider this factor in determining whether they were entitled to habeas
corpus relief, and noted that Millet was dispositive as to the facts in Walker
and Stokes. s0 The Court, however, did not address the fact that, in Millet,
it had strongly considered the petitioner's post-conviction life style in
deciding to grant habeas corpus relief.
B. Procedural Barriers To
Illinois Habeas Corpus Relief
The purpose of the Illinois Habeas Corpus Act is to provide a remedy
to individuals who are illegally imprisoned or restrained of their liberty,'8'
and the Habeas Act specifies limited grounds for which a petitioner may
be granted relief and released from custody.' Illinois courts consistently
have held that, in keeping with the purpose and requirements of the Habeas
Act, this collateral remedy only is available to correct errors of a jurisdic-
tional nature which render a subsequent commitment void.'83 The writ of
176. Id. at 424, 507 N.E.2d at 855.
177. Id. at 424, 507 N.E.2d at 854.
178. Id. at 424, 507 N.E.2d at 855.
179. Id. at 416-18, 507 N.E.2d at 851-52.
180. Id. at 420-21, 507 N.E.2d at 853. See also Crump v. Lane, 117 I1. 2d 181, 184-85,
510 N.E.2d 893, 895 (1987) (petitioner not entitled to habeas corpus relief because six year
delay between when leave to appeal was denied and when he began serving his sentence was
attributable to the petitioner. His life style since his conviction, even if exemplary, would
not have affected the court's decision in light of Walker).
181. Long v. Israel, 56 Ill. App. 3d 14, 16, 371 N.E.2d 873, 874 (5th Dist. 1977).
182. IL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 10-124 (1987). See supra note 35 for text of statute.
Traditionally, allegations of an unreasonable denial of bail or excessive bail could be
addressed through a petition for habeas corpus relief. People ex rel. St. George v. Woods,
47 I11. 2d 261, 265 N.E.2d 164 (1970); People v. Harris, 38 II!. 2d 552, 232 N.E.2d 721
(1967); People ex rel. Sammons v. Snow, 340 I1. 464, 173 N.E. 8 (1930). Such allegations
are no longer considered by the courts on collateral attack and Supreme Court Rule 604(c),
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 0A, para. 604(c) (1987), is now the sole avenue for challenging a denial
of bail or seeking a reduction or modification of bail ordered or conditions surrounding bail.
People v. Saunders, 122 Il. App. 3d 922, 927-28, 461 N.E.2d 1006, 1011 (2d Dist. 1984).
183. Baker v. Department of Corrections, 106 Iil. 2d 100, 106, 477 N.E.2d 686, 689 (1985);
People v. Carbona, 53 111. App. 3d 1022, 1025, 369 N.E.2d 197, 199 (1st Dist. 1977); People
ex rel. Bassin v. Israel, 31 111. App. 3d 744, 745, 335 N.E.2d 53, 55 (5th Dist. 1975); People
ex rel. Rose v. Randolph, 33 IlI. 2d 453, 456-57, 211 N.E.2d 685, 687 (1965).
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habeas corpus, therefore, is neither available to correct erroneous judg-
ments, nor a substitute for direct appeal. 18 4 Thus, in reviewing a petition
for habeas corpus relief, the courts do not consider factual issues or
circumstances surrounding the offense. "' The Habeas Act does not specify
a time limit during which a petitioner is obligated to file a petition for
relief, nor does it limit habeas corpus review to certain categories of
offenses, such as felonies. 16 Accordingly, this remedy is available to felons
and misdemeanants anytime they can prove a jurisdictional defect in the
original court judgment or a subsequent event occurring after a lawful
judgment.
In interpreting the Habeas Act, the Illinois courts also have held that,
because a petition for relief is reviewed in a civil proceeding for the purpose
of enforcing the right of personal liberty and not relitigating issues related
to the original conviction, the petitioner is not entitled to appointed counsel
during a habeas corpus proceeding. 8 7 In addition, a petition for habeas
corpus relief may be dismissed without a hearing if it does not sufficiently
allege a jurisdictional defect in the original court judgment or an event
subsequent to the original judgment warranting release from custody.",
The procedural issues that have been most frequently addressed by the
Illinois courts are: 1) the Habeas Act's standing requirement; and, 2)
whether a petition incorrectly labelled as a request for habeas corpus relief
instead should be examined under a more appropriate statutory provision.
These issues will now be examined.
1. Custody Requirement
The Habeas Corpus Act states that "every person imprisoned or other-
wise restrained of his or her liberty . . . may apply for habeas corpus...
,,119 The Illinois appellate courts have inconsistently interpreted this lan-
guage when determining whether a petitioner has standing to seek relief.
At issue is whether the statute requires a petitioner be in actual physical
custody before the courts will consider his request for release.
The third district, in People ex rel. Williams v. Morris,'" and the first
district, in People ex rel. Petraborg v. Fields,'9' held that the statutory
184. Baker, 106 I1. 2d at 106, 477 N.E.2d at 689; Carbona, 53 Ill. App. 3d at 1025, 369
N.E.2d at 199; Bassln, 31 Il. App. 3d at 745, 335 N.E.2d at 55; Rose, 33 111. 2d at 456-57,
211 N.E.2d at 687.
185. Bassin, 31 111. App. 3d at 745, 335 N.E.2d at 55; Rose, 33 I1. 2d at 456-57, 211
N.E.2d at 687.
186. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 10-101 to -137 (1987).
187. People v. Goulet, 52 Ill. App. 3d 609, 612, 367 N.E.2d 1045, 1047-48 (4th Dist.
1977); People ex rel. Ross v. Ragen, 391 11. 419, 422-23, 63 N.E.2d 874, 875 (1945).
188. People ex rel. Kalec v. Pate, 38 Ill. 2d 350, 351-52, 231 N.E.2d 434, 435 (1967);
Goulet, 52 11. App. 3d at 611-12, 367 N.E.2d at 1047-48.
189. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l10, para. 10-102 (1987).
190. 44 11. App. 3d 39, 357 N.E.2d 851 (3d Dist. 1976).
191. 14 I1. App. 3d 1025, 303 N.E.2d 160 (lst Dist. 1973).
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language requires a petitioner to be under actual physical restraint before
he has standing to seek habeas corpus relief. The petitioner in Williams
was on parole and alleged that his sentence had expired because he had
not been given proper credit for time spent incarcerated prior to his
conviction. 92 The court noted that, although a parolee technically remains
in legal custody until his sentence expires, because the petitioner was not
in actual custody and was at liberty, "there [was] little sense in directing
a writ of habeas corpus to a parole officer . . . whose only authority to
take physical custody of the parolee [was] dependant upon that parolee's
breaching of a condition of his parole."' 9 The court thus affirmed the
trial court's dismissal of the parolee's petition on the ground that he did
not have standing to seek relief. 194 The petitioner in Petraborg sought relief
from a detainer warrant filed against him by the parole board while he
was in federal custody, alleging that the warrant was void and his Illinois
sentence had expired. 93 The court held that because the petitioner was in
the physical custody of federal authorities, and not Illinois authorities, he
did not have standing to seek habeas corpus relief. 96 The court explained
that, "because a petition for habeas corpus is literally a request for the
production of the body, we believe the term 'custody' as used in the statute
refers to physical control or possession and may not be considered as a
concept which is susceptible to a constructive definition."' 97
Nonetheless, in Collins v. Sielaff,'98 the first district held that a parolee
was sufficiently restrained of his liberty to be entitled to seek habeas corpus
relief. The petitioner parolee alleged that credit had not been properly
applied to his sentence and that he was entitled to complete discharge
because his sentence had expired. The court concluded that the conditions
of parole imposed on a parolee place him within the category of persons
who are restrained of liberty for the purpose of seeking habeas corpus
relief.' 99 The court, in reaching its decision, referred to People ex rel.
Bassin v. Israel'0 where the fifth district also held that a paroled petitioner
was entitled to seek habeas corpus relief because a parolee remains in legal
custody and the restrictions inherent in such custody are sufficient to invoke
habeas corpus review.2 0'
The Illinois Supreme Court finally addressed this issue as it related to a
petitioner released on bail in the 1981 decision of Creek v. Clark.2 2 The
192. Williams, 44 Il1. App. 3d at 40, 357 N.E.2d at 852.
193. Id. at 40-41, 357 N.E.2d at 852.
194. Id. at 41, 357 N.E.2d at 853.
195. Petraborg, 14 I1. App. 3d at 1025-26, 303 N.E.2d at 161.
196. Id. at 1027, 303 N.E.2d at 161.
197. Id. at 1026, 303 N.E.2d at 161.
198. 43 111. App. 3d 1022, 357 N.E.2d 1213 (1st Dist. 1976).
199. Id. at 1023-24, 357 N.E.2d at 1214.
200. 31 111. App. 3d 744, 335 N.E.2d 53 (5th Dist. 1975).
201. Id. at 745, 335 N.E.2d at 55.
202. 88 Ill. 2d 54, 429 N.E.2d 1199 (1981).
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court held that the petitioner, who had been indicted for reckless homicide
and was free on bail, did not have standing under the Illinois Habeas
Corpus Act. 203 The court reasoned that the statutory language required that
a petitioner be under actual physical restraint because "a person at large
... already enjoys the liberty which is normally sought by the writ of
habeas corpus. Moreover, it is futile to order a party . . to produce the
'body' of one not in his physical custody."'
In spite of Creek, interpretation of this standing requirement appears to
remain unsettled. The fifth district, in People ex rel. Yoder v. Hardy,20'
which was decided after Creek, held that a petitioner serving a mandatory
supervised release was entitled to seek habeas corpus relief when he alleged
that his good conduct credit was improperly revoked. The court explained
that the action was not moot because, if the petitioner proved his allegation,
he might be entitled to an earlier termination of such supervision. 20 6 Yoder
thus appears to contradict Creek because any distinction drawn between
the level of custody present in mandatory supervised release and parole is
spurious at best.
It is noteworthy that federal habeas corpus petitioners are likewise faced
with a custody requirement.2w Nonetheless, in Jones v. Cunningham,2' the
United States Supreme Court ruled that a person on parole is in custody
for purposes of the federal enactment. 20 9 The Court pointed out that,
"besides physical imprisonment, there are other restraints on a man's
liberty, restraints not shared by the public generally, which have been
thought sufficient in the English-speaking world to support the issuance of
habeas corpus." ' 0 While the Court conceded that custody originally had
been interpreted as actual physical confinement, the writ of habeas corpus
had "grown to achieve its grand purpose-the protection of individuals
against erosion of their rights to be free from wrongful restraints upon
their liberty." '2 While a later Supreme Court opinion 22 intimated that the
203. Id. at 61, 429 N.E.2d at 1202.
204. Id. at 61, 429 N.E.2d at 1201-02. The petitioner cited a number of federal cases in
support of his argument that a person on bail has standing to seek habeas corpus relief. The
court stated that these cases were brought under the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2241-55 (1987), and therefore, were not controlling on the interpretation of the Illinois
Habeas Corpus Act. 88 111. 2d at 60-61, 429 N.E.2d at 1202.
205. 116 Ill. App. 3d 489, 451 N.E.2d 965 (5th Dist. 1983).
206. Id. at 492, 451 N.E.2d at 967.
207. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1987).
208. 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
209. Id. at 243.
210. Id. at 240.
211. Id. at 243. See also Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973) (petitioner's
release upon own recognizance pending execution of his sentence satisfied "custody" re-
quirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254).
212. Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1968).
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mere existence of collateral or civil consequences that follow a conviction 23
may not constitute a significant restraint on liberty that would trigger the
custody requirement, the Court specifically has recognized that where
custodial sanctions might be anticipated in the future214 or, are at least a
possibility, as where a petitioner's parole might be revoked, 2", "custody"
exists for purposes of federal habeas corpus. Most important, these inter-
pretations of the federal habeas corpus custody requirement elevate sub-
stance above form in that they provide "swift judicial review of allegedly
unlawful restraints on liberty" that might occur in the future. 216 This
immediate resolution of the matter serves the interest of avoiding the
inequity of forcing a meritorious petitioner to wait for relief until after his
placement in confinement begins to move the often slow wheels of the
administration of criminal justice. Furthermore, this approach recognizes,
as in the possible case of a petitioner who previously has served a brief
period of incarceration followed by a parole term, that the "petitioner
should not be thwarted ... simply because the path of litigation has been
so long ... that he has [already] served his sentence.1 21 7 Finally, where a
defendant is convicted of a serious offense, such as a felony, but is released
on probation, it would seem very inappropriate to throw the artificial
barrier of custody in the petitioner's path to possible relief, where con-
ceivably the trial court was wholly without jurisdiction in the matter and
the court's judgment thus was void. By insisting on a strict interpretation
of custody, the Illinois courts may in effect prevent the writ of habeas
corpus from meeting, to borrow from the language of the United States
Supreme Court, its "grand purpose.1 21 1
2. Mislabelled Habeas Corpus Petition
The Habeas Corpus Act states that, where the petitioner is entitled to
relief but "has sought the wrong remedy, the court shall permit the
pleadings to be amended ... and shall grant the relief to which the
[petitioner] is entitled on the amended pleadings or upon the evidence.''219
Prior to 1973, the Illinois courts held that a petition incorrectly labelled
213. See Decker, Collateral Consequences of a Felony Conviction in Illinois, 56 Cm.[-
IKENT L. REV. 731 (1980), for a review of collateral consequences, such as the loss of the
right to hold public office or collect pension benefits, that follow an Illinois felony conviction.
214. Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973) (petitioner on recognizance awaiting
execution of sentence in custody); Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir. Ct., 410 U.S. 484 (1973)
(detainer in first state on a pending felony charge creates custody as to that charge even
though defendant incarcerated in second state); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968) (when
petitioner, serving first of two consecutive sentences, is challenging second sentence, he is in
custody).
215. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
216. Peyton. 391 U.S. at 63.
217. Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 240 (1968).
218. Jones, 371 U.S. at 243.
219. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 10-121 (1987).
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as a request for habeas corpus relief could be considered under a more
appropriate statutory provision, but that the courts were not required to
do so.220 For example, in People ex rel. Haven v. Macieiski,2 2' the petitioner
requested habeas corpus relief, but alleged constitutional violations sur-
rounding his plea of guilty to aggravated battery. The Illinois Supreme
Court noted that the petition did not allege that the trial court lacked
personal or subject matter jurisdiction over the petitioner or that there had
been an occurrence subsequent to his conviction warranting his release
from custody.m The court held that the petitioner should have brought
his petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act and that the trial court
could have treated the petition as such, but was not required to do so. 2 3
The court thus affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the petitioner's request
for habeas corpus relief. 2'4
The Illinois Supreme Court similarly held in People ex rel. Lewis v.
Frye12s that, where the petitioner sought habeas corpus relief but alleged
constitutional violations surrounding his plea of guilty to incest, the trial
court could have treated the petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act, which was the more appropriate remedy, but that it was not required
to do so.26 Since the petition did not allege appropriate grounds for habeas
corpus relief, the court affirmed the trial court's decision to dismiss the
petition. 2 7
This rule, moreover, was followed in the intermediate appellate courts,
albeit with some hesitation. For example, the petitioner in People v. Cobb 21
acknowledged that his pro se petition for habeas corpus relief was defective
because it alleged constitutional violations related to pre-trial and trial
procedures prior to his conviction for rape and aggravated kidnapping. He
argued that, because he had filed an obviously mislabelled petition while
without representation by counsel, the court should have considered the
petition under the more appropriate Post-Conviction Hearing Act.2 2 9 The
appellate court held that the petition did not allege grounds for habeas
corpus relief, that the trial court was not required to consider the petition
as one for post-conviction relief, and, therefore, that the trial court had
properly dismissed the petition.230 The court appeared to base its decision
220. People ex rel. Lewis v. Frye, 42 Ill. 2d 58, 60, 245 N.E.2d 483, 484-85 (1969); People
ex rel. Haven v. Macieiski, 38 I1. 2d 396, 398, 231 N.E.2d 433, 434 (1967); People v. Cobb.
8 Ill. App. 3d 1081, 1083, 290 N.E.2d 610, 612 (2d Dist. 1972).
221. 38 I1. 2d 396, 231 N.E.2d 433 (1967).
222. Id. at 398, 231 N.E.2d at 434.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. 42 II. 2d 58, 245 N.E.2d 483 (1969).
226. Id. at 60, 245 N.E.2d at 484-85.
227. Id. at 60, 245 N.E.2d at 485.
228. 8 111. App. 3d 1081, 290 N.E.2d 610 (2d Dist. 1972).
229. Id. at 1082, 290 N.E.2d at 611.
230. Id. at 1083, 290 N.E.2d at 611-12.
[Vol. 38:201
1989] ILLINOIS COLLATERAL ATTACK REMEDIES
in part on the fact that the petitioner was entitled to amend his petition
and refile for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.23 ' Thus, the
court believed that the petitioner was not prejudiced in any way by the
dismissal of his habeas corpus petition. Whether the Cobb court would
have reached a different conclusion had prejudice been present, however,
was not clear.
Any appellate court developments, however, were cut short in 1973 when
the Illinois Supreme Court reversed its previous rulings and held, in People
ex rel. Palmer v. Twomey,232 that a petition incorrectly labelled as a request
for habeas corpus relief should be considered under a more appropriate
statutory provision if it alleges grounds for relief cognizable under that
provision. 233 The court based its decision on its previous ruling in People
v. Slaughter,234 which addressed the quality of appointed counsel in Post-
Conviction Hearing Act proceedings. The Slaughter court had noted that
many post-conviction petitions were filed pro se and that adequate repre-
sentation was necessary to amend such petitions to more sufficiently present
a petitioner's allegations of a constitutional violation. 2 3 As a result, the
Slaughter court held that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act requires ap-
pointed counsel and the opportunity to amend or withdraw a petition for
relief. 2-6 The court in Palmer stated that a petitioner proceeding pro se is
as likely to select the wrong collateral attack remedy as he is to file an
inadequate post-conviction petition. " 7 In keeping with the philosophy of
Slaughter and to preserve judicial economy, trial courts, therefore, must
now consider mislabelled habeas corpus petitions under any other statutory
provision that appropriately may apply to a petitioner's allegations.2 8
Although the majority of mislabelled habeas corpus petitions alleged
constitutional deprivations and instead should have been brought under
the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, the Palmer holding is not limited to
mislabelled petitions where Post-Conviction Hearing Act relief more ap-
propriately applies. The appellate decisions after Palmer, however, have
placed limits on its effect. In Graham v. Klincar,239 the petitioner sought
habeas corpus relief for constitutional violations related to parole proce-
dures. The trial court dismissed the petition because it did not allege
231. Id. at 1083, 290 N.E.2d at 612.
232. 53 Il1. 2d 479, 292 N.E.2d 379 (1973).
233. Id. at 484, 292 N.E.2d at 382.
234. 39 Ill. 2d 278, 235 N.E.2d 566 (1968).
235. Id. at 285, 235 N.E.2d at 569.
236. Id.
237. 53 III. 2d at 484, 292 N.E.2d at 382.
238. Id. See also People v. Carbona, 53 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 1025, 369 N.E.2d 197, 199 (1st
Dist. 1977) (defendant appealing from denial of motion for new trial did not specify
procedural basis of motion and court independently considered petition under Post-Conviction
Hearing Act after determining habeas corpus and coram nobis were inappropriate remedies
based on allegations in the petition).
239. 163 Il. App. 3d 1091, 517 N.E.2d 606 (3d Dist 1987).
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grounds for habeas corpus relief and the petitioner appealed, contending
that the trial court should have considered his petition as requesting a writ
of mandamus.240 The appellate court cited the Illinois Habeas Corpus Act
as allowing a petitioner the opportunity to amend a mislabelled petition if
the court determines he is entitled to another type of relief, and noted that
a writ of mandamus was available to remedy constitutional violations
related to parole procedures.241 The court held, however, that the parole
procedures in question did not constitute constitutional deprivation and,
in addition, the petitioner had improperly sought leave to amend. The trial
court, therefore, properly had dismissed the petition and was not obligated
to consider it as a request for a writ of mandamus.2 2 As to the constitu-
tional violations, the court reasoned that, although a writ of mandamus
was available to remedy the violations alleged, the facts in this case did
not amount to such violations. 243 The court thus appeared to interpret the
Habeas Corpus Act as requiring the mislabelled petition on its face to
sufficiently allege violations warranting a different remedy, and that amend-
ing the petition would merely change its label and not its content. The
Graham court, however, did not explain how the petitioner's request for
leave to amend was improper, or why the burden was on the petitioner to
properly seek leave before the court should consider a mislabelled petition
under a more appropriate statutory remedy.
Similar to Graham, People ex rel. Petraborg v. Fields,24 also was decided
after Palmer. The appellate court in Petraborg appeared to interpret the
Palmer holding as applicable only to those situations where a petitioner
files his petition pro se and also thereafter does not obtain counsel. The
trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus relief and the petitioner
alleged on appeal that the court should have regarded the petition as one
for a writ of mandamus because it was filed pro se and he was unfamiliar
with the law. 241 The appellate court disagreed and did not reconsider the
petition under the more appropriate remedy because the petitioner was
appointed counsel shortly after the pro se petition was filed.24 6 The court
stated that counsel had time to amend the petition but apparently chose
not to do so.247
The courts' holdings in Graham and Petraborg illustrate the contrast
between the Illinois courts' approach to reviewing a petition under the
Habeas Corpus Act versus the Post-Conviction Hearing Act where peti-
240. Id. at 1092, 517 N.E.2d at 607.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 1092-93, 517 N.E.2d at 607.
243. Id.
244. 14 I1. App. 3d 1025, 303 N.E.2d 160 (1st Dist. 1973).
245. Id. at 1027, 303 N.E.2d at 161.
246. Id.
247. Id.
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tions, especially those filed pro se, are liberally construed 48 The Illinois
Supreme Court, in Palmer, took notice of this difference when it stated
that the philosophy of Slaughter should be followed and mislabelled habeas
corpus petitions must be considered under more appropriate statutory
remedies. 49 The court did not, however, clearly discuss that this also means
that petitions be liberally construed when determining whether more ap-
plicable remedies exist, and the appellate courts since Palmer have not
interpreted or extended Palmer to philosophically treat habeas corpus
petitions in the same manner as petitions filed under the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act.
C. Critical Summary
A review of the Illinois case law involving habeas corpus petitions reveals
the existence of several requirements or conditions that serve as barriers
to gaining meaningful collateral review of possible errors at the trial court
level. First, the Illinois courts insist that habeas corpus only is an appro-
priate remedy where the error in question would entitle the accused to
immediate discharge from custody. For example, where a defendant is
sentenced to a more extensive term of imprisonment than that authorized
by law or where he wrongfully is denied good-time credit or release on
parole, the error may remain unchecked because in none of these situations
is the defendant invariably entitled to immediate, unconditional release.
Second, some Illinois cases demand that the defendants be in actual,
physical custody before habeas corpus review is made available. Thus, if
a trial court judgment otherwise was void for complete want of subject
matter jurisdiction, a defendant would be barred from relief if he had been
sentenced only to probation or given a fine. Accordingly, by mechanically
reciting that the petitioner 1) would not be entitled to immediate release if
some form of relief were granted, or 2) is not in custody, the actual merits
of his claim are never addressed through habeas corpus review.
While the case law does claim to afford relief from judgments of courts
lacking jurisdiction, the Illinois courts' narrow view of jurisdiction repre-
sents a third obstacle to effective relief. The Illinois courts have refused
to follow the step of federal habeas corpus which holds that 1) jurisdiction
may be "lost" during the course of trial court proceedings, and 2) depri-
vation of constitutional rights is cognizable under habeas corpus. Further,
Illinois habeas corpus is interpreted as extending only to judgments which
248. People v. Slaughter, 39 I1. 2d 278, 285, 235 N.E.2d 566, 569-70 (1968) (fundamental
fairness requires incoherent pro se post-conviction petition be reconsidered after counsel
appointed and petition arr ended); People v. Williams, 1111. App. 3d 275, 277, 296 N.E.2d
617, 617 (5th Dist. 1973) (pro se motion to vacate judgment and sentence to be liberally
construed and reconsidered under Post-Conviction Hearing Act after counsel appointed and
petition amended).
249. People exrel. Palmer v. Twomey, 53 Il1. 2d 479, 484, 292 N.E.2d 379, 381-82 (1973).
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are completely void. Thus, where the charging instrument, although sta-
tutorily defective, provides some semblance of notice to the defendant
about the nature of the charge, it is not void. Similarly, where a sentence
not authorized by law is imposed, it is not necessarily void so long as some
aspect of the sentence remains valid.
The last major objection that can be directed at much of the habeas
corpus case law is the stark absence of jurisprudential principles that might
be articulated to justify the application of some of these rules. For example,
while the case law is replete with references to the proposition that habeas
corpus is available only where the defendant is entitled to immediate,
unconditional discharge from custody, no effort is made to explain why
this is the case. If a petitioner, for example, was sentenced to twenty years
and only ten years of incarceration were permitted by law, it makes little
sense to estop the petitioner from raising, and the reviewing court from
considering, the matter until the invalid term has become operable. No
consideration is given, in such a case, to the uncertainties and resultant
anxieties suffered by the defendant. No consideration is given, in such a
case, to the usual delays in bringing this matter to a speedy and correct
resolution and the resultant languishing of the petitioner in confinement
while the merits of the possible illegal confinement continue. Rather, the
rule is stated, but no justification for the rule is articulated.
II. CoRAm NOBIS
While the writ of habeas corpus originated to address circumstances
where a court had exceeded its jurisdiction in detaining a person, 0 the
common law writ of coram nobis (or writ of error coram nobis) developed
to correct erroneous factual determinations by lower courts. 21 Initially, the
writ of coram nobis evolved to fill a gap because trial courts were not
authorized to correct their own factual findings and reviewing courts were
limited to consideration of only alleged mistakes of law. 2 2 Thus, at common
law, coram nobis review of factual errors eventually complemented habeas
corpus consideration of legal errors. For example, the writ of coram nobis
was deemed an appropriate remedy to challenge the conviction of an insane
person, where the trial court had not properly recognized this fact, or to
challenge the guilty plea of an accused that had been entered out of fear
of mob violence, a fact that might also have eluded the trial court. 53
Accordingly, the writ of coram nobis, a post-conviction remedy with ancient
historical roots,2 4 became the foundation for a second major device to
250. W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 31, at 1011.
251. Id. at 1012-13.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. See People v. Touhy, 397 Ill. 19, 23-24, 72 N.E.2d 827, 830 (1947); Leighton, Post-
Conviction Remedies in Illinois Criminal Procedure, U. ILL. L. F. 540, 563 (1966).
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collaterally attack a final judgment of conviction in many state courts
where a petitioner had no opportunity of raising his claim at trial. 255
Meanwhile, at the federal level, the writ of coram nobis came to have
limited importance earlier in this century primarily because of the dramatic
expansion of federal habeas corpus which took cognizance of all federal
constitutional claims raised in both federal and state proceedings.2 6 Indeed,
several developments led some to believe that the writ of coram nobis had
been abolished in federal court.2" In 1954, however, the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Morgan,218 made clear that a federal
district court was empowered to issue the writ of coram nobis pursuant to
the federal All-Writs Act. 2 9 The Court, however, cautioned that
"[c]ontinuation of litigation after final judgment and exhaustion of waiver
of any statutory right of review should be allowed through this extraor-
dinary remedy only under circumstances compelling such action to achieve
justice" 260 where an error "of the most fundamental character" has oc-
curred. 261 Thus, where a petitioner demonstrated that his 1977 federal mail
fraud conviction was based on government proof that he defrauded persons
of nonproperty rights, 2 an interpretation of the statute the United States
Supreme Court discredited in a 1987 decision,2 3 the writ of error coram
nobis was employed by a district court to vacate his conviction. 264 In another
case, where a petitioner showed his mail fraud conviction was faulty because
the government had not proved a relationship between his use of the mail
and an alleged fraudulent scheme, the federal appellate court granted his
petition for coram nobis relief and reversed his conviction.265 And, where
another petitioner proved a co-defendant's conviction had been obtained
255. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 31, at 1013. See also Comments, Criminal Law
and Procedure-Remedies Available to Convicted Defendant When New Facts Are Found,
39 MICH. L. REV. 963, 966-70 (1941).
256. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 31, at 1013. The authors also pointed out that
the development of the motion for a new trial, which allowed the trial court to reconsider
its own factual findings, and the expanded availability of counsel, which made it more
difficult to excuse the defense's failure to bring a factual error to the attention of the trial
court, contributed to the demise of the writ of coram nobis. Id.
257. United States v. Mandel, 672 F. Supp. 864, 866 (D. Md. 1987) (citing 3 C. WRIGHT,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 592, at 428 (1982)).
258. 346 U.S. 502 (1954).
259. Id. at 511. Section 1651 of the All Writs Act states: "The Supreme Court and all
courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of
their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651(a) (1966).
260. 346 U.S. at 511.
261. Id. at 512.
262. United States v. Mandel, 672 F. Supp. 864 (D. Md. 1987).
263. McNally v. United States, 479 U.S. 1005 (1987) (federal mail fraud statute prohibits
defrauding people of their property interests but does not refer to depriving the citizenry of
the intangible right to good government).
264. Afandel, 672 F. Supp. at 878.
265. United States v. Travers, 514 F.2d 1171 (2d Cir. 1974).
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contrary to applicable law and reversed on appeal, a district court granted
the petitioner's request for corar nobis relief since his judgment of con-
viction had been obtained under the same circumstances as the co-defendant
and his failure to appeal on the same grounds as the co-defendant. 2 6' In
any event, it is not required that the petitioner be in custody 67 nor is it
required that he raise a constitutional irregularity2 6 before federal coram
nobis relief can be granted.
In Illinois, what may be fairly described as statutory coram nobis,
provides a defendant with a second basis for collaterally attacking a final
judgment of conviction. 6 9 The Illinois legislature abolished the writ and
codified this remedy in 1871.270 Following a number of statutory re-enact-
ments, coram nobis commonly became known as a section 72 motion, and
is now codified in the Code of Civil Procedure under chapter 110, section
2-1401.271 Changes in each enactment primarily were procedural and not
substantive, and, therefore, the purpose of this remedy and the grounds
for relief basically have remained the same. 72
The statute itself does not specify the requirements a petitioner must
meet before he is entitled to relief.2"1 The Illinois courts have interpreted
the statute and developed the law in this area. In developing this law, the
courts have relied on earlier case law addressing relief under the common
law writ and subsequent legislative enactments.274 The Illinois courts con-
266. United States v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 54 (W.D. Mo. 1970).
267. Chavez v. United States, 447 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1971).
268. United States v. Travers, 514 F.2d 1171 (2d Cir. 1974).
269. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1401 (1987).
270. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 154 (Gross 1871). See People v. Touhy, 397 Ill. 19, 23, 72
N.E.2d 827, 830 (1947); Leighton, supra note 254, at 563.
271. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 72 (1933); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. li0, para. 2-1401 (1987).
See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1401 (Smith-Hurd 1982), Joint Committee Comments,
at 602-04, Historical and Practice Notes, at 604-05.
272. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1401 (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT ch. 110, para. 2-1401
(Smith-Hurd 1982), Historical and Practice Notes, at 604-05; Leighton, supra note 253. at
563-64.
273. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1401 (1987). The pertinent part of this statute
reads as follows:
(a) Relief from final orders and judgments, after 30 days from the entry thereof,
may be had upon petition as provided in this Section. Writs of error coram nobis
and coram vobis, bills of review and bills in the nature of bills of review are
abolished. All relief heretofore obtainable and the grounds for such relief here-
tofore available, whether by any of the foregoing remedies or otherwise, shall be
available in every case, by proceedings hereunder, regardless of the nature of the
order or judgment from which relief is sought or of the proceedings in which it
was entered. There shall be no distinction between actions and other proceedings,
statutory or othewise, as to availability of relief, grounds for relief or the relief
obtainable.
Id.
274. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.1l0, para. 2-1401 (Smith-Hurd 1982), Historical and Practice
Notes, at 607.
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sistently have held that collateral attack relief from a conviction under
statutory coram nobis only is available if a petitioner shows: 1) that some
error of fact existed in the original trial proceedings that did not appear
on the record and was not known to the trial court; and, 2) that if such a
fact would have been known at the time of judgment, the judgment would
not have been entered. 2"7 Thus, coram nobis relief is not available to attack
errors of law committed by the trial court. 276 As a remedy, the courts will
vacate the original judgment of conviction if the petitioner successfully
makes the requisite showing.277
In determining whether to vacate a petitioner's judgment of conviction
under statutory coram nobis, the Illinois courts frequently begin their
analysis by reciting the maxim that this post-conviction remedy invokes a
court's equitable powers, which should prevent enforcement of a judgment
that is unfair or unjust. 278 In one case, the Illinois Supreme Court went so
far as to state that this maxim is a guiding principle in the administration
of statutory coram nobis. 279 However, similar to Illinois habeas corpus,
the grounds under which statutory coram nobis relief may be granted are
narrow, and such relief is rarely granted. The articulated grounds for relief
under statutory coran nobis are substantially more specific than those
required for obtaining habeas corpus relief. In addition, whereas the courts
under the Illinois Habeas Corpus Act simply find that most petitioners'
claims do not allege a jurisdictional defect in the original trial court
judgement or a subsequent event warranting release from custody, the
courts addressing claims under statutory coram nobis frequently hold that,
even though a petitioner's claim does allege an error of fact in the original
trial court proceeding that was unknown to the court at the time judgment
was entered, the petitioner still is not entitled to relief.
When reviewing the case law in this area, it is difficult to find the courts
invoking their equitable powers to ensure fairness and justice. Instead,
technicalities associated with statutory coram nobis frequently are used to
deny a petitioner relief. Furthermore, the courts have developed a number
of escape hatches to deny relief, even though the requisite error of fact is
alleged and proved. The courts often hold that: the factual error is not
material to the outcome of the case;280 the factual error merely constitutes
cumulative evidence and the petitioner would have been convicted regardless
275. People v. Berland, 74 111. 2d 286, 313-14, 385 N.E.2d 649, 661-62 (1978); People v.
Touhy, 397 II. 19, 25, 72 N.E.2d 827, 830 (1947); People v. Stewart, 66 I1. App. 3d 342,
347, 383 N.E.2d 1179, 1183 (1st Dist. 1978).
276. People v. Stevens, 127 I1. App. 2d 415, 419, 262 N.E.2d 286, 288 (1st Dist. 1970).
277. Stewart, 66 I1. App. 3d at 347, 383 N.E.2d at 1183.
278. Ostendorf v. International Harvester Co., 89 Ill. 2d 273, 285, 433 N.E.2d 253, 258
(1982); People v. Dugan, 401 I1. 442, 445-46, 82 N.E.2d 482, 484 (1948); People v. Alfano,
95 I1. App. 3d 1026, 1029-30, 420 N.E.2d 1114, 1117 (2d Dist. 1981).
279. Ostendorf, 89 III. 2d at 285, 433 N.E.2d at 258.
280. Stewart, 66 III. App. 3d 342, 383 N.E.2d 1179.
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of the error;28 ' or the petitioner was negligent or did not exercise due
diligence in not identifying the error prior to the entry of judgment.2a 2
Each of these reasons for denying relief under statutory coram nobis will
be explored following a discussion of the grounds for granting relief.
In any event, statutory coram nobis is a rarely sought post-conviction
remedy, perhaps because of the specificity of the grounds for relief and
the correspondingly infrequent occurrence of situations that constitute such
grounds. It should be noted, however, that the incidence of both Illinois
habeas corpus and statutory coram nobis petitions has decreased signifi-
cantly since the Illinois legislature enacted the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
in 1949, which is a more comprehensive collateral attack remedy addressing
the more frequent allegations of constitutional violations.
A. Grounds For Illinois Statutory Coram Nobis Relief
The Illinois courts have articulated four major factual errors entitling a
petitioner to a vacated judgment of conviction, provided that these facts
were unknown to the trial court during the original proceedings: 1) the
petitioner was incompetent during the trial proceedings or when entering
a plea or was an infant not properly represented; 2) the conviction was
obtained by duress or fraud; 3) the conviction was based on perjured
testimony; or, 4) newly discovered evidence would alter the outcome of
the proceedings. Because of the specificity of these areas, it is relatively
clear when a petitioner is or is not alleging appropriate grounds for relief
under statutory coram nobis. However, it should be remembered as pre-
viously noted, that the courts have formulated a number of reasons for
denying relief, even though the alleged factual error exists.
1. Incompetency and Infancy
If a petitioner was incompetent during the trial proceedings or when
entering a plea, or was an infant not properly represented and the trial
court was unaware of this fact, the Illinois courts consistently have held
that the requisite factual error exists and relief under statutory coram nobis
is appropriate. 283 The case law addressing this type of factual error, how-
ever, is neither plentiful nor particularly current. The courts also have
provided very little guidance in the way of governing principles, and, given
the nature of statutory coram nobis, the case law addressing this type of
alleged factual error (as is the case with the majority of factual errors
alleged under statutory coram nobis) has predictably focused on which
version of the facts the court will accept. Three key cases help illustrate
the operation of the incompetency and infancy principle.
281. People v. Berland, 74 Ill. 2d 286, 385 N.E.2d 649 (1978).
282. People v. Hammers, 48 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 363 N.E.2d 914 (4th Dist. 1977); In re
Pyles, 40 Ill. App. 3d 221, 351 N.E.2d 893 (3d Dist. 1976).
283. People v. Hinton, 52 Ill. 2d 239, 243, 287 N.E.2d 657, 659 (1972).
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First, in People v. McLain,284 the petitioner was convicted of armed
robbery. Following his arrest for this crime, but prior to arraignment, he
was held in the county jail where he tried to hang himself. He was adjudged
mentally ill in a civil commitment hearing and was committed to the state
hospital.2 5 Upon release two and one half months later, the petitioner was
arraigned, charged, and subsequently found guilty of armed robbery.286
Neither the petitioner nor his attorney requested a hearing to determine
his competency to stand trial and the judge was unaware that he had a
prior history of mental illness.287 The petitioner filed a petition for relief
under statutory coram nobis and alleged that if the court had been aware
of his prior mental illness, a bona fide doubt as to his sanity would have
been raised and a hearing ordered to determine his competency to stand
trial. 2" The court noted that this issue appropriately was raised under
statutory coram nobis. 219 The court considered the evidence which sup-
ported the petitioner's claim, vacated the conviction, and ordered a new
trial.291
Second, the petitioner in People v. Owens29' pled guilty to aggravated
battery and was sentenced to three years probation. No inquiry was made
into his mental competence at that time. One week after the petitioner pled
guilty and was sentenced, he was arrested for armed robbery and the court
ordered that he be examined to determine his mental fitness to stand trial
on the armed robbery charge.2 92 The psychiatric report indicated that the
petitioner was suffering from severe organic brain damage, acquired during
a head injury five years prior to his arrest. 293 The petitioner later alleged,
in his petition for relief under statutory coram nobis, that his conviction
and sentence for the first crime should be vacated because he was unable
to understand the nature of the proceedings against him and was unable
to assist in his defense at the time he entered his guilty plea. 294 The court
284. 37 Ill. 2d 173, 226 N.E.2d 21 (1967).
285. Id. at 175, 226 N.E.2d at 23.
286. Id. at 176-77, 226 N.E.2d at 23.
287. Id. at 177, 226 N.E.2d at 23.
288. Id. at 174-75, 226 N.E.2d at 22.
289. Id. at 178, 226 N.E.2d at 24.
290. Id. at 177-80, 226 N.E.2d at 24-25. See also People v. Harris, 113 I1. App. 3d 663,
447 N.E.2d 941 (1st Dist. 1983) (petitioner's sentence vacated pursuant to petition for relief
under statutory coram nobis because the trial court judge learned of petitioner's mental
illness for the first time at his sentencing hearing when his attorney informed the judge that
petitioner was not present because he had attempted suicide both before and after trial);
People v. Samman, 408 Il. 549, 97 N.E.2d 778 (1951) (petitioner entitled to relief under
statutory coram nobis because he was adjudged insane 10 years prior to present conviction,
insanity finding had not been changed by judicial process, and trial court was unaware of
the insanity finding when it entered the judgment of conviction for the current offense).
291. 57 Ill. App. 3d 157, 372 N.E.2d 857 (1st Dist. 1978).
292. Id. at 159, 372 N.E.2d at 858.
293. Id. at 159, 372 N.E.2d at 858-59.
294. Id. at 159, 372 N.E.2d at 859.
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noted that statutory coram nobis was the appropriate remedy for the
petitioner and ordered his aggravated battery conviction vacated. 95 The
court reasoned that the petitioner was found unfit to stand trial shortly
after he had entered a guilty plea on the earlier offense and that this
unfitness was due to brain disease suffered prior to either offense.296
Therefore, the trial court could not have been aware of the petitioner's
incompetency at the time it accepted his guilty plea on the aggravated
battery charge. If the court had been aware of this fact. it would have had
a bona fide doubt as to the petitioner's fitness to enter a plea.2 97
Finally, in Chmielewski v. March,98 a civil judgment was entered against
the petitioner for becoming intoxicated and assaulting the plaintiff. The
petitioner filed a petition under statutory coram nobis and alleged that a
judgment should not have been entered against him because he was a minor
and a guardian ad litem had not been appointed to assist him. 2" The court
agreed that relief under statutory coram nobis was the appropriate remedy
and vacated the petitioner's judgment.30 The court noted that, due to his
infancy, the trial court should have appointed a guardian ad litem to
protect the minor defendant's interests.310
2. Fraud and Duress
The Illinois courts have held that a petitioner who proves that his
conviction was obtained pursuant to duress or fraud is entitled to a vacated
judgment under statutory coram nobis, provided that the trial court was
unaware of the fact of the duress or fraud before the judgment was
entered. 02 However, the case law demonstrates that the fraud or duress
must be quite extreme before the courts will grant coram nobis relief. For
example, in People v. Dugan 3°' the petitioner alleged that his guilty plea
to burglary was a result of entrapment, deception, force, and duress. The
petitioner presented facts showing that the local police chief repeatedly
taunted him until he complied with the police chief's demand to commit a
burglary with suspects that the police chief was in the process of investi-
gating.104 Upon apprehension by the police, the petitioner was to sign a
295. Id. at 160, 372 N.E.2d at 859.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 162, 372 N.E.2d at 860. See also Schroers v. People, 399 Ill. 428, 78 N.E.2d
219 (1948) (petitioner entitled to a hearing on his motion for relief under statutory coram
nobis where he pled guilty to murder and evidence showed that due to his mental state at
the time the plea was entered, there was a doubt as to whether he was capable of entering
a plea, a fact unknown to the court at the time it accepted the plea).
298. 350 Ill. App. 379, 113 N.E.2d 69 (lst Dist. 1953).
299. Id. at 381, 113 N.E.2d at 70.
300. Id. at 382, 113 N.E.2d at 70.
301. Id.
302. Thompson v. People, 410 II. 256, 261, 102 N.E.2d 315, 318 (1951).
303. 401 111. 442, 82 N.E.2d 482 (1948).
304. Id. at 444, 82 N.E.2d at 483.
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confession and plead guilty to the burglary charge. In return, the state was
to agree to a sentence of probation for the petitioner. The petitioner
followed this plan but the state did not agree to probation and he was
sentenced to prison101 The trial court dismissed the petitioner's coram
nobis petition without a hearing.30 The Illinois Supreme Court, however,
found that a conviction actually based on duress or fraud appropriately
should be vacated under coram nobis and held that this petitioner had
made out a prima facie case of fraud and was entitled to a hearing where
the trial court would address his request for relief.30 7
Similarly, in Thompson v. People,"0 8 the petitioner was convicted of
keeping a house of ill fame and subsequently sought coram nobis relief.
The petitioner alleged that after his trial he discovered that the two witnesses
he wished subpoenaed were not served because the local sheriff and state's
attorney intentionally had attempted to suppress evidence favorable to him.
The petitioner presented facts that the sheriff and state's attorney not only
did not serve the subpoenas, but also threatened the witnesses and told
them to leave town until the trial was completed.109 Accordingly, the coram
nobis petition alleged that the petitioner was convicted pursuant to fraud
and duress by the sheriff and state's attorney.310 The Illinois Supreme Court
stated that the allegations were properly reviewable under statutory coram
nobis and held that the petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing.,"
In People v. Hammond,"2 however, the Illinois appellate court held that
the petitioner's statutory coram nobis claim that his conspiracy conviction
was obtained by fraud and duress did not rise to a level warranting relief., 3
The petitioner presented facts that the state's attorney's intentional and
deliberate violations of court discovery orders resulted in his conviction
which was thereby obtained through fraud and duress.2 4 The state's at-
torney repeatedly had failed to inform the petitioner of the whereabouts
of the prosecution's key witness. It also was alleged that, because of the
prosecutor's delays in bringing this matter to trial, two defense witnesses
had died and one had left the state. The petitioner discovered after his
trial that the state's attorney had intentionally withheld information about
the state's key witness. The petitioner claimed that this delayed his trial to
his prejudice and prevented him from interviewing the state witness prior
to trial which subsequently hampered his impeachment efforts of this
305. Id. at 445, 82 N.E.2d at 483-84.
306. Id. at 445, 82 N.E.2d at 484.
307. Id. at 447, 82 N.E.2d at 484-85.
308. 410 Il1. 256, 102 N.E.2d 315 (1951).
309. Id. at 258-59, 102 N.E.2d at 317.
310. Id. at 259, 102 N.E.2d at 317.
311. Id. at 263, 102 N.E.2d at 318-19.
312. 105 111. App. 3d 175, 433 N.E.2d 1329 (4th Dist. 1982).
313. Id. at 186, 433 N.E.2d at 1333-36.
314. Id. at 182, 433 N.E.2d at 1332-33.
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witness during the trial.31 The court noted that the petitioner's claim
appropriately was brought under statutory coram nobis. 16 The court,
however, held that, because the petitioner had sufficient information about
the state's witness for impeachment purposes, the alleged fraud did not
necessarily cause his conviction.1 7 The court cited Thompson and a number
of similar cases and stated that in those cases there was a much greater
threat of conviction pursuant to the alleged fraud than in this case.3 '
Furthermore, it stated that there was nothing in the record to support the
defendant's claim that the loss of the three defense witnesses undermined
his right to a fair trial. Accordingly, the court held that the petitioner was
not entitled to coram nobis relief.3 19
3. Perjury
Early Illinois case law held that the existence of perjured testimony at
trial did not constitute grounds for relief under statutory coram nobis. For
example, in People v. Touhy,320 the petitioner was convicted of kidnapping
and after judgment was entered he learned that the state's principal witness
admitted to falsely identifying him as the kidnapper. He petitioned for
coram nobis relief and the Illinois Supreme Court denied his petition,
holding that the ancient writ of error coram nobis, and thus, its statutory
counterpart, were not intended to address a claim of a conviction based
on perjured testimony.32'
More recently, however, the courts have determined that a conviction
based on perjured testimony may properly be vacated under statutory coram
nobis. The courts, however, have not provided a rationale for either
rejecting or accepting the existence of perjured testimony as grounds for
coram nobis relief. In People v. Alfano,122 for example, the petitioner was
convicted of arson and arson with intent to defraud an insurer. He peti-
tioned for coram nobis relief and alleged that the state's expert witness
had testified falsely as to his expertise and qualifications.3 3 The court noted
that statutory coram nobis affords a remedy to obtain relief from a
conviction based on perjured testimony, even if the state was unaware that
the testimony was false. 24 The court held that the trial court should not
have dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing, and vacated
the judgment of conviction. 325
315. Id. at 182, 433 N.E.2d at 1330-32.
316. Id. at 183, 433 N.E.2d at 1332-34.
317. Id. at 183, 433 N.E.2d at 1335.
318. Id. at 183, 433 N.E.2d at 1335.
319. Id. at 184, 433 N.E.2d at 1335-36.
320. 397 Ill. 19, 72 N.E.2d 827 (1947).
321. Id. at 25, 28, 72 N.E.2d at 831, 832.
322. 95 Il1. App. 3d 1026, 420 N.E.2d 1114 (2d Dist. 1981).
323. Id. at 1028-29, 420 N.E.2d at 1116.
324. Id. at 1030, 420 N.E.2d at 1118.
325. Id. at 1027, 420 N.E.2d at 1119.
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Similarly, in People v. Banks,326 the petitioner was convicted of murder
and sought coram nobis relief when he discovered information that sug-
gested that a state's witness had given perjured testimony at his trial
regarding the weapon used to kill the victim. The reviewing court stated
that the petitioner's claim was properly brought under statutory coram
nobis.2 17 The court vacated the petitioner's judgment of conviction and
held that the trial court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing to
address the petitioner's alleged factual errors.3 28
Nonetheless, in People v. Dotson,3 29 the court held that the petitioner
was not entitled to coram nobis relief, even though the petition alleging a
conviction based on perjured testimony appropriately was brought under
statutory coram nobis.330 The petitioner was convicted of aggravated kid-
napping and rape and the victim later recanted her testimony and admitted
to giving perjured testimony at trial. In denying the petitioner's relief, the
court reasoned that recanted testimony inherently is unreliable and the
petitioner had not sufficiently corroborated the victim's admission with
additional evidence.3"' Thus, although an allegation of perjured testimony
may be properly brought under statutory coram nobis, when the claim is
supported by a confession of perjury, the petitioner must sustain a higher
burden of proof and produce additional evidence to support his claim
before relief under statutory coram nobis will be granted.
4. Newly Discovered Evidence
Similar to the early Illinois case law addressing coram nobis relief for a
conviction allegedly based on perjured testimony, until recently, the courts
had held that the existence of evidence discovered following a judgment
of conviction that arguably would have altered the outcome of the trial is
not appropriately considered under statutory coram nobis. While the ma-
jority of coram nobis petitions alleged that newly discovered evidence must
warrant a vacated judgment of conviction, the reviewing courts consistently
had held that this fact was not sufficient for relief.332 Other than pointing
to the fact that newly discovered evidence was not a basis for relief under
326. 121 II. App. 3d 279, 459 N.E.2d 992 (1st Dist. 1981).
327. Id. at 287, 459 N.E.2d at 998.
328. Id. at 289, 459 N.E.2d at 1000.
329. 163 Ill. App. 3d 419, 516 N.E.2d 718 (1st Dist. 1987).
330. Id. at 426, 516 N.E.2d at 719, 722.
331. Id. at 424-25, 516 N.E.2d at 721-22.
332. People v. Colletti, 48 Ill. 2d 135, 268 N.E.2d 397 (1971); Williams v. People, 31 111.
2d 516, 202 N.E.2d 468 (1964); People v. Touhy, 397 I1. 19, 72 N.E.2d 827 (1947); People
v. Griswold, 89 Il1. App. 3d 661, 411 N.E.2d 1224 (3d Dist. 1980); People v. Hammers, 48
Ill. App. 3d 1023, 363 N.E.2d 914 (4th Dist. 1977); People v. Heidelberg, 33 Il1. App. 3d
574, 338 N.E.2d 56 (3d Dist. 1975); People v. Freeman, 26 I1. App. 3d 443, 326 N.E.2d
207 (Ist Dist. 1974).
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the common law writ of error coram nobis, 3" the courts provided no
rationale for this decision.
Then, in its 1982 decision in Ostendorf v. International Harvester Com-
pany,33 4 the Illinois Supreme Court reversed its previous rulings and held
that the existence of newly discovered evidence can be the basis for relief
under statutory coram nobis.33s The only rationale given by the court for
the reversal was that, in all of the earlier cases, the courts never explicitly
stated that newly discovered evidence could not be the basis for coram
nobis relief, but that relief was denied in those cases because the petitioner
had not exercised due diligence in discovering the evidence earlier or the
new evidence was not material to the outcome of those cases. 336
Interestingly, the case most frequently cited by the courts addressing
coram nobis petitions which raise this issue, People v. Touhy, specifically
states that newly discovered evidence is not a basis for relief. Moreover,
neither the petitioner's due diligence nor the materiality of the evidence
was at issue in that case.337 Given the Illinois courts' lack of rationale for
denying newly discovered evidence as grounds for relief, and the Illinois
Supreme Court's lack of rationale for accepting newly discovered evidence
as grounds for relief and its inaccurate reading of earlier case law, the
permanence of the Ostendorf holding is questionable. Furthermore, it is
surprising that the Illinois Supreme Court departed from years of precedent
with so little analysis.
B. Materiality, Cumulative Evidence,
Negligence, And Due Diligence
Coram nobis relief frequently is unavailable as a collateral attack remedy
to petitioners, even if a petitioner proves the existence of a factual error
such as incompetency, duress, fraud, perjured testimony, or newly discov-
ered evidence, and that this error was unknown to the court at the time
judgment was entered. In addition to requiring that a coram nobis petition
allege factual error within one of the four subject matter categories outlined
above, the Illinois courts also have created two other requirements: 1) the
factual error in question must be a fact that could have altered the outcome
of the trial; and, 2) the petitioner's own negligence must not be the reason
that this factual error was not raised prior to the entry of judgment.",
333. Touhy, 397 Ill. at 28, 72 N.E.2d at 830-31.
334. 89 I1. 2d 272, 433 N.E.2d 253 (1982).
335. Id. at 283-84, 433 N.E.2d at 257-58.
336. Id. at 283, 433 N.E.2d at 257-58.
337. 397 I1. 19, 28, 72 N.E.2d 827, 830-31. See also People v. Freeman, 26 I1. App. 3d
443, 447, 326 N.E.2d 207, 210 (1st Dist. 1974) (due diligence and materiality not at issue
and the court noted that the rule is that "newly discoverd evidence cannot be the basis for
relief under [statutory coram nobisl").
338. People v. Hammond, 105 I1. App. 3d 175, 433 N.E.2d 1329 (4th Dist. 1982); People
v. Stewart, 66 11. App. 3d 342, 383 N.E.2d 1179 (1st Dist. 1978).
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Although these requirements are a logical extension of the purpose of
statutory coram nobis and are of practical importance, the courts all too
frequently appear to use the requirements as an escape hatch for denying
what otherwise would be proper coram nobis relief. Even when the mate-
riality of the evidence presented and the petitioner's due diligence in
obtaining the evidence are at issue in a case, and the court nonetheless
grants relief, it is unclear as to why the court decided as it did when
compared to similar cases where the courts denied relief. In short, there
does not appear to be a common logic or approach that flows through the
case law and explains the courts' decisions.
1. Materiality and Cumulative Evidence
The requirement that the alleged factual error must be a fact that could
have prevented the court from entering a judgment of conviction has been
interpreted as meaning that the fact must be material to the outcome of
the trial and must not merely constitute cumulative evidence. The absence
of proof addressing this requirement is a common defect and one that the
state will often focus on in its response to a petition for coram nobis relief.
Correspondingly, it is the most frequent basis upon which the courts deny
relief. For example, in People v. Hammond,339 the petitioner located a
defense witness after the judgment of conviction was entered and he had
been unable to locate the witness prior to that time. He sought coram
nobis relief and alleged that this witness' testimony would have prevented
the judgment of conviction from being entered against him. The witness
was to offer testimony that would have impeached the credibility of the
prosecution's principal witness. 40 The court denied the petitioner coram
nobis relief and held that the new defense witness' testimony would not
have been material to the outcome of the case, but would have merely
constituted cumulative evidence.3 4' The court found that the testimony of
the prosecution's principal witness had been sufficiently impeached at trial
through cross-examination.342
Another example of the cumulative evidence doctrine is found in People
v. Berland.343 In that case, the petitioner was convicted of arson with intent
to defraud an insurer. He sought coram nobis relief alleging that after the
judgment of his conviction was entered, he became aware that the prose-
cution's witnesses had made statements prior to trial that were inconsistent
with their trial testimony. He further alleged that the identification pro-
cedures used prior to trial by the state were conducted incorrectly and that
all of these facts, had they been known at the time of trial, would have
339. 105 Ill. App. 3d 175, 433 N.E.2d 1329 (4th Dist. 1982).
340. Id. at 186, 433 N.E.2d at 1336.
341. Id. at 186, 433 N.E.2d at 1337.
342. Id.
343. 74 111. 2d 286, 385 N.E.2d 649 (1979).
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prevented the judgment of conviction from being entered against him.314
The court, however, disagreed and held that the petitioner was not entitled
to coram nobis relief because the alleged factual errors merely constituted
cumulative evidence and would not have altered the outcome of the trial.3 4'
Finally, in People v. Stewart,346 the petitioner was convicted of armed
robbery and sought coram nobis relief after he became aware of facts that
showed that his attorney planned the robbery and instructed the co-defen-
dant to leave town. The petitioner argued that the attorney's actions
prevented the co-defendant from testifying at trial as to the petitioner's
innocence.34 7 The court denied the petitioner coram nobis relief and held
that, even if the alleged factual errors were true, this would not have
altered the outcome of the trial because eyewitnesses had positively iden-
tified the petitioner.3 48
2. Due Diligence and Negligence
Even if a coram nobis petitioner proves the existence of a factual error
that was unknown to the court prior to the entry of a judgment, and even
if this factual error would have altered the outcome of the trial and not
merely constituted cumulative evidence, the petitioner still may be denied
a vacated judgment under statutory coram nobis. In addition to meeting
the requirements previously discussed, a petitioner must show that he used
due diligence in determining the existence of a factual error prior to the
entry of the judgment and that he was not negligent in either failing to
discover the error earlier or in bringing the error to the court's attention.
The cases, however, present some disagreement as to when a lawyer's
negligence should be imputed to a coram nobis petitioner.
For example, in People v. Banks,149 the petitioner sought coram nobis
relief and alleged that, following his conviction for murder, he became
aware that a state's witness had falsely testified at trial regarding the
murder weapon. He learned of this fact through a letter sent to his attorney
by a county sheriff who discussed a conversation that he had had with the
344. Id. at 315, 385 N.E.2d at 662-63.
345. Id. at 316, 385 N.E.2d at 663.
346. 66 I1. App. 3d 342, 383 N.E.2d 1179 (1st Dist. 1978).
347. Id. at 345, 383 N.E.2d at 1182.
348. Id. at 347, 383 N.E.2d at 1184. See also People v. Wade, 51 Ill. App. 3d 721, 366
N.E.2d 528 (5th Dist. 1977) (petitioner convicted of murder was not entitled to coram nobis
relief where state pursued a "single gunman" theory and co-defendant was subsequently
convicted of the murder; co-defendant's conviction constituted cumulative evidence because
co-defendant testified as a witness at petitioner's trial in support of petitioner); In re Pyles,
40 I11. App. 3d 221, 351 N.E.2d 893 (3d Dist. 1976) (physician's deposition testimony, not
pursued at trial, that evidence of minor's injuries may have been due to circumstances other
than parental neglect did not entitle petitioner to coram nobis relief because this information
was not material to the outcome of the case in light of other evidence supporting court's
finding of parental neglect).
349. 121 Ill. App. 3d 279, 459 N.E.2d 992 (lst Dist. 1984).
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state's witness immediately following the murder. The content of this
conversation was contradictory to the testimony later given by this witness
at trial." '0 The sheriff sent the letter to the petitioner's attorney subsequent
to reading an article about the case in a newspaper. The trial court denied
the petitioner coram nobis relief, stating that the petitioner's attorney did
not exercise due diligence and could have discovered the information prior
to entry of the judgment."' The appellate court vacated the petitioner's
conviction and held that the attorney had no way of knowing that the
sheriff existed and possessed information pertinent to the case.352 The court
noted that even the most diligent attorney could not have discovered this
information prior to trial."' However, the court implied that had the
attorney been negligent, the petitioner's coram nobis relief would have
been properly denied.
Even more to the point is People v. Hammers,"14 where the petitioner
was convicted of murder and later alleged, in his coram nobis petition,
that he had obtained evidence which would show that another person
committed the murder. This evidence consisted of admissions by the other
person to three people that he had committed the murder.35 The trial court
denied the petitioner coram nobis relief and stated that the petitioner had
been negligent in not presenting at trial the defense that another person
murdered the victim,3 -6 although there was some evidence that it was the
petitioner's attorney who had not presented the defense, contrary to the
petitioner's wishes."'
However, in People v. McManus,18 the court granted the petitioner
coram nobis relief when it was shown that the petitioner's attorney had
been negligent in not pursuing an appeal of the petitioner's delivery of
cocaine conviction.5 9 Notice of appeal had been filed but was dismissed
when the petitioner and his attorney failed to attend the scheduled hearing.
The petitioner later learned that his attorney had not pursued the appeal,
even though he told the petitioner that he had.360 The appellate court held
that the petitioner was entitled to coram nobis relief because, if these facts
had been known to the court, it would not have entered an order dismissing
350. Id. at 288, 459 N.E.2d at 993, 997-98.
351. Id. at 288, 459 N.E.2d at 999.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. 48 II. App. 3d 1023, 363 N.E.2d 914 (4th Dist. 1977).
355. Id. at 1026-27, 363 N.E.2d at 916-17.
356. Id. at 1025, 363 N.E.2d at 915-16.
357. Id. at 1028, 363 N.E.2d at 918. See also In Re Pyles, 40 Iil. App. 3d 221, 351 N.E.2d
893 (3d Dist. 1976) (physician's deposition testimony was not introduced at trial and contra-
dicted the physician's trial testimony; petitioner not entitled to coram nobis relief because
this contradictory testimony could have been introduced at trial through cross-examination).
358. 66 Il1. App. 3d 986, 384 N.E.2d 568 (3d Dist. 1978).
359. Id. at 990-91, 384 N.E.2d at 572-73.
360. Id. at 987, 384 N.E.2d at 570.
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the appeal. 36' The court reasoned that the petitioner had been deprived of
his right to appeal because of circumstances beyond his control and, even
though his attorney was at fault, the petitioner himself was not at fault. 62
C. Procedural Barriers To
Illinois Statutory Coram Nobis Relief
Illinois statutory coram nobis is a narrow collateral attack remedy that
only is available to an individual who shows that an error of fact existed
in the original trial proceedings that did not appear on the record and was
not known to the trial court judge, and that the judgment of conviction
would not have been entered if this error of fact had been known. 63 Thus,
statutory coram nobis is not available to correct errors of law.'" Nor is
coram nobis available to reconsider a petitioner's guilt or innocence and,
thus, as with all collateral attack remedies, it is not a substitute for direct
appeal." 5 A coram nobis petition and a direct appeal, therefore, are not
conflicting avenues of relief and both can proceed simultaneously, or one
avenue can follow the other. 66 Coram nobis relief is limited, however, by
the doctrines of waiver and res judicata. Statutory coram nobis is not
available to review claims which could have been presented to the trial
court or on direct appeal, and such claims which might have been raised,
but were not, are deemed waived. 67 In addition, a petitioner is precluded
from raising in a coram nobis petition errors of fact previously raised and
decided at trial or at other proceedings. 6
Although statutory coram nobis is civil in nature, it is available to attack
criminal judgments of convictions. 369 A coram nobis petition begins a new
civil action and is not a continuation of the original case. 70 Therefore, a
finding and judgment are entered independent of the original judgment of
conviction, and the coram nobis finding does not affect enforcement of
the original judgment of conviction.' 7' Because statutory coram nobis
proceedings are civil in character, a petitioner must prove his allegations
361. Id. at 988-89, 384 N.E.2d at 571.
362. Id. at 990-91, 384 N.E.2d at 572.
363. People v. Berland, 74 Ill. 2d 286, 313-14, 385 N.E.2d 649, 661-62 (1978); People v.
Touhy, 397 11. 19, 24, 72 N.E.2d 827, 830 (1947); People v. StewarE, 66 Ill. App. 3d 342,
347, 383 N.E.2d 1179, 1183 (1st Dist. 1983).
364. Berland, 74 Ill. 2d at 314-15, 385 N.E.2d at 662; People v. Rave, 392 Ill. 435, 439,
65 N.E.2d 23, 26 (1946).
365. Berland, 74 11. 2d at 314, 385 N.E.2d at 662.
366. People v. Alfano, 95 11. App. 3d 1026, 1030, 420 N.E.2d 1114, 1117 (2d Dist. 1981).
367. People v. Mamolella, 42 Ill. 2d 69, 72, 245 N.E.2d 485, 486 (1969).
368. Berland, 74 Il1. 2d at 314-15, 385 N.E.2d at 662.
369. People v. Crooks, 326 Ill. 266, 280, 157 N.E. 218, 223 (1927).
370. IL.. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1401(b) (1987); People v. Toluhy, 397 Il. 19, 25, 72
N.E.2d 827, 831 (1947).
371. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1401 (d) (1987).
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by a preponderance of the evidence 72 and either the petitioner or the state
may appeal the court's finding. 3"
Statutory coram nobis requires that a petition be supported and accom-
panied by affidavits. 74 The Illinois Supreme Court has held that, where
supporting and opposing affidavits controvert one another, an evidentiary
hearing must be held to determine whether coram nobis relief is war-
ranted.-7 ' The court also has noted that, in the absence of such contradictory
affidavits, a judgment may be entered on the basis of the affidavits without
an evidentiary hearing. 76 However, no other Illinois precedents discuss
whether and when a coram nobis petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary
hearing to determine if relief is warranted.
A coram nobis petition can attack either a misdemeanor or a felony
conviction, and custody is not a prerequisite for relief.377 In addition, there
is no obligation to exhaust any other possible remedy.378 The Illinois courts
have held that an incorrectly labelled coram nobis petition, if it contains
allegations that are cognizable under the Illinois Habeas Corpus Act or
Post-Conviction Hearing Act, should be addressed under the more appro-
priate collateral attack remedy.379
Statutory coram nobis requires that a petition be filed within two years
of the original judgment of conviction.380 The statute also notes that legal
disability, duress, or fraudulent concealment of evidence will toll the two
year statute of limitations. 8 The application of this two year limitation
period is the procedural issue most frequently addressed by a reviewing
court after a petitioner's request for coram nobis relief has been denied at
the trial level.
The Illinois Supreme Court consistently has held that imprisonment does
not constitute legal disability or duress. 8 2 Therefore, an imprisoned peti-
tioner is not entitled to an extension of the two year period equal to the
time of incarceration. 33 Thus, barring the existence of fraudulent conceal-
ment or duress, an imprisoned petitioner must file a coram nobis petition
372. People v. Stewart, 66 I11. App. 3d 342, 352, 383 N.E.2d 1179, 1187 (lst Dist. 1978).
373. People v. Touhy, 397 111. 19, 26, 72 N.E.2d 827, 831 (1947).
374. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1401(b) (1987).
375. Ostendorf v. International Harvester Co., 89 Il. 2d 273, 285-86, 433 N.E.2d 253,
259 (1982).
376. Id.
377. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1401 (1987).
378. Id.
379. People v. Logan, 49 11. App. 3d 787, 364 N.E.2d 713 (4th Dist. 1977); People v.
Carbona, 53 !11. App. 3d 1022, 369 N.E.2d 197 (1st Dist. 1977).
380. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1401(c) (1987).
381. Id.
382. Williams v. People, 31 I11. 2d 516, 517, 202 N.E.2d 468, 469 (1964); Morgan v.
People, 16 II!. 2d 374, 378, 158 N.E.2d 24, 26 (1959); People v. Rave, 392 II1. 435, 444, 65
N.E.2d 23, 28 (1946).
383. Williams, 31 111. 2d at 517, 202 N.E.2d at 469; Morgan, 16 II. 2d at 378, 158 N.E.2d
at 26; Rave, 392 I11. at 444, 65 N.E.2d at 28.
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within two years of the original judgment of conviction for the petition to
be considered by the Illinois courts.
The two year statutory period is suspended, however, where it is deter-
mined that a petitioner was incompetent to stand trial or to enter a plea. 8 '
The Illinois Supreme Court has held that incompetency constitutes a legal
disability within the meaning of statutory coram nobis and that the statute
of limitations will not begin to run until a petitioner is adjudged compe-
tent."'5
D. Critical Summary
Similar to Illinois habeas corpus, statutory coram nobis presents several
barriers to a petitioner who seeks collateral review of a final judgment of
conviction. First, the grounds for relief under statutory coram nobis not
only are extremely narrow, but the Illinois courts' interpretation of earlier
case law regarding these grounds fails to provide a petitioner with consis-
tency, guidance, or comfort. The case law addressing a petitioner's claim
that he was incompetent during the trial proceedings or when entering a
plea, or was a minor not properly represented, is scarce and not current.
Furthermore, for a petitioner to gain relief because his conviction was
obtained pursuant to duress or fraud, he must show that the fraud or
duress was extreme and obvious. In addition, the case law addressing issues
of perjured testimony or newly discovered evidence is inconsistent, and the
analysis and rationale are superficial. Second, the courts all too frequently
resort to the escape hatches of materiality and due diligence and deny a
petitioner relief, even when a factual error existed that was unknown to
the trial court at the time judgment was entered.
Statutory coram nobis does present a more principled method of ana-
lyzing whether collateral relief is warranted when compared to the state
habeas corpus vehicle. Nonetheless, statutory coram nobis has its limita-
tions. In addition to the multiple substantive barriers to relief, the Illinois
courts' coram nobis jurisprudence presents several conceptual and proce-
dural shortcomings. First, the courts state that a guiding premise in their
application of statutory coram nobis is that their equitable powers should
be invoked to prevent enforcement of a judgment of conviction that is
unfair or unjust. While no one can quarrel with this general assertion, the
case law provides no further refinement of, or principles useful in assessing,
what factual errors invariably will render a judgment unfair or unjust. For
instance, one principle that might be articulated to cover all petitions of
this nature is that the equitable powers of the court will be exercised
whenever a factual error occurred which casts some doubt on whether the
petitioner committed the crime in question or, alternatively, whenever such
384. People v. Samman, 408 III. 549, 97 N.E.2d 778 (1951); Schroers v. People, 399 Ill.
428, 435, 78 N.E.2d 219, 223 (1948).
385. Schroers v. People, 399 I11. 428, 78 N.E.2d 219 (1948).
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error might have altered the outcome of the proceeding. While such a
statement is at the heart of many of the coram nobis decisions, this concept
is not apparent in various other instances. To illustrate, if a petitioner
seeking coram nobis relief presents newly discovered evidence in circum-
stances where he was inept in not raising the evidence in the trial court
prior to entry of the judgment of conviction, he will be denied relief
because of his failure to employ due diligence even though the evidence in
question might have altered the outcome of the trial court proceedings. In
this situation, it is questionable as to whether a just or fair result has been
achieved given the nature of the penal sanction. If correct resolution of
the fact of guilt or innocence is the primary focus of these inquiries,
dismissing a petitioner's claim due to his negligence in not raising it earlier
appears to elevate form over substance.
An additional criticism that arises from the courts' routine recital that
equitable relief will be afforded petitioners where "unjust or unfair"
judgments have been entered, is that such a statement, which is frequently
dicta, may raise false hopes in the minds of unrepresented inmates and
inexperienced attorneys. Considering the rarity with which these petitions
for relief are granted, it might be appropriate for the courts to refer to
this collateral remedy as an "extraordinary remedy" that is only available
where an error of "the most fundamental character" has occurred, con-
sistent with the manner in which the federal courts characterize the federal
coram nobis protection. 8 6
Moreover, in certain instances, the courts considering coram nobis pe-
titions inappropriately have based their decisions on only those facts existent
in the trial court record and denied hearings where new facts outside the
record might have been raised, even though these facts might have altered
the outcome of the cases. In People v. Hammond, 87 for example, the court
dismissed without a hearing the petitioner's claims that possible intentional
delays by the state resulted in the loss of three defense witnesses, two who
died and one who left the state.38 8 Even though the latter witness was
available later to testify at an evidentiary hearing,38 9 the petition was
dismissed. The court asserted that the petitioner's claim-that the prose-
cutor's intentional delays contributed to the loss of the witness-was noth-
ing more than speculation.190 The court held that nothing in the trial court
record supported these claims. 39'
If the thrust of coram nobis protection is to have any meaning, matter
outside the trial court record must be considered. And the only way in
386. See supra notes 258-61 and accompanying text.
387. 105 Il. App. 3d 175, 433 N.E.2d 1329 (4th Dist. 1982). See supra notes 312-19, 339-
42 and accompanying text.
388. 105 Ill. App. 3d at 182, 433 N.E.2d at 1333-34.
389. Id. at 178, 433 N.E.2d at 1331.
390. Id. at 182, 433 N.E.2d at 1334.
391. Id.
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which matter outside the trial court record can be considered in conjunction
with the petition for coram nobis relief is to afford the petitioner an
opportunity to make a record at an evidentiary hearing involving the claim
for collateral relief. The failure to provide a hearing gives the appellate
court an opportunity to consider whether the petitioner's claims truly are
speculative or, alternatively, are claims which raise serious questions about
the petitioner's guilt.
A perusal of the coram nobis case law, as illustrated by Hammond and
People v. Dotson, 9- reveals that as a practical matter, the petitioned court
normally assumes the fact finding process at the trial court level was
reliable. Returning to the assertion that well defined principles governing
coram nobis case law are non-existent, it must be posited that if the
petitioned courts normally are relying on the integrity of the trial court's
factual determination, the courts should articulate this reality in their
decisions by stating that there exists a legal presumption of factual cor-
rectness in the trial court proceedings.
Finally, the coram nobis case law reflects inconsistent applications of
certain doctrines. For instance, in People v. Hammers, 393 the petitioner
was denied coram nobis relief because of his negligence in bringing to the
attention of the trial court the admission of a person to three witnesses
that this person, rather than the petitioner, actually had committed the
crime in question. This negligence was imputed to the petitioner personally
even though there existed some evidence that his attorney had not presented
this defense at trial, contrary to the petitioner's wishes. Meanwhile, in
People v. McManus,9 the court granted coram nobis relief after concluding
that the petitioner's failure to appeal was attributable to the petitioner's
attorney and not to the petitioner personally. In both cases, the omissions
were the fault or decision of the attorney, but in one case fault was imputed
to the petitioner and, in the other, to the attorney. Thus, in connection
with the due diligence/negligence barrier to coram nobis relief, it remains
unclear as to whether or not a petitioner is vicariously responsible for his
attorney's failure to properly raise an issue.
III. POST-CONVICTION H.AUIN AcT
The Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides the third method for collat-
erally attacking a final judgment of conviction in the Illinois courts. 3"9 This
Act is the most broad and comprehensive of the Illinois collateral attack
392. 99 111. App. 3d 117, 424 N.E.2d 1319 (1st Dist. 1981). See supra notes 329-31 and
accompanying text.
393. 48 II. App. 3d 1023, 363 N.E.2d 914 (4th Dist. 1977). See .upra notes 354-57 and
accompanying text.
394. 66 II1. App. 3d 986, 384 N.E.2d 568 (3d Dist. 1978). See rupra notes 358-62 and
accompanying text.
395. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 122-1 to -8 (1987).
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remedies and is designed to provide relief to an individual who shows that
his state or federal constitutional rights were substantially violated during
the proceedings which resulted in his conviction.196
There are two explanations as to why this collateral attack remedy is
more comprehensive than either statutory habeas corpus or statutory coram
nobis. First, the purpose of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act is to address
denials of state or federal constitutional rights . 97 The grounds for relief,
therefore, are more broad-based than either the jurisdictional defects or
subsequent events addressed by habeas corpus or the factual errors ad-
dressed by coram nobis. In addition, the Illinois courts' interpretation and
application of statutory habeas corpus and statutory coram nobis make
the grounds for relief under those two collateral attack remedies even more
narrow than an initial reading of either act might suggest. On the other
hand, constitutional rights violations encompass a wider array of factual
events and legal issues. Furthermore, there is a more uniform consensus
in federal and state courts as to what events constitute such violations and,
therefore, the Illinois courts are not able to limit the scope of this mode
of relief to the same degree as they do the statutory coram nobis and
habeas corpus doctrines.
Second, the Post-Conviction Hearing Act was enacted by the Illinois
legislature in 1949 specifically to address the inadequacies in the nature
and application of both statutory habeas corpus and statutory coram
nobis. ' " Prior to this time, it had become increasingly apparent that these
two Illinois post-conviction remedies were extremely limited, not only in
terms of their grounds for relief, but also in terms of the Illinois courts'
consistent resorts to the technical trappings of each remedy to deny peti-
tioners relief. 99 Consequently, petitioners did not have an adequate post-
conviction procedure through which to present claims of constitutional
rights violations.400 Petitioners were left with only federal habeas corpus
as the method by which to pursue such claims. 40 1 This solution, however,
was both inadequate and practically unworkable. The federal district courts
became saturated with an increasing number of petitions for federal habeas
corpus relief, all requesting review of state court convictions. 4 2 In addition,
396. See id. at para. 122-1.
397. See id.
398. See People v. Slaughter, 39 Ill. 2d 278, 283-84, 235 N.E.2d 566, 568-69 (1968);
Leighton, supra note 254, at 566-70; Comment, Practice and Procedure Under the Illinois
Post-Conviction Hearing Act, 8 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 129, 129-30 (1974) [hereinafter
Comment, Practice and Procedure].
399. Slaughter, 39 I1. 2d at 283-84, 235 N.E.2d at 568-69; Leighton, supra note 254, at
568-70.
400. Leighton, supra note 254, at 567. See Slaughter, 39 Ill. 2d at 284, 235 N.E.2d at 569.
401. Leighton, supra note 254, at 567-68; Comment, Practice and Procedure, supra note
398, at 129.
402. Slaughter, 39 I1. 2d at 283, 235 N.E.2d at 568; Leighton, supra note 254, at 567;
Comment, Practice and Procedure, supra note 398, at 129.
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federal court jurisdiction to review these federal habeas corpus petitions is
limited to cases where state court remedies have been exhausted.403 This
jurisdictional requirement resulted in the federal courts more closely ex-
amining the availability and adequacy of state court remedies.' °
In 1947, Justice Rutledge noted the ineffectiveness and technical trappings
of the Illinois post-conviction remedies in his concurring opinion in Marino
v. Ragen.40s The petitioner in Marino filed for federal habeas corpus relief
and alleged a variety of constitutional violations in the trial court proceed-
ing that resulted in his murder conviction. Justice Rutledge wrote a forceful
concurrence, in which he chastised the Illinois courts and legislature for
not providing petitioners with post-conviction remedies that would effec-
tively address constitutional rights violations .' 6 The Illinois legislature
responded by enacting the Post-Conviction Hearing Act,' 07 and thus pro-
vided an additional collateral relief vehicle to a petitioner who shows a
substantial deprivation of any constitutional right that occurred in the
original trial proceedings.
Even though the grounds for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act are broader and more comprehensive than those under Illinois habeas
corpus or Illinois coram nobis, this does not mean that a petitioner has a
greater opportunity of ultimately obtaining collateral attack relief under
the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. The Illinois courts, in determining whether
relief is warranted under the Act, continue to frequently deny petitioners
403. Slaughter, 39 Ill. 2d at 283, 235 N.E.2d at 568. For an extended discussion of the
exhaustion of state remedies, see Comment, Practice and Procedure, supra note 398, at 150-
55.
404. Slaughter, 39 Ill. 2d at 283, 235 N.E.2d at 568.
405. 332 U.S. 561, 563-70 (1947) (Rutledge, J., concurring). Justice Rutledge stated:
The trouble with Illinois is not that it offers no jrocedure. It is that it offers too
many, and makes them so intricate and ineffective that in practical effect they
amount to none. The possibility of securing effective determination on the merits
is substantially foreclosed by the probability, indeed the all but mathematical
certainty, that the case will go off on the procedural ruling that the wrong one
of several possible remedies has been followed.
Id. at 565.
406. Id. at 563-70 (Rutledge, J., concurring). More specifically, Rutledge complained:
The Illinois scheme affords a theoretical system of remedies. In my judgment it
is hardly more than theoretical. Experience has shown beyond all doubt that, in
any practical sense, the remedies available there are inadequate. Whether this is
true because in fact no remedy exists, or because every remedy is so limited as
to be inadequate, or because the procedural problem of selecting the proper one
is so difficult, is beside the point. If the federal guarantee of due process in a
criminal trial is to have real significance in Illinois, it is imperative that men
convicted in violation of their constitutional rights have an adequate opportunity
to be heard in court. This opportunity is not adequate so long as they are required
to ride the Illinois merry-go-round of habeas corpus, coram nobis, and the writ
of error before getting a hearing in federal court.
Id. at 569-70.
407. Slaughter, 39 11. 2d at 284, 235 N.E.2d at 569; Leighton, supra note 254, at 570-71.
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relief. Three major reasons are given by the courts for this result: 1) the
petitioner did not prove that the alleged constitutional deprivation sub-
stantially violated his constitutional rights;48 2) the alleged deprivation did
not involve a constitutional right;409 and, 3) the doctrines of waiver and
res judicata prevented the petitioner from obtaining relief.4 0
The case law in this area has occasionally provided a more in-depth
analysis than the case law addressing relief under statutory habeas corpus
or statutory coram nobis. Constitutional issues, of course, more readily
lend themselves to intricate analysis. Notwithstanding, consistent with ha-
beas corpus and coram nobis, petitioners are rarely granted collateral attack
relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.
A. Existence Of A Constitutional Right
A petitioner seeking relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act must
show that his state or federal constitutional rights were substantially vio-
lated during the proceedings that resulted in his conviction. 41 , Before
determining whether a petitioner has sufficiently proved a substantial con-
stitutional violation, however, a more basic issue must be addressed. If the
petitioner does not even have a constitutional right to whatever he is alleging
has been violated, then any further inquiry under the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act is irrelevant.
The Illinois courts frequently have denied petitioners relief under the Act
simply by determining that there is no constitutional right involved in the
petitioner's claim. This is a separate issue from whether the petitioner's
federal or state constitutional rights were substantially violated. Thus, a
petitioner must point to the breach of a constitutional guarantee before he
is entitled to any relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.
1. Statutory Rights and Violations
The Illinois Supreme Court consistently has held that statutory rights do
not confer constitutional rights and the existence of a statutory violation
408. See, e.g., People v. Stewart, 121 111. 2d 93, 520 N.E.2d 348 (1988) (claim of uncon-
stitutional application of death penalty did not sufficiently allege substantial constitutional
deprivation).
409. See, e.g., People v. Radford, 53 Ill. 2d 120, 290 N.E.2d 212 (1972) (erroneous
statutory interpretation does not result in the substantial denial of constitutional rights for
which the Post-Conviction Act provides a remedy).
410. See, e.g., People v. Mengedoht, 91 111. App. 3d 239, 414 N.E.2d 893 (2d Dist. 1980)
(failure to raise ineffective counsel claim in earlier proceedings precluded petitioner from
raising claim on appeal of denial of post-conviction petition).
411. "Any person imprisoned in the penitentiary who asserts that in the proceedings which
resulted in his conviction there was a substantial denial of his [constitutional] rights ... may
institute a proceeding under this Article." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 122-1 (1987).
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in and of itself, therefore, does not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation. 412 The Illinois courts use this rationale to deny petitioners relief
under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act most often when the allegations
focus on rights and violations associated with: 1) arrests and detention; 2)
guilty pleas; 3) time lapses between formal charges and the beginning of
trial proceedings; and, 4) sentencing hearings.
a. Arrests and detention
Even though the Illinois Supreme Court has held that statutory rights
alone do not confer constitutional rights, the state's highest court has not
always been clear as to why a particular petitioner's allegations only address
statutory violations with no constitutional rights implicated, or which
statutory right instead of a constitutional right is even being examined.
This most often occurs when a petitioner seeking relief under the Post-
Conviction Hearing Act alleges the existence of an illegal arrest and deten-
tion. For example, in People v. Orndoff,"3 the petitioner was convicted of
burglary and larceny. He later filed for relief under the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act and alleged, inter alia, that he had been illegally arrested and
detained and that the indictment charging him had been defective. The
Illinois Supreme Court simply noted that these allegations pertained to
statutory rights, not constitutional rights, and that relief under the Post-
Conviction Hearing Act is limited to proved allegations of constitutional
violations. 4"4 The court denied the petitioner relief without any further
explanation. 4 1
Similarly, in People v. French,"6 the petitioner was convicted of armed
robbery and in his petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act he
alleged, inter alia, that his arrest was unconstitutional. The court cited
Orndoff and held, with no discussion, that the petitioner was not entitled
to relief because allegations of statutory violations pertaining to an arrest
and detention prior to the return of an indictment do not implicate a
constitutional violation and thus are not cognizable under the Post-Con-
viction Hearing Act. 4 7
These decisions are bothersome for two reasons. First, the court never
stated what statute these allegations referred to. Second, claims of illegal
arrests and detention obviously involve fourth amendment rights. Perhaps
a collateral attack on a judgment of conviction is not the most appropriate
time to raise such claims for the first time, but these claims do implicate
412. See, e.g., People v. Radford, 53 Ill. 2d 120, 290 N.E.2d 212 (1972) (alleged erroneous
interpretation of probation statute does not involve a substantial constitutional right).
413. 39 I11. 2d 96, 233 N.E.2d 378 (1968).
414. Id. at 98-99, 233 N.E.2d at 380.
415. Id. at 99, 233 N.E.2d at 380-81.
416. 46 IUl. 2d 104, 262 N.E.2d 901 (1970).
417. Id. at 107, 262 N.E.2d at 903-04.
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constitutional violations and the Illinois Supreme Court's blanket statement
that they do not is inaccurate.
b. Guilty pleas
The Illinois courts also have held that, because statutory rights do not
confer constitutional rights, noncompliance with Supreme Court Rule 402,
governing guilty pleas, 418 does not alone result in a constitutional viola-
tion. 419 Rule 402 requires that a judge admonish a defendant as to various
consequences of pleading guilty to a charge prior to accepting a guilty plea
and entering a judgment of conviction.420 The purpose of Rule 402 is to
determine whether a defendant made a knowing and intelligent guilty
plea.421 Although a defendant does not have a constitutional right to be
admonished, as required by Rule 402, he does have a constitutional right
to have his guilty plea refused unless it is knowing and intenigent. 422 Thus,
a petitioner who seeks relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act and
alleges that his constitutional rights were substantially violated by a judge's
failure to admonish him correctly, as required by Rule 402, must show
that noncompliance with Rule 402 resulted in his guilty plea not being
knowing and intelligent. 423
For example, in People v. Krantz, 4 4 involving two consolidated cases,
both petitioners sought relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act and
alleged that their constitutional rights were violated because the judges had
accepted their guilty pleas without properly admonishing them as required
by the Rule. The first petitioner claimed that prior to entering his guilty
plea for forgery, the judge did not adequately inform him of the nature
of the charge against him and did not ensure that he understood the nature
of this charge. During the guilty plea proceeding, the trial court had asked
the petitioner if he understood that he was charged with forgery and the
state's attorney had clearly outlined the evidence the state had against the
petitioner. 4  Before denying the petitioner relief under the Post-Conviction
418. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. IIOA, para. 402 (1987).
419. See, e.g., People v. Gardner, 8 I1. App. 3d 588, 289 N.E.2d 638 (5th Dist. 1972)
(where petitioner was not asked whether he understood his right to an indictment prior to
pleading guilty, petitioner's claim only alleged a statutory violation, not a constitutional
violation).
420. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 402 (1987).
421. People v. Turner, 25 Il. App. 3d 847, 851, 323 N.E.2d 371, 374 (3d Dist. 1975).
422. People v. McCoy, 74 IlI. 2d 398, 402, 385 N.E.2d 696, 698 (1979).
423. People v. Weathers, 83 111. App. 3d 451, 453, 404 N.E.2d 1011, 1012 (3d Dist. 1980).
See also People v. Akers, 137 I1. App. 3d 922, 484 N.E.2d 1160 (4th Dist. 1985) (guilty plea
entered in reliance upon the state's unfulfilled promises or a judge's misrepresentations is
not voluntary, and if such circumstances exist, a petitioner has a claim cognizable under the
Post-Conviction Hearing Act); People v. Crislip, 20 I11. App. 3d 175, 312 N.E.2d 830 (5th
Dist. 1974) (petitioner states a claim for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act where
he shows that his guilty plea was coerced by police threats).
424. 58 111. 2d 187, 317 N.E.2d 559 (1974).
425. Id. at 189, 190, 317 N.E.2d at 561, 563.
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Hearing Act, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that Rule 402 required only
substantial compliance with its provisions and the Rule has been adequately
followed if an ordinary person would understand the nature of the charge
against him in a similar situation.42 The court held that the trial court had
substantially complied with Rule 402; the petitioner did not show that his
guilty plea was not knowing and intelligent and, thus, he was not entitled
to relief.42"
The second petitioner alleged that the trial court had not admonished
him prior to accepting his guilty plea to burglary as required by Rule 402
because the judge had not informed him of the maximum penalty that
could be imposed for burglary. The Illinois Supreme Court held that even
though the trial court had neglected to admonish the petitioner regarding
his potential sentence, his plea was knowing and intelligent because he had
participated in plea bargain negotiations with the state's attorney and, thus,
was aware of the sentence the state could seek.428 The petitioner, therefore,
was not entitled to post-conviction relief. 4 9
Similarly, in People v. Weathers,30 the petitioner pled guilty to murder
and subsequently sought relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. The
petitioner alleged that his due process rights were violated because the trial
court did not determine that the state had a factual basis to support a
murder conviction as required by Rule 402. The appellate court simply
noted the general rule that only substantial compliance with Rule 402 is
required and alleged noncompliance with this rule does not raise a consti-
tutional issue absent a showing that the petitioner's plea was not knowing
and intelligent.43' The court held that because the petitioner did not allege
or show that his guilty plea was not knowing and intelligent, he was not
entitled to relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. 432
426. Id. at 193, 317 N.E.2d at 562.
427. Id. at 193, 317 N.E.2d at 563.
428. Id. at 194, 317 N.E.2d at 563.
429. Id. at 195, 317 N.E.2d at 564. See also People v. Turner, 25 Ill. App. 3d 847, 323
N.E.2d 371 (3d Dist. 1975) (because defendant participated in plea-bargaining negotiations,
post-conviction relief denied in spite of fact that defendant expected probation but received
prison term; Rule 402 does not require that defendant know in advance of entering his plea
what sentence will be imposed, and thus no constitutional issue was presented). But see
People v. Akers, 137 I11. App. 3d 922, 484 N.E.2d 1160 (4th Dist. 1985) (when court does
not admonish a defendant as to the potential maximum sentence which may be imposed,
Supreme Court Rule 402 is not substantially complied with and a guilty plea entered under
such circumstances is not voluntary and thus petitioner is entitled to relief under the Post-
Conviction Hearing Act).
430. 83 111. App. 3d 451, 404 N.E.2d 1011 (3d Dist. 1980).
431. Id. at 453, 404 N.E.2d at 1012.
432. Id. at 453, 404 N.E.2d at 1012-13. See also People v. Warship, 59 I11. 2d 125, 319
N.E.2d 507 (1974) (on appeal, defendant alleged that there was no factual basis for his guilty
plea as required by Supreme Court Rule 402, but court held that factual basis must be
determined prior to entering final judgment which is the sentencing stage, as opposed to
prior to accepting guilty plea, and factual basis here was determined during the mitigation
and aggravation hearing and defendant thus was not entitled to reversal of his conviction).
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Finally, in People v. McCoy,4 13 the Illinois Supreme Court used a similar
rationale to deny the petitioner's request for post-conviction relief. The
petitioner alleged that his constitutional rights were violated because, prior
to accepting his guilty plea to burglary, the trial court judge did not
admonish him under Rule 402 that he would be required to serve a parole
term in addition to a prison term. The Illinois Supreme Court held that
the petitioner was not entitled to relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act because he did not show that his plea was not knowing and intelligent. 434
Admittedly, the trial court did not admonish the petitioner that a mandatory
parole term was part of his sentence, but the petitioner knew that the court
was not bound to accept the sentencing recommendation and the imposed
prison and parole terms still were less than the maximum sentence which
could have been imposed. 4" The petitioner's allegations, therefore, did not
raise a constitutional issue and he was not entitled to relief.436
c. Speedy trials
The Illinois courts have used a similar rationale, that mere allegations
of statutory violations are not cognizable under the Post-Conviction Hear-
ing Act because statutory rights do not confer constitutional rights, to deny
petitioners relief when a claim focuses on a violation of the right to a
speedy trial. A criminal defendant in custody has a statutory right to be
brought to trial within 120 days from the date he was taken into custody. 437
If a defendant is released on bail or on personal recognizance, he has a
statutory right to be brought to trial within 160 days from the date he
433. 74 Il. 2d 398, 385 N.E.2d 696 (1979).
434. Id. at 403, 385 N.E.2d at 698.
435. Id. at 403, 385 N.E.2d at 699.
436. Id. But see People v. Isringhaus, 38 Ill. App. 3d 535, 347 N.E.2d 834 (5th Dist. 1976)
(on appeal, defendant alleged that trial court did not comply with Rule 402 because it did
not inform him that his parole would be revoked upon pleading guilty to another charge,
however, reviewing court held parole revocation is not a direct consequence of a guilty plea,
but a collateral consequence, unlike a mandatory parole term, and a court thus is not required
under Rule 402 to admonish a defendant that his parole will be revoked upon pleading
guilty).
The state's highest court also has held that a lower court is not required to advise a
defendant of his right to appeal prior to accepting his guilty plea. People v. Cox, 53 Ill. 2d
101, 291 N.E.2d 1 (1972). In denying the petitioner relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act, the court noted that:
Our rule stems from the dictates of good practice rather than constitutional
command, and where the question has arisen it has been held that the failure of
a court to advise of the right to appeal is not a denial of due process or equal
protection. Clearly the failure to advise petitioner of his right to appeal from a
judgment of conviction ... raises no question of constitutional dimension.
53 111. 2d at 106, 291 N.E.2d at 4 (citations omitted) (quoting People v. Covington, 45 I11.
2d 105, 108, 257 N.E.2d 106, 108 (1970)).
437. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 103-5(a) (1987).
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demands a speedy trial .4 8 In addition, a defendant's right to a speedy trial
is guaranteed by the Illinois constitution. 4 1
9
Despite the familiar rationale that statutory rights do not confer consti-
tutional rights and, thus, an alleged statutory violation alone does not
implicate a constitutional violation, the Illinois Supreme Court's cursory
dismissal of post-conviction petitions in this area is particularly unsettling.
For example, in People v. French," the petitioner sought relief under the
Post-Conviction Hearing Act and alleged, inter alia, that his constitutional
rights were violated because he was denied his right to a speedy trial by
not being brought to trial within 120 days of being taken into custody.
The Illinois Supreme Court denied the petitioner relief and, with no further
discussion, noted that a violation of the statutory right to a speedy trial is
not "constitutional in scope."4'
Likewise, in People v. Morris,"2 the petitioner claimed that his consti-
tutional right to a speedy trial was violated. The Illinois Supreme Court
held that where there is a question as to whether or not the petitioner
waived the right, the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does not provide relief. 44
Without discussing why waiver might have been at issue in this case, the
court held that the petitioner had not raised a constitutional issue and,
accordingly, that his claim was not cognizable under the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act. 4"
When addressing statutory violations of the right to a speedy trial, the
Illinois Supreme Court has stated that the statute is designed to preserve
the Illinois constitutional guarantee. 44 However, the statutory right is not
the "precise equivalent" of the constitutional right and a statutory violation
of the right to a speedy trial does not in itself create a constitutional
issue. 446 The court has not clearly explained its reason for this view and
has not provided any guidance as to when a violation of the statutory right
to a speedy trial does implicate a constitutional violation.
d. Sentencing hearings
The Illinois courts also have denied petitioners relief under the Post-
Conviction Hearing Act with little to no rationale or analysis when a claim
raises issues regarding the petitioner's sentencing hearing. The statutory
right to a sentencing hearing provides that, following a determination of
438. Id. at para. 103-5(b).
439. ILL. CONST. art. II, § 9.
440. 46 I1. 2d 104. 262 N.E.2d 901 (1970).
441. Id. at 107, 262 N.E.2d at 903-04.
442. 3 111. 2d 437, 121 N.E.2d 810 (1954).
443. Id. at 442-43, 121 N.E.2d at 814.
444. Id. at 443, 121 N.E.2d at 814.
445. People v. Stuckey, 34 Ill. 2d 521, 523, 216 N.E.2d 785, 786 (1966) (quoting People
v. Benson, 19 Ill. 2d 50, 53, 166 N.E.2d 80, 83 (1960)).
446. Id. at 523, 216 N.E.2d at 786.
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guilt, a hearing shall be held to impose a sentence.4 7 At the hearing, the
court must consider any aggravating or mitigating evidence the parties wish
to present. 44 The Illinois courts have held that this statutory right does
not confer any constitutional rights and a petitioner who seeks relief under
the Post-Conviction Hearing Act has not alleged a constitutional violation
merely by claiming that he was denied a mitigation and aggravation hearing
or that the evidence presented at such a hearing was insufficient to warrant
the sentence imposed. For example, in People v. Blewett,449 the petitioner
filed for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act and alleged that his
due process rights were violated when, at his sentencing hearing, the judge
refused to consider the sentences given to the co-defendants in determining
the petitioner's sentence. The appellate court denied the petitioner relief
and, without further discussion, simply noted that what evidence will be
allowed at such a hearing is not reviewable under the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act because this issue is not of "constitutional magnitude. ' '450
The petitioner in People v. Scott4l' also alleged that his constitutional
rights were violated when a trial court judge accepted his guilty plea to
murder and did not admonish the petitioner as to his statutory right to a
mitigation and aggravation hearing prior to imposing sentence. The Illinois
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief
and held, without any explanation, that the statute providing for such a
hearing does not confer any constitutional rights. 4 2
2. Trial Errors
The Illinois courts, in determining whether relief is warranted under the
Post-Conviction Hearing Act, consistently have held that mere trial errors
do not involve a constitutional right. For example, in People v. Farley,41"
the petitioner alleged that he was entitled to relief under the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act because the trial court improperly granted a trial continuance
which resulted in a violation of his right to a speedy trial. The Illinois
Supreme Court denied the petitioner relief, explaining that the constitution
guarantees the right to trial but does not guarantee an error-free trial. 4 4
Hence, procedural matters or ordinary trial errors do not constitute federal
or state constitutional violations.4 15 The court noted that procedural or trial
errors may result in a reversal of a conviction, but that this would not be
447. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005.4-1(a) (1987).
448. Id. at para. 1005-4-1(a)(3).
449. 11 Ill. App. 3d 1051, 298 N.E.2d 366 (1st Dist. 1973).
450. Id. at 1056, 298 N.E.2d at 370 (citing People v. Wilbourn, 48 II. 2d 187, 268 N.E.2d
418 (1971)) (petitioner denied post-conviction relief where he alleged that aggravation and
mitigation hearing did not provide sufficient evidence for court to determine his sentence
because the statute providing for such a hearing does not confer any constitutional right).
451. 49 Il1. 2d 231, 274 N.E.2d 39 (1971).
452. Id. at 233-34, 274 N.E.2d at 40.
453. 408 I1. 288, 96 N.E.2d 453 (1951).
454. Id. at 292, 96 N.E.2d at 456.
455. Id.
259
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
because a constitutional right was violated. Instead, a reversal in such
situations would occur because of procedural errors in enforcing a consti-
tutional right. 4 6
The Illinois Supreme Court's explanation in Farley for holding that mere
trial errors are not cognizable under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act is
confusing and not particularly helpful. At one point the court concluded
that there is no constitutional right to have a trial free of error and, thus,
such claims are not properly brought under the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act. The court later stated, however, that a reversal of a conviction might
be warranted because of procedural errors since these procedures are
supposed to enforce a constitutional right. These statements are contradic-
tory and it remains unclear after Farley whether or not a petitioner has a
constitutional right to have an error-free trial.
In any event, subsequent case law has recited the general rule that mere
trial errors do not implicate constitutional violations because there is no
constitutional right involved. The courts have not discussed when a trial
error rises to the level of a resultant constitutional violation. With no
further explanation, the general rule is used to deny petitioners relief under
the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. For example, in People v. Cox,4 35 the
petitioner alleged that he was denied due process when the trial court
admitted incriminating statements from his co-defendants at his trial for
armed robbery. The Illinois Supreme Court simply held that a claim of
erroneously admitted evidence constitutes trial error and does not involve
a constitutional right. 45 8
The same superficial rationale has been used by the Illinois courts to
deny petitioners relief when their claims involve allegations of improper
jury instructions. In People v. Clark,'4 9 for example, the petitioner alleged
that he was denied due process when the trial court gave the jury an
improper instruction as to the charge of murder. The appellate court held
that the instruction was erroneous, but that "the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act does not provide a remedy for any and all trial errors." 460 Without
further discussiol, the court held that this error did not involve a consti-
tutional right or a denial of due process. 46'
In People v. Roberts,4 12 the Illinois Supreme Court similarly denied two
petitioners relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act when the peti-
tioners alleged that their constitutional rights were violated because the
trial court improperly instructed the jury.463 The court conceded that the
456. Id.
457. 34 I1. 2d 66, 213 N.E.2d 524 (1966).
458. Id. at 68, 213 N.E.2d at 525.
459. 84 Ill. App. 3d 186, 405 N.E.2d 450 (3d Dist. 1980).
460. Id. at 188, 405 N.E.2d at 452.
461. Id. at 189, 405 N.E.2d at 452. The court simply concluded: "The giving of the
improper instruction did not amount to a violation of due process." Id.
462. 75 Ill. 2d 1, 387 N.E.2d 331 (1979).
463. Id. at 9-10, 387 N.E.2d at 335.
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instructions were erroneous, but added that a legitimate claim of erroneous
jury instructions did not "elevate these errors to constitutional status." '46
The petitioners' claims, therefore, were not cognizable under the Post-
Conviction Hearing Act. 465
3. Insufficiency of Evidence
Early Illinois case law held that an allegation of insufficient evidence
presented at trial did not present a constitutional issue and, therefore, was
not cognizable under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. 466 This case law
gave no rationale for the general rule. Nonetheless, it is well settled that
collateral attack proceedings are not available to relitigate a petitioner's
guilt or innocence, or to redetermine a trial court's verdict. 467 Because
insufficiency of evidence claims more readily lend themselves to an exam-
ination of the petitioner's guilt and the trial court's verdict, the courts may
have believed that these claims should not be raised during a collateral
attack on the final judgment of conviction. This possible rationale, how-
ever, does not answer the question of why allegations of insufficient
evidence do not implicate constitutional considerations.
In 1979, the United State Supreme Court held, in Jackson v. Virginia,468
that a claim of insufficient evidence resulting in a guilty finding raises a
federal constitutional issue. 469 The Court based its decision on an interpre-
tation of In Re Winship.470 The Jackson Court held that because Winship
had found that the defendant has a constitutional right to be protected
against a conviction unless he is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
464. Id. But see People v. Ciconte, 32 Il. App. 3d 374, 377, 336 N.E.2d 260, 263 (1st
Dist. 1975) (jury instruction erroneous but error was not of "sufficient constitutional mag-
nitude" to grant petitioner an evidentiary hearing under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
because erroneous instruction did not destroy the petitioner's presumption of innocence in
the jury's eyes).
The implication arising from Ciconte is that an erroneous instruction may involve a
constitutional right and thereby cause a substantial constitutional violation. In other words,
an erroneous instruction may go beyond being a mere trial error and extend to a constitutional
violation if the instruction removes the petitioner's constitutional right to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty. In such a case, an alleged erroneous jury instruction would be
cognizable under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.
465. 75 Il. 2d at 10, 387 N.E.2d at 335. See also People v. Johndrow, 40 I1. 2d 288,
239 N.E.2d 853 (1968) (claim that trial court arbitrarily denied petitioner's tendered jury
instruction not cognizable under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act).
466. E.g., People v. Moore, 60 Ill. 2d 379, 384, 327 N.E.2d 324, 327 (1975); People v.
Dunn, 52 Ill. 2d 400, 402, 288 N.E.2d 463, 464 (1972); People v. Frank, 48 Ill. 2d 500, 504-
05, 272 N.E.2d 25, 27-28 (1971); People v. Johnson, 37 Il1. App. 3d 328, 330, 345 N.E.2d
531, 533 (3d Dist. 1976).
467. E.g., People v. Harris, 91 Ill. App. 3d 376, 379, 414 N.E.2d 911, 914 (3d Dist. 1980)
(citing People v. Orndoff, 39 Ill. 2d 96, 233 N.E.2d 378 (1966)).
468. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
469. Id. at 321.
470. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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as to every element of the offense charged, a defendant is denied due
process if his criminal conviction is not based on sufficient proof of guilt.' 7'
The Supreme Court's holding in Jackson would appear to lay to rest
any question of whether a claim of insufficient evidence raises a consti-
tutional issue and thus is cognizable under the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act. However, the first district in People v. Talley472 held that Jackson v.
Virginia does not mean that all insufficiency of evidence claims are of
constitutional magnitude. 4 3 The Talley court stated that the standard set
out in Jackson for determining whether an insufficiency of the evidence
claim raises a constitutional issue is whether "any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt." 47 4 The appellate court applied this standard, found that there was
sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to find the petitioner guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt, and denied the petitioner relief under the Post-Con-
viction Hearing Act.47
Although the Jackson Court did enunciate the standard as quoted by
the Illinois appellate court in Talley, this standard was not meant to be
used to find that a claim of insufficient evidence does not raise a consti-
tutional issue. The standard instead can be read to guide lower courts in
determining whether or not the evidence resulting in the petitioner's guilt
truly was supportive of the finding. The Jackson Court clearly and strongly
held that insufficient evidence claims raise a federal constitutional issue.
In addition, the Talley court did not need to go so far as to hold that the
Jackson holding did not mean that all claims of insufficient evidence raise
a constitutional issue. The appellate court only needed to determine whether
the petitioner's claims proved a substantial denial of his constitutional
rights. If they did, then the petitioner was entitled to relief. If they did
not, then the petitioner was not entitled to relief. By stating that some
claims of insufficient evidence may not rise to the level of a constitutional
claim, the Talley court inaccurately interpreted and applied Jackson and
interjected an additional unnecessary step in determining whether a peti-
tioner advancing such claims is entitled to relief under the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act.
B. Grounds For Relief Under The Illinois
Post-Conviction Hearing Act
The majority of petitioners seeking relief under the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act do raise constitutional issues and, thus, appropriately bring
their claims under it. However, mere conclusory allegations that constitu-
471. 443 U.S. at 315-18.
472. 97 Il1. App. 3d 439, 422 N.E.2d 1084 (1st Dist. 1981).
473. Id. at 444, 422 N.E.2d at 1088.
474. Id. (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319).
475. Id. at 444-45, 422 N.E.2d at 1088-89.
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tional rights were violated are insufficient. 476 A petitioner must show that
the activity or event in question substantially violated his federal or state
constitutional rights before he is entitled to relief under the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act. 4 7 Therefore, even though a constitutional right is involved
and a constitutional issue is raised, and even though a violation of this
right is alleged, the Illinois courts frequently deny a petitioner relief by
finding that the claim was merely conclusory or that the petitioner did not
prove the existence of a substantial constitutional violation. Although the
courts have not defined "substantial" in this context, it is logical to assume,
and the case law supports, that a substantial constitutional deprivation
exists where it appears that the outcome of the trial would have been
different if the alleged violation had not occurred. The case law in this
area is voluminous and it is easiest to analyze the Illinois courts' decisions
by presenting and discussing the case law as it relates to claims under each
relevant constitutional amendment. 478
1. Fourth Amendment Violations
There is very little case law addressing relief under the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act that can be discussed under the heading of alleged fourth
amendment violations. Two explanations for this paucity of case law can
be advanced. First, very few petitioners seeking relief under the Post-
Conviction Hearing Act allege that their conviction resulted from a vio-
lation of their fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. A possible reason is that alleged fourth amendment
violations most appropriately are raised at pre-trial evidentiary suppression
hearings. This gives a criminal defendant an additional avenue for pre-
senting allegations of constitutional violations that is not necessarily avail-
able to a defendant who is advancing various fifth or sixth amendment
claims. The importance of this as it relates to Post-Conviction Hearing
Act petitions is that the Illinois courts most frequently deny petitions under
the Act by applying the doctrines of waiver and res judicata. This Article
will present an in-depth analysis of both doctrines following this discussion
476. E.g., People v. Shaw, 49 Ill. 2d 309, 311, 273 N.E.2d 816, 817 (1971); People v.
Pierce, 48 I1. 2d 48, 50, 268 N.E.2d 373, 374 (1971); People v. Crislip, 20 Ill. App. 3d 175,
177, 312 N.E.2d 830, 832 (5th Dist. 1974).
477. Shaw, 49 IIl. 2d at 311, 273 N.E.2d at 817; Pierce, 48 I1. 2d at 50, 268 N.E.2d at
374; People v. Ciconte, 32 I11 App. 3d 374, 375-76, 336 N.E.2d 260, 262 (1st Dist. 1975);
Crislip, 20 Ill. App. 3d at 177. 312 N.E.2d at 832.
478. Allegations are examined as they relate to fourth, fifth, and sixth amendment viola-
tions. Although many petitions for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act allege
fourteenth amendment violations, the specific claims generally allege violations of rights
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and are brought under the fourteenth amendment through
the doctrine of selective incorporation. Allegations of fourteenth amendment violations,
therefore, are not discussed separately, but only as they relate to violations of rights
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Specifically, they are presented under the subsections
discussing fourth, fifth, and sixth amendment violations.
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of the grounds for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. For
purposes of this discussion, it is important to note that, if a petitioner
could have raised a claim in a prior proceeding but did not, he is deemed
to have waived the claim.4 79 If the petitioner did raise the claim in a prior
proceeding and the court addressed the claim, he is precluded from raising
the claim again during collateral attack proceedings. 40 Thus, the fact that
a petitioner has an additional formal proceeding in which he can raise a
fourth amendment claim means that the courts .reviewing such a claim
under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act have a better opportunity of finding
that the petitioner waived the claim by not raising it during a pre-trial
proceeding on a motion to suppress evidence, or is precluded from raising
it because it already was addressed in a pre-trial suppression hearing.
For example, in People v. Somerville,'81 the petitioner was convicted of
armed robbery and sought post-conviction relief, alleging that prior to
arrest his car was illegally searched and seized and that certain evidence
derived from the search was wrongly admitted at trial. The Illinois Supreme
Court held that because the petitioner had not made a pre-trial motion to
suppress the evidence and had not raised this issue at trial or on appeal,
he had waived the claim and could not raise it under the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act.482 Clearly, petitioners who seek post-conviction relief and
allege fourth amendment violations have an additional hurdle to overcome
than petitioners alleging other constitutional violations. This decreases the
likelihood of a petitioner pursuing fourth amendment claims under the Post-
Conviction Hearing Act.
Second, because the Post-Conviction Hearing Act addresses claims of
substantial constitutional deprivation that occurred during the proceedings
that resulted in conviction, fourth amendment claims more frequently may
be classified as fifth amendment due process claims. In other words, if a
petitioner alleges that he was searched illegally and evidence obtained during
this search thus was obtained illegally, and that introduction of this evidence
at trial resulted in his conviction, he is actually claiming that he was
deprived of liberty without due process in violation of the fifth amendment.
For example, in People v. Heirens,48 3 the petitioner was convicted of murder
and burglary after he had pled guilty. In his Post-Conviction Hearing Act
petition, he alleged that his home had been searched illegally and his
confession obtained pursuant to police coercion. He subsequently pleaded
guilty. The Illinois Supreme Court denied him collateral relief and held
479. E.g., People v. Roberts, 75 Il1. 2d 1, 10-11, 387 N.E.2d 331, 335-36 (1979); People
v. Spicer, 42 Il1. App. 3d 246, 250, 355 N.E.2d 711, 713 (lst Dist. 1976).
480. Roberts, 75 Il. 2d at 10, 387 N.E.2d at 335-36; Spicer, 42 I1. App. 3d at 250, 355
N.E.2d at 713.
481. 42 Ill. 2d 1, 245 N.E.2d 461 (1969).
482. Id. at 12, 245 N.E.2d at 468.
483. 4 I11. 2d 131, 122 N.E.2d 231 (1954).
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that his guilty plea and conviction were not the result of the alleged illegal
search and coercion. 4 4 The court did note, however, that if the petitioner's
conviction had resulted from any fourth amendment violation, then his
due process rights would have been violated and he would have been
entitled to relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act .4 s
In any event, allegations of fourth amendment violations are cognizable
under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. In People v. Jennings,486 the
petitioners sought relief under the Act and alleged that their confessions
had been obtained pursuant to force and violence. Although the Illinois
Supreme Court remanded the case so that the trial court could determine
whether the petitioners were entitled to relief, the court noted that the
allegations were cognizable under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act and, if
the petitioners made the requisite showing, they would be granted relief. 48 7
The Illinois courts more frequently hold, however, that petitioners have
not sufficiently proved the requisite substantial constitutional deprivation
of fourth amendment rights. For example, in People v. Goerger,41, the
petitioner was convicted of aggravated battery and alleged, inter alia, that
his confession was involuntary, his arrest was without a warrant, and
evidence was seized from his home without a search warrant. The Illinois
Supreme Court, without any analysis or discussion, held that the petitioner
484. Id. at 141-42, 122 N.E.2d at 237.
485. Id. at 141, 122 N.E.2d at 237 (citing Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942)).
Two other categories of claims potentially cognizable under the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act exist which revolve around an arrest situation but more likely would arise as allegations
of fifth amendment due process violations. First, in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 616-20
(1976), the United States Supreme Court held that the use of a petitioner's post-arrest silence,
after Miranda warnings had been given, to impeach his credibility at trial, violates the
petitioner's due process rights. In other words, if a petitioner elects to invoke his right to
remain silent after being taken into custody and given Miranda warnings, the state can not
use this silence at trial when the petitioner is testifying to challenge the petitioner's explanation
or testimony. If the state asks a testifying petitioner about his original silence after being
taken into custody, the petitioner could allege a violation of his due process rights and his
claim would be cognizable under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. See People v. Talley, 97
Ill. App. 3d 439, 445-46, 422 N.E.2d 1084, 1089 (1st Dist. 1981).
Second, in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), the United States Supreme Court
held that if a criminal defendant's request for counsel during custodial interrogation was not
acted upon and the defendant subsequently confessed to criminality, use of this confession
against the defendant violates his fifth amendment due process rights. Thus, once a defendant
invokes his right to counsel, he may not be interrogated further until counsel is made available
to him. If a petitioner was questioned while in custody and requested counsel, any confession
obtained from him before counsel arrived could not be used against the petitioner or he
would have a due process violation claim cognizable under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.
See People v. James, 111 Il1. 2d 283, 489 N.E.2d 1350 (1986) (finding Edwards claims to be
generally cognizable under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, but not retroactively applicable
to pending collateral attack proceedings).
486. 411 Ill. 21, 102 N.E.2d 824 (1952).
487. Id. at 24-27, 102 N.E.2d at 826-27.
488. 52 I11. 2d 403, 288 N.E.2d 416 (1972).
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was not entitled to relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act because
his allegations simply were conclusory and he had not shown that his
constitutional rights were substantially violated. 48 9
Similarly, in People v. Nischt,49 the petitioner was convicted of murder
and alleged in his post-conviction petition that his confession was obtained
pursuant to police brutality. The Illinois Supreme Court denied the peti-
tioner relief and held that the petitioner had not made the requisite showing
in light of the police officers' denial of brutality in obtaining the confes-
sion. 49'
2. Fifth Amendment Violations
The majority of case law addressing Post-Conviction Hearing Act peti-
tions focuses on allegations of various fifth amendment violations. These
allegations can be divided into the two main categories of double jeopardy
and due process violations. Given the fact that the purpose of the Post-
Conviction Hearing Act is to provide relief where there has been a sub-
stantial constitutional violation during the proceedings which resulted in
conviction, it is not surprising that the majority of claims allege a variety
of due process violations, since the right to due process manifests itself at
a number of stages throughout a variety of legal proceedings.
a. Due process violations
i. Perjured Testimony.-One of the most frequent claims raised in Post-
Conviction Hearing Act petitions alleging due process deprivations in the
proceedings which resulted in convictions, is that perjured testimony was
admitted at the trials and influenced the outcomes of the trials to the
petitioners' detriment. The Illinois courts agree that the use of perjured
testimony raises a constitutional issue in that a convicted criminal defendant
is deprived of liberty without due process of law if such testimony was
admitted against him at trial.4 92 An allegation of a conviction based on
perjured testimony, therefore, is cognizable under the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act.493
The Illinois courts, however, frequently hold that a petitioner is not
entitled to post-conviction relief because either his allegations are conclu-
489. Id. at 406-08, 288 N.E.2d at 418-19.
490. 23 I1. 2d 284, 178 N.E.2d 378 (1961).
491. Id. at 289.90, 178 N.E.2d at 381-82.
492. People v. Smith, 139 Ill. App. 3d 21, 30, 486 N.E.2d 1347, 1352 (Ist Dist. 1985)
(citing United States ex reL Washington v. Vincent, 525 F.2d 262, 267 (2d Cir. 1975)); People
v. Tidwell, 88 Il1. App. 3d 808, 811, 410 N.E.2d 1163, 1165 (2d Disl. 1980) (citing, in part,
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959)); People v. Veal, 58 Il1. App. 3d 938, 964, 374 N.E.2d
963, 982 (1st Dist. 1978).
493. People v. Alden, 15 I1. 2d 498, 502, 155 N.E.2d 617, 620 (1959); People v. Cooper,
142 Ill. App. 3d 223, 228, 491 N.E.2d 815, 818 (4th Dist. 1986).
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sory in nature or he has not made the requisite showing of a substantial
constitutional deprivation. For example, in People v. Carbona494 the pe-
titioner sought post-conviction relief and alleged that one of the state's
witnesses had testified falsely at trial as to a conversation he had with the
petitioner prior to trial. This testimony implicated the petitioner and con-
tributed to her conviction for murder. In support of her claim, the petitioner
produced an affidavit from another participant in the conversation who
refuted the witness' trial testimony. The court denied the petitioner relief
under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, holding that her allegations were
conclusory in nature and were not supported with "legally available specific
factual data. '49 The court noted that the petitioner was attempting merely
to relitigate her case, and further held that her allegations did not even
warrant an evidentiary hearing. 496
Similarly, in People v. Shannon4 97 the court denied the petitioner relief
under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act because the allegation of the ad-
mission of perjured testimony at trial was conclusory and did not provide
specific factual information. 48 The petitioner was convicted of burglary,
having testified at trial that, although he had entered the building without
the owner's consent, he had entered through an open door with the sole
intent of drinking a bottle of wine. The owner of the building testified at
trial that the door could not have been open without triggering an alarm.
Following his conviction, the petitioner filed for relief under the Post-
Conviction Hearing Act and produced the affidavit of one of the store's
employees. This employee stated that prior to the date of the burglary he
had inspected that alarm system, found it to be defective, and informed
the building's owner. The court stated that, because the petitioner had not
shown that the building owner knew that the defective alarm system
prevented the alarm from being triggered when the door in question was
opened, his allegations merely were conclusory and did not warrant an
evidentiary hearing to consider his petition.4 99
Given the specific facts presented by the petitioners in Carbona and
Shannon to support their allegations, and the courts' findings that these
494. 53 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 369 N.E.2d 197 (Ist Dist. 1977).
495. Id. at 1027, 369 N.E.2d at 200.
496. Id. at 1027, 369 N.E.2d at 201.
497. 28 Ill. App. 3d 873, 329 N.E.2d 399 (Ist Dist. 1975).
498. Id. at 879-80, 329 N.E.2d at 405-06.
499. Id. at 880-81, 329 N.E.2d at 406. See also People v. Harris, 55 Ill. 2d 15, 302 N.E.2d
1 (1973) (post-conviction relief denied because petitioner's allegations that two state witnesses
falsely testified at trial were conclusory and without supportive factual evidence); People v.
Somerville, 42 Ill. 2d 1, 11-12, 245 N.E.2d 461, 467-68 (1969) (inconsistency in witness
testimony between that given at trial and that given at evidentiary hearing does not make
allegation of perjured testimony more than conclusory in nature and does not justify post-
conviction relief); People v. McGinnis, 51 111. App. 3d 273, 276-77, 366 N.E.2d 969, 973 (1st
Dist. 1977) (negative results of vaginal analysis do not show that victim provided perjured
testimony at trial and allegations thus are conclusory in nature and petitioner is not entitled
to post-conviction relief).
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petitions did not warrant evidentiary hearings, it is apparent that a peti-
tioner seeking relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act on the basis
of perjured testimony has a fairly high burden to overcome before he will
even be entitled to an evidentiary hearing to consider his claim. Futhermore,
the hurdle becomes higher because, even if a petitioner alleges a substantial
constitutional violation and his petition is not merely conclusory, the Illinois
courts provide no clear guidance as to whether this petitioner also must
show that the perjured testimony was knowingly admitted by the state into
evidence at trial. It is a well established rule that before a conviction will
be reversed on the basis of admission of perjured testimony, the petitioner
must show that the state knowingly used the testimony./° The Illinois
courts, however, are not only divided in terms of whether this same standard
must be satisfied before post-conviction relief is granted,"' but also are
not consistent in determining what constitutes the knowing use of perjured
testimony. 0 2
In People v. Cornille103 for example, the petitioner was convicted of
arson and alleged in his Post-Conviction Hearing Act petition that he had
been convicted on the basis of perjured testimony. The state's expert witness
testified at trial as an arson investigator and implicated the petitioner in
the crime. The witness admitted to a newspaper reporter two years later
that he had lied about his credentials and, thus, had given false testimony
at several arson trials. The state contended that the petitioner's allegations
did not rise to the level of a due process deprivation because he could not
show that the state knew about the witness' lack of credentials and false
testimony. However, the Illinois Supreme Court discussed a number of
federal cases addressing a similar issue and stated that a conviction based
on perjured testimony violates due process even though the state did not
knowingly use the testimony. 5°4 The court noted that the federal case law
supported this conclusion and, in each case, the state lacked diligence in
determining whether or not its witness was testifying falsely at trial.10'
Because the state easily could have verified the credentials of its own expert
witness and did not, it was not diligent and, thus, was sufficiently involved
in submitting false testimony to be responsible for its admission.106 The
petitioner, therefore, was convicted in violation of his due process rights
and he was entitled to relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.507
500. E.g., People v. Winchel, 159 Ill. App. 3d 892, 904, 512 N.E.2d 1298, 1305 (1st Dist.
1987) (citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959)).
501. See Id. at 904-05, 512 N.E.2d at 1305 (describing the disagreement).
502. See People v. Shannon, 28 III. App. 3d 873, 878, 329 N.E.2d 399, 404 (1st Dist.
1975).
503. 95 I11. 2d 497, 448 N.E.2d 857 (1983).
504. Id. at 509-15, 448 N.E.2d at 863-66.
505. Id. at 511-12, 448 N.E.2d at 864-65.
506. Id. at 513, 448 N.E.2d at 865.
507. Id. at 515, 448 N.E.2d at 866.
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People v. Cihlar08 holds the state to an even stricter standard. In that
case, the petitioner had been convicted of rape, burglary, and home in-
vasion. Following his trial, he located three neighbors of the victim who
stated that the victim told them information which was contrary to the
testimony she had given at trial. Although a state's witness testified at trial
in support of the victim's testimony, this witness later agreed with the
neighbors and told a state's attorney that her trial testimony was incorrect.
The Illinois Supreme Court held that this constituted the knowing use of
perjured testimony by the state.5°9 Even though the particular state's at-
torney trying the case was unaware of the perjured testimony, the court
noted that the prosecution "is charged with the knowledge of its agents,
including the police." 10 The petitioner's conviction, therefore, was ob-
tained in violation of his due process rights and he was entitled to relief
under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. 5 '
Similar to Cihlar, in People v. Bland,'" the appellate court held that the
petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing regarding his claim that a
state's witness falsely testified at trial, even though no knowledge of the
perjured testimony could be imputed to the state.5"3 The witness testified
at trial as to the petitioner's participation in a murder and armed robbery.
This witness later recanted her testimony and the petitioner provided the
witness' affidavit along with his petition for post-conviction relief. The
court noted that, even though knowing use of perjured testimony must be
shown to establish a due process violation, the petitioner in this case would
not have been convicted had the witness not testified falsely at trial. s14
In contrast, in People v. Bailey,5"' the appellate court held that a peti-
tioner must establish that the state knowingly submitted false testimony
before a due process violation exists and he is entitled to relief under the
Post-Conviction Hearing Act.51 6 The court distinguished Cornille and stated
that, in that case, the state relied on the testimony of its expert witness in
a closely balanced case and had specifically selected the expert to testify.5 t 7
Here, the alleged perjured testimony was given by an occurrence witness
"whose presence at the trial was determined by her relationship to the
508. 111 Ill. 2d 212, 489 N.'E.2d 859 (1986).
509. Id. at 218-19, 489 N.E.2d at 862.
510. Id. at 219, 489 N.E.2d at 862 (quoting Imbler v. Craven, 298 F. Supp. 795, 806. (S.D.
Cal. 1969), aff'd, 424 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1970)). See also People v. Martin, 46 I1. 2d 565,
264 N.E.2d 147 (1970) (where police officer testified that informant was not paid and then
in another trial a different officer testified that this informant usually was paid, state was
imputed with knowledge that officer in the first trial may have falsely testified).
511. 111 Ill. 2d at 219, 489 N.E.2d at 862.
512. 67 Il1. App. 3d 716, 384 N.E.2d 1380 (1st Dist. 1979).
513. Id. at 720-21, 384 N.E.2d at 1385.
514. Id. at 720, 384 N.E.2d at 1385.
515. 141 I1. App. 3d 1090, 490 N.E.2d 1334 (1st Dist. 1986).
516. Id. at 1098-99, 490 N.E.2d at 1340.
517. Id. at 1099, 490 N.E.2d at 1341.
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case." 1 8 The petitioner had not established that the state knowingly used
this witness' perjured testimony and, thus, he was not entitled to post-
conviction relief.3"9
The first district's rationale for distinguishing Bailey from Cornille is
unenlightening at best. The current state of the case law shows that,
although a petitioner has a better chance of obtaining relief under the Post-
Conviction Hearing Act if he shows that the state knowingly introduced
perjured testimony at trial against him, relief still may be granted without
proving this element. Until the Illinois courts provide petitioners with
guidance and more consistent analysis, petitioners alleging that their con-
victions were based on perjured testimony should not be discouraged by
not being able to show the so-called requisite knowledge element.
ii. State's Non-Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence. -Failure by the
state to disclose information to a criminal defendant upon request that is
favorable to his defense, deprives the defendant of his right to due proc-
ess. 120 An allegation that the state suppressed such evidence, therefore, is
cognizable under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act 2 ' because the convicted
petitioner is claiming that he was deprived of his liberty in violation of his
due process rights since he was unable to prepare his defense sufficiently.
Although the United States Supreme Court recognized this constitutional
right in Brady v. Maryland,'22 it also held that, to sufficiently prove a
constitutional violation, the accused must show 1) that he requested the
information from the state, and 2) that the information was material to
guilt or punishment.123
The Illinois Supreme Court has focused on these two requirements and
denied Post-Conviction Hearing Act relief where they have not been met
by reasoning that such petitioners have not shown a substantial constitu-
tional violation. For example, in People v. Jones,2 4 the petitioner was
convicted of murder and in his Post-Conviction Hearing Act petition he
alleged that his due process rights were violated because the state had failed
to disclose to the petitioner the grand jury testimony of a potential witness.
At the petitioner's request, the state provided him with a list of state
witnesses and any statements they had made, and included this potential
witness' name. However, the state did not provide a copy of his grand
jury testimony. The state did not present this witness at trial. The petitioner
contended that the grand jury testimony was favorable to his defense
because this testimony corroborated the petitioner's explanation that the
518. Id.
519. See id. at 1099, 490 N.E.2d at 1340.
520. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86-88 (1963).
521. See People v. Jones, 66 Ill. 2d 152, 158, 361 N.E.2d 1104, 1106 (1977).
522. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
523. Id. at 87.
524. 66 III. 2d 152, 361 N.E.2d 1104 (1977).
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victim was the aggressor in a fight between the petitioner and the victim.
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the petitioner did not sufficiently
show a substantial constitutional deprivation and affirmed the lower court's
dismissal of his post-conviction petition without an evidentiary hearing.25
First, the court reasoned that the petitioner had not specifically requested
the grand jury testimony, but only had asked for the state to produce a
list of witnesses and any statements made by them. The petitioner, there-
fore, did not satisfy the demand requirement of Brady.52 6 Second, the court
found that the grand jury testimony was not sufficiently material since this
testimony would not have altered the outcome of the trial.i"7 Thus, the
materiality requirement of Brady also was not satisfied.
Similarly, in People v. Moore,128 the petitioner was convicted of murder
and alleged that his due process rights were violated when the state failed
to disclose the results of certain police investigative efforts that would have
supported the petitioner's alibi defense at trial. The Illinois Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
petition, concluding that the petitioner had not shown a substantial vio-
lation of his constitutional rights.129 The court reasoned that the petitioner
had not requested the information from the state that he now alleged was
unconstitutionally concealed.'" Further, the details of the police investi-
gation included information that was immaterial to the petitioner's de-
fense.131
iii. Incompetency to Enter a Plea or to Stand Trial.-The Illinois courts
consistently have held that the due process rights of a mentally incompetent
criminal defendant are violated if he is convicted of criminality. 32 Com-
petency to stand trial or to enter a guilty plea, therefore, is of constitutional
magnitude and is an issue cognizable under the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act. ' " Once a defendant presents evidence that raises a bona fide doubt
as to his mental fitness, the court is required to order a fitness hearing to
consider further evidence and to determine whether the defendant is men-
tally competent to stand trial . 4 Evidence of psychiatric or social distur-
525. Id. at 162, 361 N.E.2d at 1108.
526. Id. at 158-60, 361 N.E.2d at 1106-07.
527. Id. at 160-62, 361 N.E.2d at 1107-08.
528. 42 I1. 2d 73, 246 N.E.2d 299 (1969).
529. Id. at 80-81, 84, 246 N.E.2d at 304, 306.
530. Id. at 80-81, 246 N.E.2d at 304.
531. Id. at 81, 246 N.E.2d at 304.
532. People v. Andson, 73 Ill. App. 3d 700, 704, 392 N.E.2d 358, 362 (1st Dist. 1979)
(citing People v. Murphy, 72 I1. 2d 421, 430, 381 N.E.2d 677, 682 (1978)).
533. People v. Bailey, 141 Ill. App. 3d 1090, 1097, 490 N.E.2d 1334, 1339 (1st Dist. 1986);
Andson, 73 I1. App. 3d at 705, 392 N.E.2d at 362.
534. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 104-16 (1987).
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bances alone are not enough to raise a bona fide doubt as to mental
competency. 35 Rather, fitness to stand trial in this context requires that a
defendant be able to understand the nature of the proceedings against him
and be able to assist in his defense. 36 A defendant is deprived of liberty
without due process in violation of the fifth amendment, therefore, if he
is unable to understand the proceedings against him or he is unable to
assist in his defense and a judgment of conviction is entered against him.
In addition, once a defendant is adjudged incompetent to stand trial or
to enter a plea, he is presumed to remain unfit until he is adjudged
competent." 7 For example, in People v. Thompson,"8 the petitioner was
arrested for rape, examined to determine his fitness to stand trial, found
unfit, and transferred to the Department of Mental Health for treatment.
Five months later the state's attorney and defense counsel stipulated to the
petitioner's competency based on further psychiatric examinations, and the
petitioner was brought to trial where he entered a plea of guilty but mentally
ill. The petitioner later sought relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act and alleged that his due process rights were violated when a judgment
of conviction was entered agafnst him. The court held that because the
petitioner had been adjudged unfit to stand trial, a presumption of unfitness
remained until he was adjudged competent, and competence could not be
determined simply by stipulation to psychiatric conclusions by the attorneys
involved in the case. 39 Hence, a judgment of conviction had been entered
against the petitioner while he was legally incompetent in violation of his
due process rights and he was entitled to relief under the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act. 40
Similarly, in People v. Andson,5 41 the petitioner was adjudged incom-
petent to stand trial and four years later he was convicted of rape. The
finding of incompetency was based on psychiatric examinations which
showed that the petitioner suffered from chronic, irreversible mental dis-
ease. The court found that the adjudication of incompetency was not
excessively remote from his conviction and, because he had not been
adjudged competent in the interim, his conviction violated his due process
rights.5 42 The' petitioner thereby was entitled to relief under the Post-
Conviction Hearing Act. 543
535. People v. Lee, 43 I1. App. 3d 807, 810-11, 357 N.E.2d 652, 654-55 (2d Dist. 1976)
(quoting People v. Hammond, 45 Ill. 2d 269, 276-77, 259 N.E.2d 44, 47 (1970)).
536. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 104-10 (1987).
537. E.g., People v. Thompson, 158 Ill. App. 3d 860, 865, 511 N.E.2d 993, 996 (3d Dist.
1987).
538. 158 111. App. 3d 860, 511 N.E.2d 993 (3d Dist. 1987).
539. Id. at 865, 511 N.E.2d at 996.
540. Id.
541. 73 111. App. 3d 700, 392 N.E.2d 358 (1st Dist. 1979).
542. Id. at 705-06, 392 N.E.2d at 362-63.
543. Id. at 706, 392 N.E.2d at 363.
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Petitioners filing for post-conviction relief, who allege due process viol-
ations because their convictions were entered while they were mentally
unfit, have had a more difficult time obtaining relief when they were not
adjudged incompetent prior to conviction. For example, in People v. Lee,'44
the petitioner had a long history of mental illness for which he was treated
on an inpatient and outpatient basis. Five years later the petitioner was
convicted of murder and alleged in his Post-Conviction Hearing Act petition
that this prior psychiatric treatment should have raised a bona fide doubt
as to his fitness to stand trial. The court found that, although the petitioner
suffered from mental disorders, there was no evidence to show that he was
unable to understand the charges against him or was unable to assist in
his defense. 41 Thus, he was not convicted in violation of his due process
rights and was not entitled to post-conviction relief.5 46
Similarly, in People v. Cyburt, 47 the petitioner was convicted of various
sexual offenses upon entering a guilty plea. He later alleged in his Post-
Conviction Hearing Act petition that he was incompetent to enter the plea
because at the time of the plea he was acting bizarre and taking anti-
depressive medications. In addition, he attempted suicide on the day fol-
lowing his guilty plea. However, a psychiatric examination had been con-
ducted six weeks prior to entering the plea in which the petitioner was
found mentally fit. The court first noted that the competency standard was
the same for entering a plea as it was to stand trial.5 48 The court then held
that the petitioner was able to understand the charge against him, could
assist in his defense and, accordingly, was not convicted in violation of his
due process rights. 49
iv. Sentencing Violations. -Petitioners who seek relief under the Post-
Conviction Hearing Act and claim that their constitutional rights were
violated because of the sentence imposed against them, most frequently
allege fifth amendment due process violations and eighth amendment viol-
ations for infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. Because the case
law in this area does not provide any in depth constitutional analysis and
does not differentiate between the two types of constitutional claims, this
Article will consider allegations of sentencing violations in its discussion
of fifth amendment due process violations.
The Illinois courts consistently have held that a sentence challenged as
excessive is not reviewable under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act if the
sentence is statutorily prescribed. In People v. Baker,"10 for example, the
544. 43 Ill. App. 3d 807, 357 N.E.2d 652 (2d Dist. 1976).
545. Id. at 810-12, 357 N.E.2d at 654-55.
546. Id. at 812, 357 N.E.2d at 656.
547. 50 III. App. 3d 414, 365 N.E.2d 1004 (1st Dist. 1977).
548. Id. at 417, 365 N.E.2d at 1006.
549. Id. at 417-18, 365 N.E.2d at 1006.
550. 92 Iil. 2d 85, 440 N.E.2d 856 (1982).
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petitioner was sentenced to thirty years to life pursuant to his guilty plea
for murder. He sought post-conviction relief and alleged that his consti-
tutional rights had been violated because the sentence imposed was exces-
sive. His claim was based on an interpretation of the sentencing statute
that a term of life imprisonment was not statutorily recognized. The Illinois
Supreme Court held that the sentence was statutorily authorized, the pe-
titioner's constitutional rights were not violated, and accordingly he was
not entitled to relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.",
Likewise, in People v. Krankel,5 the petitioner was convicted of burglary
and sentenced to fourteen years imprisonment consecutive to two five year
terms he already was serving for prior offenses. He sought post-conviction
relief and raised a number of issues regarding the imposed sentence: the
extended term sentence was improper; he was entitled to resentencing
because a prior conviction was overturned; and his sentence was dispro-
portionate to the nature and seriousness of the offense. The court denied
the petitioner relief, holding that his constitutional rights had not been
substantially violated because the sentence imposed was within the appro-
priate statutory guidelines.15
Petitioners have been granted Post-Conviction Hearing Act relief, how-
ever, when constitutional issues are raised regarding the sentence imposed
after rehearing and resentencing. For example, in People v. Yarbar,55 4 the
petitioner originally was sentenced to five to ten years imprisonment for
robbery. He then was resentenced to four to twelve years based on the
revised Uniform Code of Corrections. The petitioner filed for post-convic-
tion relief and alleged that his due process rights were violated because the
new sentence imposed was higher than the original sentence. The court
cited a previous Illinois Supreme Court decision which had held that,
absent conduct on the part of the petitioner after sentencing that would
warrant the imposition of a higher sentence, the petitioner's due process
rights are violated if he is given a heavier sentence on retrial. M Applying
this standard, the appellate court in Yarbar found that, because this
petitioner had done nothing after the imposition of the original sentence
that would support inflicting a higher sentence, his due process rights were
violated when he was resentenced to four to twelve years.556 Consequently,
the petitioner was entitled to Post-Conviction Hearing Act relief." 7
551. Id. at 95, 440 N.E.2d at 861. See also People v. Ballinger, 53 I1. 2d 388, 292 N.E.2d
400 (1973) (alleged excessive sentence was within statutory limits and petitioner, therefore,
was not entitled to post conviction relief).
552. 131 Ill. App. 3d 887, 476 N.E.2d 777 (4th Dist. 1985).
553. Id. at 895-97, 476 N.E.2d at 784-86.
554. 43 I1. App. 3d 668, 357 N.E.2d 166 (1st Dist. 1976).
555. Id. at 672, 357 N.E.2d at 169 (quoting People v. Baze, 43 Il. 2d 298, 303, 253
N.E.2d 392, 395 (1969)).
556. Id. at 672, 357 N.E.2d at 169.
557. Id. at 672, 357 N.E.2d at 169-70.
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Similarly, in People v. Talley,"-8 the petitioner was resentenced following
an appeal of an earlier case and the new sentence imposed was the same
as the original sentence. He sought Post-Conviction Hearing Act relief and
alleged that the sentence was excessive because the court had not considered
on resentencing his potential for rehabilitation as evidenced by his conduct
in prison. The petitioner presented evidence that showed that the trial court
judge believed he did not have discretion to impose a different sentence
than originally was imposed. The appellate court held that the trial court
is empowered to consider the possibility of rehabilitation as evidenced by
prison behavior and may reduce the original sentence on remand based on
this consideration. 5 9 Because during resentencing the trial court had un-
derestinated its authority and had not considered this mitigating factor,
the petitioner had been resentenced in violation of his constitutional rights
and he was entitled to post-conviction relief.'0
The Illinois courts also have held that similarly situated defendants must
receive similar sentences.56' A petitioner who alleges that his constitutional
rights have been violated because disparate sentences were imposed between
he and a similarly situated co-defendant, therefore, has a cognizable Post-
Conviction Hearing Act claim.562 For example, in People v. Hoffman, 563
the petitioner was convicted of armed robbery in a jury trial and was
sentenced to fifteen to thirty years of imprisonment. He alleged in his post-
conviction petition that this sentence violated his constitutional rights
because his co-defendant, who had pled guilty, received a lighter sentence.
The court held that the petitioner was not entitled to post-conviction relief
because he had not sufficiently shown that he and the co-defendant were
similarly situated or that he received a higher sentence than his co-defendant
simply because he exercised his right to be tried by a jury.56 The court did
note that had the petitioner provided evidence to support his claim of
constitutional deprivation, he would have been entitled to Post-Conviction
Hearing Act relief. 5
In two recent Illinois Supreme Court decisions, People v. Stewart (Wal-
ter)'6 6 and People v. Stewart (Raymond Lee),'6 7 the court addressed the
question of whether Post-Conviction Hearing Act relief is warranted where
a petitioner alleges that the death penalty was imposed arbitrarily and
capriciously because of prosecutorial discretion in seeking it. In both cases,
558. 97 I11. App. 3d 439, 422 N.E.2d 1084 (1st Dist. 1981).
559. Id. at 447-48, 422 N.E.2d at 1091.
560. Id. at 448, 422 N.E.2d at 1091.
561. People v. Krankel, 131 Ill. App. 3d 887, 898, 476 N.E.2d 777, 786 (4th Dist. 1985)
(citing People v. Henne, 10 II1. App. 3d. 179, 180, 293 N.E.2d 172, 174 (1973)).
562. People v. Hoffman, 25 Iii. App. 3d 261, 322 N.E.2d 865 (1st Dist. 1974).
563. Id.
564. Id. at 265-67, 322 N.E.2d at 869.
565. Id. at 267, 322 N.E.2d at 869.
566. 123 III. 2d 368, 528 N.E.2d 631 (1988).
567. 121 III. 2d 93, 520 N.E.2d 348, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 246 (1988).
DEPA UL LAW REVIEW
the petitioners presented as evidence a study which showed the pattern of
certain prosecutors in seeking the death penalty. The Illinois Supreme Court
held that in both cases the petitioners had not shown that the death penalty
was sought improperly in their cases and, thus, had not sufficiently shown
a deprivation of their constitutional rights in receiving this sentence. 5 " The
court noted that the petitioners were not entitled to Post-Conviction Hear-
ing Act relief unless they provided sufficient evidence to show that the
state had considered improper factors and arbitrarily and capriciously
sought the death penalty against them individually. 69
Because allegations of state constitutional violations are cognizable under
the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, petitioners may have an additional claim
regarding unconstitutionally imposed sentences under the Illinois consti-
tution that they would not have under the federal constitution. The Illinois
constitution provides that "all penalties shall be determined both according
to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the
offender to useful citizenship. 31 70 The Illinois courts have held that this
constitutional provision requires that a trial court judge consider the re-
habilitative potential of a defendant when imposing a sentence."'I The
courts also have noted the difficulty in applying this provision because a
judge is required to balance the defendant's potential for rehabilitation
with the public's need for safety when determining an appropriate sen-
tence.'7 Although there are no Post-Conviction Hearing Act cases that
directly address this issue, the Illinois courts have reduced a defendant's
sentence on appeal because the trial court did not sufficiently consider the
defendant's rehabilitative potential when imposing a sentence. 73 In light
of this constitutional provision and the Illinois court decisions addressing
application of this provision on appeal, it is reasonable to conclude that a
petitioner who alleges that his sentence was imposed in violation of this
provision would have a claim cognizable under the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act.
b. Double Jeopardy
Allegations of improperly imposed multiple convictions or sentences in
violation of the fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy are
reviewable under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. 74 In People v. Cy-
568. 123 Ill. 2d at 381-82, 528 N.E.2d at 637-38; 121 Ill. 2d at 110-12, 520 N.E.2d at 356-
57.
569. 123 Ill. 2d at 381, 528 N.E.2d at 637-38; 121 Ill. 2d at 111-12, 520 N.E.2d at 356-
57.
570. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 11.
571. People v. Hayes, 70 Ill. App. 3d 811, 831, 388 N.E.2d 818, 832 (1st Dist. 1979).
572. People v. Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d 149, 155, 368 N.E.2d 882, 884 (1977).
573. People v. Dandridge, 9 Ill. App. 3d 174, 292 N.E.2d 51 (4th Dist. 1973); People v.
Gill, 7 Il1. App. 3d 24, 286 N.E.2d 516 (5th Dist. 1972).
574. People v. Cox, 53 11. 2d 101, 103, 291 N.E.2d 1, 2 (1972); People v. Cyburt, 50 I1.
App. 3d 414, 418, 365 N.E.2d 1004, 1006 (1st Dist. 1977).
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burl,- '7 for example, the petitioner had been convicted of rape, deviant
sexual assault, and incest, and was sentenced to respective concurrent terms
of fifteen to forty years, four to fourteen years, and three to ten years. In
his petition for post-conviction relief, the petitioner alleged that the con-
victions for both rape and incest violated his fifth amendment rights. The
court vacated the incest conviction and sentence because the rape and incest
arose from the same physical act. 76 The conviction and sentence for incest,
therefore, violated the petitioner's constitutional right against double jeop-
ardy. 71
Likewise, in People v. Ashton,57" the petitioner was convicted of armed
robbery and aggravated battery. He filed for relief under the Post-Convic-
tion Hearing Act and alleged that the aggravated battery conviction should
be reversed because it was based on the same physical conduct as the armed
robbery conviction. The court granted the petitioner relief and vacated the
aggravated battery conviction.' 9 The court found that the use or threat of
force is an essential element of armed robbery and holding a knife to the
victim's throat, which was the basis of the aggravated battery conviction,
was only for the purpose of committing the robbery. 80 Thus, the petitioner
should not have been convicted of the lesser aggravated battery charge.'"'
However, in People v. Fernandez,'82 the court refused to grant the
petitioner Post-Conviction Hearing Act relief when he was convicted of
armed robbery and aggravated assault and was sentenced to respective
concurrent terms of twenty to forty years and one to three years. The
court reasoned that the convictions and sentences did not violate the
petitioner's right not to be placed in double jeopardy because aggravated
assault was not a lesser included offense of armed robbery."' The court
stated that both charges were distinct offenses because it was possible to
commit armed robbery without bludgeoning the victim as was done in this
case. 8 4 Thus, both crimes were considered separate and independent and
it was appropriate to enter sentences on both convictions.'5 '
Finally, in People v. Cox, 5 6 the petitioner was convicted of two counts
of indecent liberties with a child and received two concurrent sentences.
The sentences imposed arose from a charge of two acts which were based
on a single occurrence with one victim and transpired almost simultane-
575. 50 I11. App. 3d 414, 365 N.E.2d 1004 (lst Dist. 1977).
576. Id. at 418, 365 N.E.2d at 1006-07.
577. Id.
578. 32 I1. App. 3d 353, 336 N.E.2d 582 (Ist Dist. 1975).
579. Id. at 354, 336 N.E.2d at 583.
580. Id. at 353-54, 336 N.E.2d at 583.
581. Id.
582. 96 Ill. App. 3d 631, 421 N.E.2d 957 (5th Dist. 1981).
583. Id. at 632, 421 N.E.2d at 958.
584. Id.
585. Id.
586. 53 I1. 2d 101, 291 N.E.2d 1 (1972).
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ously. Further, each act was prescribed by a single statute. The Illinois
Supreme Court held that only a single offense occurred and, consequently,
only one sentence should have been imposed . 7 The court granted the
petitioner Post-Conviction Hearing Act relief and vacated the second con-
viction and sentence.58
8
3. Sixth Amendment Violations
a. Ineffective counsel
Petitioners who seek relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act based
on alleged sixth amendment violations that occurred during the proceedings
resulting in conviction, most frequently claim that they were deprived of
the effective assistance of counsel. For a petitioner to satisfy the requisite
showing of a substantial constitutional violation in this area, he must meet
the two-part test as set out by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland
v. Washington.'89 First, the petitioner must show that his counsel's per-
formance was deficient and fell below the objective standard of reasona-
bleness. 90 Second, he must show that his counsel's deficient performance
prejudiced him or adversely affected the outcome of the proceedings. 9
The Illinois Supreme Court has noted that the Strickland standard does
not vary significantly from that formerly applied in Illinois. 59" Although
the Illinois courts traditionally employed a different standard to evaluate
the competency of court appointed counsel than they used to evaluate the
competency of privately retained counsel, the distinction no longer exists'9 1
and all incompetency of counsel claims are evaluated under the Strickland
two-part test . 94
The Illinois courts rarely grant a petitioner Post-Conviction Hearing Act
relief when the alleged constitutional deprivation is based on an ineffec-
tiveness of counsel claim. The case law in this area generally does not
demonstrate any in-depth analysis as to whether either portion of the
Strickland two-part standard has been met. The first part of the standard,
performance which was deficient and not objectively reasonable, is often
587. Id. at 105-06, 291 N.E.2d at 3-4.
588. Id. at 106, 291 N.E.2d at 4.
589. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
590. Id. at 687-91.
591. Id. at 691-96.
592. People v. Albanese, 104 I1. 2d 504, 524-26, 473 N.E.2d 1246, 1254-55 (1984).
593. People v. Talley, 97 111. App. 3d 439, 443, 422 N.E.2d 1084, 1087-88 (1st Dist. 1981).
594. It should be noted that a criminal defendant who elects to proceed pro se and who
has knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, is not entitled to relief based on
an ineffectiveness of counsel claim against either appointed standby counsel representation
or his own representation. People v. Williams, 97 II. 2d 252, 266-67, 454 N.E.2d 220, 226-
27 (1983). This general rule is followed whether the ineffective counsel claim is raised on
appeal or whether it is raised on collateral attack. See People v. Silagy, 116 II. 2d 357, 369-
70, 507 N.E.2d 830, 835 (1987).
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not even reached by the Illinois courts. The courts most often find that
counsel's conduct did not adversely prejudice the petitioner or that this
conduct merely was a display of trial strategy or tactics. Thus, defense
counsel was not incompetent, no substantial constitutional deprivation
occurred, and the petitioner's claim does not warrant relief under the Post-
Conviction Hearing Act. First are the cases which hold that counsel is not
ineffective simply for taking one tactical route in favor of another. For
example, in People v. Rogers,9 the petitioner was convicted of murder
and, in his Post-Conviction Hearing Act petition, he alleged that both his
trial and appellate counsel were incompetent and, thus, he was convicted
in violation of his sixth amendment rights. First, the petitioner claimed
that his counsel did not effectively represent him because he was advised
not to testify in his own behalf. The court found that counsel advised the
petitioner not to testify at trial because he mistakenly believed that a prior
conviction could have been used to impeach the petitioner's credibility.
The court held, however, that this error merely occurred pursuant to a
trial strategy decision and, therefore, did not rise to the level of a consti-
tutional violation. 96 In addition, the court held that the evidence presented
at trial was not closely balanced and that there was a substantial probability
that the petitioner would have been convicted even if he had testified.5 97
Thus, the petitioner was not prejudiced by his counsel's error. 9 Second,
the petitioner alleged that his counsel was ineffective because he failed to
impeach a state's witness during trial with a prior statement made in support
of the petitioner. The court held that, even if counsel's performance in
this regard was deficient, the petitioner failed to show that this performance
prejudiced him." 9 Further, the court noted that the petitioner also failed
to overcome the presumption that his counsel's conduct in this regard was
simply trial strategy.60 The petitioner had not proved the requisite sub-
stantial constitutional violation under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
and, accordingly, was not entitled to relief.60'
The first district also has addressed the effectiveness of defense counsel
who prevents a petitioner from exercising his right to testify in his own
behalf. Similar to Rogers, the petitioner in People v. Jones6°2 alleged that
his counsel was ineffective, in part, because this counsel had advised him
that he should not testify in his own behalf, since a prior conviction could
be used to impeach his credibility as a witness. The appellate court did not
determine whether counsel's advice was an exercise of trial strategy, but,
595. 147 III. App. 3d 1, 497 N.E.2d 856 (5th Dist. 1986).
596. Id. at 3, 497 N.E.2d at 857.
597. Id. at 3-4, 497 N.E.2d at 857-58.
598. Id. at 4-5, 497 N.E.2d at 857-58.
599. Id. at 5-6, 497 N.E.2d at 858-59.
600. Id. at 5, 497 N.E.2d at 858.
601. Id. at 6, 497 N.E.2d at 859.
602. 168 I1. App. 3d 925, 522 N.E.2d 1325 (1st Dist. 1988).
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instead, held that the alleged deprivation of the right to testify is a sufficient
claim for purposes of obtaining an evidentiary hearing under the Post-
Conviction Hearing Act.60 The court reasoned that, because the right to
testify in one's own behalf is a fundamental right and not considered a
strategic or tactical decision, a petitioner has a low standard to meet in
order to gain an evidentiary hearing, whether or not this alleged deprivation
is presented along with an ineffectiveness of counsel claim.6
Although the fifth district in Rogers reviewed the petitioner's claim after
the trial court denied him post-conviction relief based on the evidence
presented at an evidentiary hearing,60S two conclusions can be reached from
analyzing Rogers and Jones together. First, a petitioner who seeks Post-
Conviction Hearing Act relief and alleges that his counsel was ineffective
because counsel prevented him from testifying in his own behalf is claiming
deprivation of a fundamental constitutional right and, hence, has a lower
burden to meet before he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to review
his claim. Second, although a court may find during this hearing that the
petitioner was not prejudiced by not being able to testify and his counsel,
therefore, was not ineffective under the Strickland standard and the sixth
amendment, this counsel's advice to the petitioner is not merely an exercise
of trial strategy.
People v. KrankeI is another example of the Illinois courts' tendency
to determine that the alleged ineffectiveness of counsel claim is based
merely on counsel's exercise of trial strategy and, thus, the petitioner has
not proved that a substantial constitutional violation occurred and is not
entitled to Post-Conviction Hearing Act relief. The petitioner in Krankel
alleged that his counsel was ineffective because he did not adequately
investigate the petitioner's alibi defense and, as a result, did not call a
particular witness to testify at trial on the petitioner's behalf. The court
noted that the decision on whether or not to call a certain witness to testify
is a matter of strategy and that errors in strategy do not constitute inef-
fective counsel, unless the witness' testimony would exonerate the peti-
tioner.0 7 The Krankel court found that defense counsel was not ineffective
since the decision was merely tactical, and the petitioner was not entitled
to post-conviction relief. 601
The Illinois courts' other tendency is to hold that the alleged ineffective
conduct did not prejudice the petitioner. This approach is demonstrated
by People v. Wishon.60 In Wishon the petitioner pled guilty to murder
603. Id. at 937, 522 N.E.2d at 1333.
604. Id.
605. 147 III. App. 3d 1, 2-3, 497 N.E.2d 856, 856 (5th Dist. 1986).
606. 131 Ill. App. 3d 887, 476 N.E.2d 777 (4th Dist. 1985).
607. Id. at 892, 476 N.E.2d at 782.
608. Id. at 893, 476 N.E.2d at 783.
609. 163 111. App. 3d 852, 516 N.E.2d 1011 (3d Dist. 1987).
280 [Vol. 38:201
1989] ILLINOIS COLLATERAL ATTACK REMEDIES 281
and alleged in his Post-Conviction Hearing Act petition that his counsel
was ineffective for not presenting evidence that would have shown he was
mentally unfit to enter the plea. The court did not discuss whether counsel's
conduct was deficient, but simply held that the petitioner appeared to
understand the charges and articulately entered his plea and, thus, was not
prejudiced by his counsel's failure to raise the issue of competency. 610 Since
the outcome of the proceedings would not have been different even if
counsel had raised this issue, the petitioner's sixth amendment rights were
not violated and he was not entitled to post-conviction relief.6"
People v. Bailey612 is one of the few Illinois decisions that has denied a
petitioner Post-Conviction Hearing Act relief by finding that the petitioner
did not meet the first part of the Strickland standard. The Bailey court
explicitly found that the petitioner had not shown that his counsel's per-
formance was deficient and below an objective standard of reasonableness.
The petitioner had alleged that his counsel was ineffective for not com-
pelling witness testimony, not introducing certain evidence, and not ob-
jecting to jury instructions. The court held that counsel's performance was
not deficient because he objected at trial, moved for a directed verdict,
moved for a mistrial, and filed various post-trial motions .6  Thus, the
petitioner was not denied effective counsel in violation of his sixth amend-
ment rights and, accordingly, was not entitled to relief under the Post-
Conviction Hearing Act. 61 4
In a particularly unsettling opinion by the Illinois Supreme Court, People
v. James,611 the petitioner alleged that he was denied the effective assistance
of counsel because his appellate counsel failed to petition the United States
Supreme Court for review of his attempted murder conviction. The state's
highest court did not evaluate this claim under the Strickland standard,
but, instead, cited a number of other United States Supreme Court decisions
and held that, because the petitioner had no right to the assistance of
counsel in discretionary review proceedings, he could not allege that his
counsel was ineffective for failing to seek discretionary review of his case. 616
In other words, because the petitioner had no right to counsel, he had no
right to effective counsel. 617 The petitioner was not deprived of his sixth
610. Id. at 854, 516 N.E.2d at 1012-13.
611. Id. See also People v. Kubat, 114 Ill. 2d 424, 501 N.E.2d 111 (1986) (petitioner
alleged numerous reasons why his counsel was ineffective but the Illinois Supreme Court
found that the petitioner's sixth amendment rights were not violated because counsel's conduct
either was not deficient, did not prejudice the petitioner, or constituted trial strategy, however,
the court did not apply both portions of the Strickland test to any one claim in reaching its
decision).
612. 141 III. App. 3d 1090, 490 N.E.2d 1334 (Ist Dist. 1986).
613. Id. at 1101-02, 490 N.E.2d at 1342-43.
614. id. at 1105, 490 N.E.2d at 1345.
615. Ill 11. 2d 283, 489 N.E.2d 1350 (1986).
616. Id. at 291, 489 N.E.2d at 1353-54.
617. Id. at 291, 489 N.E.2d at 1354.
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amendment rights and, therefore, was not entitled to relief under the Post-
Conviction Hearing Act. 61s
The Illinois courts have held that where a petitioner shows that an actual
conflict of interest existed during his counsel's representation, or shows
that he was totally denied representation at a crucial stage, he does not
need to show that he was prejudiced by his counsel's behavior. 6 9 In such
a case, prejudice will be presumed and the petitioner will be entitled to
relief on the basis of a sixth amendment violation. 6 0 Although the courts
are consistent in reciting this holding, petitioners rarely are able to show
per se prejudice, and, as a result, must nonetheless meet the Strickland
standard to successfully allege the existence of ineffective counsel. For
example, in People v. Free,62' the petitioner alleged that he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel because the public defender appointed to
represent him had represented another person who was an adverse witness
at the petitioner's preliminary hearing. The court noted that a per se conflict
of interest exists where an attorney is representing an adverse witness and
contemporaneously representing the petitioner. 22 In such a case, the prej-
udice component of the Strickland standard is satisfied without additional
proof by the petitioner. 623 The Free court, however, concluded that the per
se test had not been met. The court first held that an actual conflict of
interest did not exist in Free because the public defender was no longer
representing the adverse witness when he was representing the petitioner. 624
As a result, the petitioner did have the burden of proving that his counsel's
representation of the adverse witness prejudiced the outcome of his trial. 6"
The court next held that the petitioner was unable to meet this burden
and, thus, was unable to show that his counsel was ineffective. 62 6 The
petitioner, therefore, had not sufficiently shown that a substantial sixth
amendment violation occurred and he was not granted relief. 6'2
Similarly, in People v. Bone,' 2s the petitioner was convicted of murder,
felony murder, and armed robbery and alleged in his Post-Conviction
Hearing Act petition that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
because this counsel conceded the petitioner's guilt during closing argument.
618. Id. at 291-92, 489 N.E.2d at 1354.
619. People v. Free, 112 Ill. 2d 154, 167-68, 492 N.E.2d 1269, 1274-75 (1986); People v.
Bernardo, 171 I1. App. 3d 652, 658, 525 N.E.2d 857, 861 (1st Dist. 1988).
620. People v. Bone, 154 Ill. App. 3d 412, 506 N.E.2d 1033 (3d Dist. 1987).
621. 112 I1. 2d 154, 492 N.E.2d 1269 (1986).
622. Id. at 168, 492 N.E.2d at 1274.
623. Id. at 169, 492 N.E.2d at 1274-75.
624. Id. at 168-69, 492 N.E.2d at 1275.
625. Id. at 169, 492 N.E.2d at 1275.
626. Id. at 169-70, 492 N.E.2d at 1275-76.
627. Id. at 170, 492 N.E.2d at 1276. See also People v. Griffin, 124 I1. App. 3d 169, 463
N.E.2d 1063 (5th Dist. 1984) (petitioner had the burden of proving prejudice in an ineffec-
tiveness of counsel claim where he was unable to show an actual conflict of interest existed
by counsel's representation of multiple defendants).
628. 154 Ill. App. 3d 412, 506 N.E.2d 1033 (3d Dist. 1987).
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The court noted that some conduct by counsel is so likely to prejudice a
defendant that prejudice will be presumed. 629 An example of such conduct
would be where defense counsel failed to attack the state's case zealously. 60
The court further noted that such conduct constituted a per se exception
to the case-by-case analysis set forth in Strickland.611 The court held that
defense counsel in this case did not actually admit the petitioner's guilt
and had defended the petitioner aggressively throughout the trial.63 2 Thus,
to support his ineffectiveness of counsel claim, the petitioner had to show
that he was prejudiced by his counsel's remarks because prejudice could
not be presumed in this case.63 1 The petitioner was unable to meet this
burden and, accordingly, was not entitled to relief under the Post-Convic-
tion Hearing Act. 634
b. Confrontation of adversarial witnesses
The sixth amendment guarantees a criminal defendant's right to confront
the witnesses against him. 63  Thus, if a petitioner offers sufficient proof
that he was deprived of this constitutional right, his claim will be cognizable
under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. 636 In People v. Talley,637 for ex-
ample, the petitioner alleged that he was denied his right to adequately
confront the witness against him when the trial court allowed a police
officer's testimony into evidence over the objections of defense counsel.
The petitioner claimed that this testimony contained inadmissible hearsay.
The court held that, although the petitioner's claim was reviewable under
the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, his right of confrontation sufficiently
was preserved through his counsel's cross-examination of the witness. 638
Therefore, the petitioner's sixth amendment rights were not violated and
he was not entitled to relief based on this issue. 639
In People v. Ikerd,60 the petitioner was convicted of armed robbery and
in his Post-Conviction Hearing Act petition he alleged that he was denied
629. Id. at 414-15, 506 N.E.2d at 1035.
630. Id.
631. Id. at 415, 506 N.E.2d at 1035.
632. Id. at 415-16, 506 N.E.2d at 1036.
633. Id.
634. Id. at 416, 506 N.E.2d at 1036. See also People v. Bernardo, 171 I1. App. 3d 652,
525 N.E.2d 857 (1st Dist. 1988) (prejudice will not be presumed where ineffectiveness of
counsel claim is based on the fact that counsel was suffering from mental illness, drug
addiction, and pending disbarrment proceedings; petitioner was unable to show prejudice
under the Strickland standard and was not entitled to post-conviction relief).
635. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
636. People v. Somerville, 42 III. 2d 1, 245 N.E.2d 461 (1969); People v. Talley, 97 II1.
App. 3d 439, 422 N.E.2d 1084 (1st Dist. 1981).
637. 97 II. App. 3d 439, 422 N.E.2d 1084 (Ist Dist. 1981).
638. Id. at 441-46, 422 N.E.2d at 1086-89.
639. Id.
640. 47 Il. 2d 211, 265 N.E.2d 120 (1970).
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the right to confront the witness against him in violation of Bruton v.
United States.6" In Bruton, the United States Supreme Court held that a
defendant's sixth amendment confrontation clause rights are violated when
a co-defendant does not testify at trial but his confession implicating the
defendant is admitted at trial, because the defendant is deprived of the
opportunity to cross-examine the co-defendant regarding the inculpating
statements." 2 Distinguishing Bruton, the Illinois Supreme Court held that
the petitioner's sixth amendment rights were not violated in Ikerd because
the co-defendant did testify at trial and denied making the confession.643
The petitioner had the opportunity to cross-examine the co-defendant and,
consequently, was not entitled to post-conviction relief. '
C. Res Judicata and Waiver
The doctrines of waiver and res judicata effectively operate to deny most
petitioners relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act even though these
petitioners make the requisite showing under the Act that a substantial
constitutional violation occurred during the proceedings that resulted in
conviction. The Illinois courts most often discuss and apply both doctrines
when denying a petitioner relief under the Act. The result is that, if the
petitioner's claim is not barred by one doctrine, it almost certainly will be
barred by the other. The general rule regarding res judicata and waiver is
that a court judgment is res judicata as to all issues actually decided, and
any issue that could have been raised during that proceeding but was not,
is waived." 5 In other words, once a petitioner institutes formal proceedings,
he is precluded from bringing up any constitutional claims raised in those
proceedings during any later proceedings, and he is prevented from bringing
up any constitutional claims in later proceedings that he could have raised
during the earlier proceedings. Furthermore, these doctrines apply regard-
less of whether the constitutional claim was reviewed or could have been
reviewed during a pre-trial suppression hearing," 6 trial,4 7 appeal,6" or
collateral attack hearing," 9 or in a post-trial motion5 0 or collateral attack
petition.61'
641. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
642. Id.
643. 47 I11. 2d at 213, 265 N.E.2d at 121.
644. Id. at 213-14, 265 N.E.2d at 121-22. See also People v. Somerville, 42 I11. 2d 1, 245
N.E.2d 461 (1969) (petitioner denied Post-Conviction Hearing Act relief where no Bruton
violation existed because petitioner confronted testifying co-defendant as to inculpating
statements through cross-examination).
645. People v. Silagy, 116 I1. 2d 357, 365, 507 N.E.2d 830, 833 (1987).
646. People v. Somerville, 42 III. 2d 1, 245 N.E.2d 461 (1969).
647. People v. Roberts, 75 III. 2d 1, 387 N.E.2d 331 (1979).
648. People v. Silagy, 116 I11. 2d 357, 507 N.E.2d 830 (1987).
649. People v. Healey, 23 Ill. App. 3d 214, 318 N.E.2d 89 (2d Dist. 1974).
650. People v. Brandon, 157 I1. App. 3d 835, 510 N.E.2d 1005 (1st Dist. 1987).
651. People v. Talley, 97 111. App. 3d 439, 422 N.E.2d 1084 (1st Dist. 1981); ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 122-3 (1987).
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For example, in People v. Silagy,60 2 the petitioner was convicted of
murder and later filed for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.
The trial court dismissed his petition without an evidentiary hearing.," On
appeal of this order, the petitioner again alleged that a number of consti-
tutional violations occurred during his trial. These allegations focussed on
such issues as jury selection, jury behavior, newly discovered evidence,
ineffective counsel, evidence presented at the sentencing hearing, and im-
position of the death penalty. The Illinois Supreme Court held that it was
precluded from considering some of these issues under the doctrine of res
judicata because the issues previously had been addressed by the appellate
court on direct appeal. 6 4 The court further held that those issues not
addressed on direct appeal were waived because the petitioner could have
raised them on direct appeal. 6"
Similarly, in People v. Kubat,616 the petitioner was convicted of aggra-
vated kidnapping and murder. His conviction was affirmed by the Illinois
Supreme Court617 and he subsequently filed for Post-Conviction Hearing
Act relief alleging that his sixth amendment rights were violated during
trial because he did not receive effective assistance of counsel. The trial
court dismissed the post-conviction petition following an evidentiary hear-
ing. 656 The Illinois Supreme Court, on appeal of the dismissal of the
petitioner's post-conviction petition, affirmed the trial court ruling and
held that all issues raised were addressed on direct appeal and the petitioner
was precluded from raising them in his post-conviction petition under the
doctrine of res judicata. 6 9 The court further held that any specific claims
regarding his counsel that were not raised on direct appeal, should have
been raised, and, accordingly, were waived. 60 The Illinois Supreme Court
opinions in Silagy and Kubat are common examples of the Illinois courts'
application of the res judicata and waiver doctrines. 6 ' The effect of these
doctrines is to deny petitioners relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act, regardless of the validity of their claims.
652. 116 Ill. 2d 357, 507 N.E.2d 830 (1987).
653. Id. at 364, 507 N.E.2d at 832.
654. Id. at 366-71, 507 N.E.2d at 833-36.
655. Id.
656. 114 Ill. 2d 424, 501 N.E.2d 111 (1986).
657. See id. at 427, 501 N.E.2d at 112.
658. Id. at 428, 501 N.E.2d at 112.
659. Id. at 436-38, 501 N.E.2d at 116-17.
660. Id.
661. See People v. Brouhard, 53 Ill. 2d 109, 290 N.E.2d 206 (1972); People v. Brandon,
157 111. App. 3d 835, 510 N.E.2d 1005 (1st Dist. 1987); People v. Mitchell, 163 I1. App. 3d
1007, 517 N.E.2d 20 (4th Dist. 1987); People v. Bailey, 141 I1. App. 3d 1090, 490 N.E.2d
1334 (Ist Dist. 1986); People v. Carbona, 53 III. App. 3d 1022, 369 N.E.2d 197 (1st Dist.
1977); People v. Spicer, 42 I1. App. 3d 246, 355 N.E.2d 711 (1st Dist. 1976); People v.
Healey, 23 III. App. 3d 214, 318 N.E.2d 89 (2d Dist. 1974); People v. Jenkins, 11 111. App.
3d 690, 297 N.E.2d 279 (1st Dist. 1973).
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The application of the res judicata and waiver doctrines is not absolute66
and there are three general exceptions to both doctrines. However, the
Illinois courts have applied these exceptions narrowly." 3 The first exception
is that, if fundamental fairness requires that the doctrines not be applied,
then the Illinois courts will consider a petitioner's claim under the Post-
Conviction Hearing Act, even if the claim was addressed or not raised but
should have been raised during an earlier proceeding.'" The case law does
not define the term fundamental fairness, but, instead, appears to apply
this exception on a case-by-case basis. For example, in People v. Cihlar,"5
the petitioner was convicted of rape, burglary, and home invasion. The
appellate court affirmed the conviction and the petitioner subsequently
filed for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act alleging that a state's
witness had testified against him falsely at trial. The trial court dismissed
the petition without an evidentiary hearing and on appeal, the appellate
court reversed. 6 6 The state appealed this reversal to the Illinois Supreme
Court, which affirmed the appellate court decision. 67 The state argued that
res judicata and waiver should apply because the appellate court affirmed
the conviction on direct appeal and the petitioner should be prevented from
raising the issue of perjured testimony at a post-conviction hearing. The
Illinois Supreme Court, however, noted that the witness had admitted to
a state's attorney that she had testified falsely and fundamental fairness
required that the petitioner's claim be considered at a post-conviction
evidentiary hearing. 66
People v. Hamby,' presents another application of the fundamental
fairness exception. In Hamby, the petitioner had been convicted of armed
robbery and his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. In his post-
conviction petition, the petitioner raised a number of constitutional issues
that were not raised on direct appeal because his attorney had chosen not
to raise them. The petitioner requested that he be allowed to proceed pro
se on direct appeal but his request was denied. The Illinois Supreme Court
held that fundamental fairness required that the petitioner be allowed to
raise these issues in a post-conviction evidentiary hearing. 670 The fact that
these claims were not raised on direct appeal was beyond the petitioner's
662. People v. Roberts, 75 III. 2d 1, 11-12, 387 N.E.2d 331, 336 (1979); People v. Stewart,
66 III. App. 3d 342, 351, 383 N.E.2d 1179, 1187 (Ist Dist. 1978); Healey, 23 Ill. App. 3d at
216, 318 N.E.2d at 91.
663. Roberts, 75 III. 2d at 11, 387 N.E.2d at 336.
664. People v. Hamby, 32 II1. 2d 291, 294, 205 N.E.2d 456, 458 (1965).
665. 111 III. 2d 212, 489 N.E.2d 859 (1986).
666. Id. at 214, 489 N.E.2d at 860.
667. Id. at 219, 489 N.E.2d at 862.
668. Id. at 217-19, 489 N.E.2d at 861-62.
669. 32 Ill. 2d 291, 205 N.E.2d 456 (1965).
670. Id. at 294, 205 N.E.2d at 458.
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control and, hence, the doctrines of res judicata and waiver should not be
applied to prevent review of the claims. 67'
However, the first district in People v. Bailey,672 applied what can only
be called an exception to the fundamental fairness exception and held that
the petitioner's claims were barred by res judicata from being considered
during a post-conviction evidentiary hearing. 6" The petitioner had been
convicted of attempted murder and on direct appeal he raised the issue of
improper jury instructions given during trial. His conviction was affirmed
and the petitioner again raised the issue of improper jury instructions in
his Post-Conviction Hearing Act petition. The appellate court held that
the jury instructions were indeed improper, but that fundamental fairness
does not require the doctrines of res judicata and waiver not be applied
(even in a case where it would otherwise have been appropriate) where the
evidence at trial was not closely balanced and was sufficient for the jury
to convict regardless of the error. 674 Because the evidence was not closely
balanced in Bailey, the court's decision on direct appeal was res judicata
and the petitioner was barred from raising the issue in his post-conviction
petition. 6"
The second exception to an application of res judicata or waiver is that,
if a petitioner's claims can be proved only by facts that are outside of the
record, the claims could not have been addressed or raised during earlier
review proceedings and the petitioner is entitled to review during a Post-
Conviction Hearing Act proceeding.6 76 For example, in People v. Jones,67
the petitioner was convicted of murder and his conviction was affirmed on
appeal. In his post-conviction petition, the petitioner alleged that he was
denied effective assistance of counsel during trial because his counsel
prevented him from testifying on his own behalf. The state argued that
the petitioner waived this claim because he did not raise it on direct appeal.
The court held that, because the factual basis for this claim was not on
the record, the claim could not have been raised on direct appeal and the
waiver doctrine did not apply. 67 The petitioner, therefore, was entitled to
671. Id. at 294-95, 205 N.E.2d at 458-59. See also People v. Spicer, 42 111. App. 3d 246,
355 N.E.2d 711 (lst Dist. 1976) (petitioner's conviction affirmed on appeal and raised issue
of perjured trial testimony in Post-Conviction Hearing Act petition; fundamental fairness
required that petitioner be allowed to advance this claim during a post-conviction evidentiary
hearing); People v. Polansky, 39 I1. 2d 84, 233 N.E.2d 374 (1968) (fundamental fairness
required that petitioner be allowed to raise constitutional claim in second post-conviction
hearing where he was denied his right to counsel during first post-conviction proceeding and
thus did not raise the claim).
672. 141 11. App. 3d 1090, 490 N.E.2d 1334 (lst Dist. 1986).
673. Id. at 1095, 490 N.E.2d at 1338.
674. Id.
675. Id.
676. People v. Goins, 103 II1. App. 3d 596, 598, 431 N.E.2d 1069, 1071 (1st Dist. 1981);
People v. Dennis, 14 Ill. App. 3d 493, 495, 302 N.E.2d 651, 652 (Ist Dist. 1973).
677. 168 I1. App. 3d 925, 522 N.E.2d 1325 (1st Dist. 1988).
678. Id. at 937, 522 N.E.2d at 1333.
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
an evidentiary hearing to review his ineffective counsel claim. 67 9
Similarly, in People v. Shannon,680 the petitioners were convicted of
burglary, the conviction was affirmed on appeal, and the trial court dis-
missed their Post-Conviction Hearing Act petition without an evidentiary
hearing. The petition alleged that a state's witness had committed perjury
at trial and the attached affidavit of a third party supported the petitioners'
claim. The state contended that the issue of the witness' credibility was
addressed on direct appeal and the petitioners' claim, therefore, could not
be considered on collateral attack based on the doctrine of res judicata.
The court first noted that the issue of the witness' credibility was different
from an allegation of perjury. 6s' In addition, the allegation was supported
by a third party's affidavit and this information was not available on direct
appeal.6s2 Accordingly, the facts surrounding the allegation were outside
of the record, could not have been addressed on direct appeal, and the
petitioners were not precluded by res judicata from raising the issue under
the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. 683
The third exception to the application of res judicata and waiver to deny
review of a petitioner's allegations under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
centers on incompetency of counsel claims. One of the general rules in this
area is that a petitioner's post-conviction claim that his trial counsel was
incompetent will not be barred by an earlier reviewing court's decision if
the petitioner was represented by the same counsel at trial and on appeal.68'
In other words, a petitioner can not be expected to raise an incompetent
trial counsel claim on appeal when the counsel who is representing him on
appeal is the same counsel who represented him at trial. Accordingly, a
corollary to this rule is that if a different attorney represented the petitioner
on appeal than represented him at trial, he will have waived his incompetent
trial counsel claim if he did not raise it on appeal. 685 An example of the
corollary principle can be found in People v. Stewart." 6 There, the peti-
tioner had been convicted of armed robbery and the conviction was af-
firmed on appeal. The petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging
that he had not received effective assistance of counsel at trial. However,
he had not raised this claim on appeal. The court held that, because a
679. Id.
680. 28 Ill. App. 3d 873, 329 N.E.2d 399 (1st Dist. 1975).
681. Id. at 876, 329 N.E.2d at 403.
682. Id.
683. Id. See also People v. Mengedoht, 91 Ill. App. 3d 239, 414 N.E.2d 893 (2d Dist.
1980) (res judicata did not bar petitioner's post-conviction allegation that his counsel was
ineffective at motion to suppress hearing because factual information regarding the allegation
was outside of the record and could not be considered on direct appeal).
684. See People v. Bland, 67 Il1. App. 3d 716, 723, 384 N.E.2d 1380, 1387 (1st Dist. 1978);
People v. Healey, 23 I1. App. 3d at 216, 318 N.E.2d 89, 91 (2d Dist. 1974).
685. People v. Stewart, 66 Ill. App. 3d 342, 351-53, 383 N.E.2d 1179, 1186-88 (Ist Dist.
1978); Healey, 23 I1. App. 3d at 217, 318 N.E.2d at 91.
686. 66 Ill. App. 3d 342, 383 N.E.2d 1179 (1st Dist 1978).
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different attorney had represented the petitioner on appeal than at trial,
there was no reason for him to not have raised the incompetent counsel
claim on appeal. 687 As a result, the petitioner was considered to have waived
the claim and was barred from raising it in his Post-Conviction Hearing
Act petition. 688
The waiver and res judicata doctrines also will not be applied to incom-
petency of trial counsel claims alleged for the first time on collateral attack
where different attorneys represented the petitioner on appeal and at trial,
but both attorneys were from the same public defender's office. In People
v. Bland,6 9 for example, the petitioner had been convicted of murder and
armed robbery and raised an incompetency of trial counsel claim for the
first time in his Post-Conviction Hearing Act petition, even though his
conviction was reviewed on direct appeal. The court held that the petitioner
had not waived this claim, even though he had not raised it on direct
appeal, because the two attorneys representing him at trial and on appeal,
although different, were both from the same public defender's office. 69°
The incompetency of counsel claim, therefore, could be addressed in a
post-conviction evidentiary hearing.69
Finally, waiver and res judicata will not be applied to issues not raised
on appeal and raised for the first time in a Post-Conviction Hearing Act
petition when the petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel in
the direct appeal itself. In People v. Blewett, 92 the petitioner contended
that a due process violation occurred at trial but was not raised on appeal
because his appellate counsel was incompetent. The petitioner thus raised
the due process claim for the first time in his Post-Conviction Hearing Act
petition. Although the court stated that it believed a due process violation
had not occurred and that the petitioner's counsel on appeal was not
ineffective, these claims would not be barred if raised for the first time on
collateral attack when a petitioner's right to direct appeal in essence has
been unconstitutionally denied because of incompetent counsel on appeal. 693
D. Procedural Barriers To
Post-Conviction Hearing Act Relief
Although the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does not necessarily contain
a greater number of procedural requirements than either statutory habeas
687. Id. at 352-53, 383 N.E.2d at 1188.
688. Id. See also Healey, 23 I11. App. 3d 214, 318 N.E.2d 89 (petitioner was barred from
raising incompetency of counsel claim in Post-Conviction Hearing Act petition where not
raised on direct appeal and different attorney represented him on appeal than represented
him at trial).
689. 67 I1. App. 3d 716, 384 N.E.2d 1380 (lst Dist. 1978).
690. Id. at 723, 384 N.E.2d at 1387.
691. Id.
692. 11 111. App. 3d 1051, 298 N.E.2d 366 (1st Dist. 1973).
693. Id. at 1055, 298 N.E.2d at 369.
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corpus or statutory coram nobis, the procedural requirements under the
Post-Conviction Hearing Act are litigated more often than those under
habeas corpus or coram nobis. This is not surprising in light of the fact
that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act is used by more petitioners to col-
laterally attack final judgments of conviction than either habeas corpus or
coram nobis. In addition, statutory habeas corpus and statutory coram
nobis are much older collateral attack remedies than the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act, and the application and constitutionality of various proce-
dures under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act are still being settled.69'
Similar to the other two Illinois collateral attack remedies, the Post-
Conviction Hearing Act is not a substitute for appeal and its purpose is
not to relitigate a petitioner's guilt or innocence. 695 Therefore, the Act does
not provide a method for redetermining a trial court's verdict.6 96 The
purpose of the Act is to remedy constitutional violations that occurred
during the proceedings resulting in conviction.6 7 Although the Act is
directly applicable to criminal proceedings, it is civil in nature and the
petitioner has the burden of showing the requisite constitutional violation
by a preponderance of the evidence. 691 Because the purpose of the Act is
to remedy constitutional violations that occurred during the proceedings
that resulted in conviction, and because the Act is directly applicable to
criminal proceedings, the Illinois courts have held that the Act does not
extend to juvenile proceedings. 699 Therefore, there is no comparable remedy
available to juveniles who allege constitutional violations arising from
various juvenile proceedings.10
The statute *of limitations under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act is
currently ten years, although this statutory period has undergone a number
of changes since the Act's inception in 1949.701 The current Act states that
a petition must be filed within ten years after a final judgment has been
entered "unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not
due to his culpable negligence. ' 7 02 The Illinois Supreme Court has noted
694. See infra notes 719-50 and accompanying text.
695. People v. James, 111 Ill. 2d 283, 290, 489 N.E.2d 1350, 1353 (1986); People v.
Stewart, 66 Ill. App. 3d 342, 348, 383 N.E.2d 1179, 1185 (Ist Dist. 1978).
696. People v. Harris, 91 111. App. 3d 376, 379, 414 N.E.2d 911, 914 (3d Dist. 1980).
697. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 122-1 (1987).
698. People v. Griffin, 124 111. App. 3d 169, 177, 463 N.E.2d 1063, 1069 (5th Dist. 1984).
But see People v. Johnson, 97 Ill. App. 3d 976, 978,-424 N.E.2d 12, 14 (Ist Dist. 1981)
("[a] pro se petition need not set forth such allegations in strict compliance with the standards
relating to pleadings and proof.").
699. In re R.R., 75 III. App. 3d 494, 495, 394 N.E.2d 75, 76 (2d Dist. 1979).
700. In re Buchanan, 62 Ill. App. 3d 463, 465, 379 N.E.2d 122, 124 (1st Dist. 1978).
701. See ILL. Rsv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 122-1 (1987) ("No proceedings under this Article
shall be commenced more than 10 years after rendition of final judgment .... "); People
v. Bates, 124 II1. 2d 81, 83-84, 529 N.E.2d 227, 228 (1988) (discussing some of the various
amendments to the limitations period and their retroactive effect).
702. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 122-1 (1987).
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that this flexibility in the ten year time frame provides a safety valve to
petitioners that did not exist with previous statute of limitation periods
under the Act.10 It is unknown how broadly the Illinois courts will ulti-
mately interpret this provision but the Illinois Supreme Court recently
applied the provision very literally to deny a petitioner relief. In People v.
Bates,704 the petitioner had been convicted of murder in 1972 and, at the
time, the statute of limitation period under the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act was twenty years. 70 - In 1984, the statutory period was shortened to ten
years.706 The petitioner filed for relief eleven years after his conviction and
five weeks after the new statutory period became effective. The Illinois
Supreme Court first determined that the shortened period applied retro-
actively to the petitioner's claim. 70 7 The court next discussed the general
rule that when a new shortened statutory time period applies, a petitioner
still is afforded a reasonable time frame after its effective date within
which to bring an action.708 Thus, the petitioner's claim was not instanta-
neously barred by the new statute of limitations. 709 The court held, however,
that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act requires a petitioner to allege facts
justifying his delay in filing and the petitioner here had not done So. 7 10
Therefore, the petitioner was not entitled to relief under the so-called
"safety valve" provision and his petition was barred by the new statute of
limitation time period.7 11
The Illinois Supreme Court's holding in Bates is troublesome in that the
petitioner clearly had a justifiable reason for not complying with the ten
year statutory period because, when he was convicted and shortly before
he filed for relief, the statutory period was twenty years and not ten years.
The petitioner's failure to allege this fact in his Post-Conviction Hearing
Act petition does not appear to be a good reason to deny review of his
claim. The court just as easily could have allowed the petitioner to amend
his petition to include this obvious reason for not complying with the ten
year period.
Similar to incorrectly labelled habeas corpus and coram nobis petitions, the
Illinois courts have held that unlabelled or mislabelled petitions should be
treated as petitions seeking relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act if the
Act more appropriately applies to the allegations set forth in the petition.712
703. Bates, 124 Il. 2d at 87-88, 529 N.E.2d at 230.
704. Id. at 81, 529 N.E.2d at 227.
705. Id. at 83, 529 N.E.2d at 228.
706. Id. at 83-84, 529 N.E.2d at 228.
707. Id. at 84-86, 529 N.E.2d at 228-29.
708. Id. at 86-87, 529 N.E.2d at 229-30.
709. Id. at 87-89, 529 N.E.2d at 230-31.
710. Id. at 88, 529 N.E.2d at 230.
711. Id.
712. People v. Carbona, 53 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 1025, 369 N.E.2d 197, 199 (1st Dist. 1977);
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For example, in People v. Yarbar,1 the petitioner filed a motion to vacate his
sentence under statutory coram nobis. The petitioner had been resentenced
under the Uniform Code of Corrections and he alleged in his motion that the
trial court had imposed an unwarranted higher maximum sentence in violation
of his due process rights. The court held that statutory coram nobis was not
applicable to his claim and that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act provided the
petitioner with a more appropriate remedy. 714 The court then proceeded to
consider whether or not the petitioner was entitled to relief under the Post-
Conviction Hearing Act .71
Similarly, in People v. Carbona,7 6 the petitioner did not mislabel her
petition, but simply did not state a procedural basis in her motion for a
new trial. The petitioner was convicted of murder and alleged that she
should receive a new trial because of newly discovered evidence. The court
first determined whether statutory habeas corpus or statutory coram nobis
more appropriately applied to the petitioner's claim. 7 ' The court finally
determined that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act provided the most ap-
propriate remedy and then analyzed the claim accordingly.718
Petitioners have challenged the constitutionality and interpretation of a
variety of procedural requirements under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.
The procedural issues most frequently addressed by a reviewing court after
a petitioner's request for relief has been denied will now be examined.
1. Constitutional Challenges and Mandatory Versus Directory
Provisions
The constitutionality of a number of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act's
procedural requirements have been challenged, and only recently have the
Illinois courts reached decisions on these issues. In addition, the Illinois
courts recently have determined that trial courts are mandated to follow
certain procedures under the Act, while other provisions are optional in
nature. Petitioners seeking relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act,
therefore, are finally receiving judicial guidance as to the procedural mean-
ing and ramifications of many of the Act's provisions.
People v. Yarbar, 43 Ill. App. 3d 668, 670, 357 N.E.2d 166, 168 (1st Dist. 1977). See supra
notes 219-49, 379 and accompanying text.
713. 43 Ill. App. 3d 668, 357 N.E.2d 166 (1st Dist. 1976).
714. Id. at 670-71, 357 N.E.2d at 168.
715. Id. at 670-72, 357 N.E.2d at 168-70. See also People v. Williams, 11 111. App. 3d
275, 296 N.E.2d 617 (5th Dist. 1973) (petitioner's motion to vacate judgment and sentence
should be considered under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act because form over substance
should not prevail in determining whether petitioners are entitled to post-conviction relief);
People v. Mass, 9 Il1. App. 3d 67, 292 N.E.2d 33 (2d Dist. 1972) (petitioner's pro Se motion
for rehearing on aggravation and mitigation should be considered under the more appropriate
Post-Conviction Hearing Act).
716. 53 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 369 N.E.2d 197 (1st Dist. 1977).
717. Id. at 1025, 369 N.E.2d at 199.
718. Id. at 1025-27, 369 N.E.2d at 199-201.
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Up until 1986, the Post-Conviction Hearing Act required that all petitions
and proceedings under the Act must be handled by a judge who was not
involved in the original proceedings which resulted in conviction.7 19 This
provision was held to be unconstitutional by the Illinois Supreme Court in
People v. Joseph.720 The purpose of the provision was to provide a peti-
tioner with a more objective and fresher approach to reviewing his claim
and, therefore, ensure greater procedural protection.72 , However, the court
in Joseph held that this provision violated the constitutionally mandated
separation of powers principle.7 2 The court noted that the assignment of
judges to a proceeding is an administrative function of the judicial system
and, accordingly, is an element of judicial power . 7 2 The court held that
the legislature constitutionally has no authority to interfere with the court's
administrative and supervisory responsibilities, and the statutory provision
encroached upon judicial administrative responsibilities, namely, assigning
judges to proceedings.7 24 Thus, the court held that the provision was
unconstitutional. 725
The Post-Conviction Hearing Act allows a trial court judge to dismiss a
frivolous or meritless post-conviction petition without first appointing
counsel,72 6 and petitioners also have challenged this provision as violative
of the separation of powers clause of the Illinois constitution and of due
process and equal protection. In People v. Porter,727 the petitioner first
contended that this provision violated the doctrine of separation of powers
because it conflicted with Supreme Court Rule 651(c). The rule provides
that a trial court must provide an indigent petitioner with a transcript and
counsel upon a timely filing of a notice of appeal in a post-conviction
proceeding 27 8 The rule further requires that the record filed in the appellate
court show that this counsel reviewed the petition and consulted with the
petitioner. 729 The petitioner alleged that when a trial court dismisses a pro
se indigent petitioner's claim without appointing counsel, the record on
appeal fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 651(c). The Illinois
Supreme Court held that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act provision was
not unconstitutional and did not conflict with Rule 651(c).7 1 0 The court
719. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38,"para. 122-8 (1987) (providing rule as articulated by the Illinois
legislature in 1983).
720. 113 Il1. 2d 36, 495 N.E.2d 501 (1986).
721. Id. at 50-51, 495 N.E.2d at 508 (Simon, J., dissenting).
722. Id. at 44, 495 N.E.2d at 505.
723. Id. at 44, 495 N.E.2d at 504.
724. Id. at 44, 495 N.E.2d at 505.
725. Id. at 47-48, 495 N.E.2d at 507.
726. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 122-2.1(a) (1987).
727. 122 Ill. 2d 64, 521 N.E.2d 1158 (1988).
728. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IIOA, para. 651(c) (1987).
729. Id. For an application of Supreme Court Rule 651(c) to a petitioner's claim that post-
conviction counsel did not comply with the rule, see People v. Stewart, 121 Ill. 2d 93, 520
N.E.2d 348 (1988).
730. 122 Ill. 2d at 70-73, 521 N.E.2d at 1159-61.
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reasoned that Rule 651(c) governs appeals from post-conviction proceed-
ings, while the Post-Conviction Hearing Act provision governs the trial
court review of collateral claims.7' Therefore, both provisions address
different stages of the post-conviction process."2  In addition, the court
noted that a petitioner does not have a right to counsel at post-conviction
proceedings and any statutory provision requiring appointment of counsel
at such a proceeding is a matter of "legislative grace." '33
The Porter court also held that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act's pro-
vision allowing for dismissal of a petition without appointing counsel did
not violate the petitioner's equal protection and due process rights.7 4 The
court stated that the provision only speaks to the dismissal of frivolous or
meritless claims.7 3 5 If an indigent petitioner sufficiently alleges a constitu-
tional violation, the petition will not be dismissed and he will be entitled
to appointed counsel.73 6 The Act, therefore, provides indigent petitioners
with an opportunity to be heard and is not fundamentally unfair.737
The Post-Conviction Hearing Act states that the trial court must review
a petition and enter its order within thirty days after the petition is filed
and docketed. 3 Although the Illinois appellate courts held that this pro-
vision was not mandatory and that an order dismissing a petition after the
thirty days was not void,7 39 the Illinois Supreme Court recently held in
People v. Porter that this provision is mandatory.7 0 The supreme court
noted that, in order to determine whether a statutory provision is mandatory
or directory, the legislative intent of the provision must be examined.7 4 '
The court found the provision mandatory for two reasons. First, the Act
states that a court "shall" examine a petition and enter an order within
thirty days and the word "shall" generally indicates a mandatory intent. 42
Second, when a provision prescribes the result if a trial court fails to
comply, this is indicative of mandatory intent.7 43 The provision at issue
731. Id. at 72, 521 N.E. 2d at 1160.
732. Id.
733. Id. at 73, 521 N.E.2d at 1161 (quoting People v. Ward, 124 Ill. App. 3d 974, 978, 464
N.E.2d 1144, 1147 (lst Dist. 1984)).
734. Id. at 73-78, 521 N.E.2d at 1161-63.
735. Id. at 74, 521 N.E.2d at 1161.
736. Id. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 122-4 (1987). It should be noted that if an indigent
petitioner's claim is not dismissed as frivolous or meritless, he also is entitled to a free copy
of a transcript of the proceedings. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 122-4 (1987); People v. Cooper,
142 I1. App. 3d 223, 228-29, 491 N.E.2d 815, 818-19 (4th Dist. 1986).
737. 122 Ill. 2d at 74-78, 521 N.E.2d at 1161-63.
738. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 122-2.1(a) (1987).
739. People v. Roy, 151 Ill. App. 3d 940, 503 N.E.2d 835 (2d Dist. 1987). But see People
v. Brown, 142 I1. App. 3d 139, 143-44, 491 N.E.2d 486, 488-90 (5th Dist. 1986) (finding the
30 day limit to be mandatory rather than permissive).
740. 122 IIl. 2d 64, 83-86, 521 N.E.2d 1158, 1165-67 (1988).
741. Id. at 84-85, 521 N.E.2d at 1166.
742. Id. at 85, 521 N.E.2d at 1166.
743. Id.
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states that if the petition is not dismissed, the court shall order the petition
docketed for further consideration.744 The court thus concluded that the
thirty day requirement was mandatory and not directory. 74
Finally, the Act requires that if a trial court determines that a petition
is frivolous or without merit, the dismissal shall occur through a written
order. 46 The Illinois Supreme Court held in Porter, however, that the
written order requirement was not mandatory. 747 The court noted that the
word "shall" does not always indicate a mandatory legislative intent, and
the purpose and context of the provision must be examined.748 The court
found that the word "shall" referred to the court's duty to dismiss a
meritless or frivolous claim, and not to the fact that the dismissal must be
in writing. 49 Further, because the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does not
state that the order is void if not in writing, the legislature intended that
this portion of the provision be directory and not mandatory.750
2. Evidentiary Hearing
The Illinois courts consistently have held that a petitioner seeking relief
under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does not have a right to an evi-
dentiary hearing to review his claim.'l A trial court, however, should order
a hearing when a petitioner makes a substantial showing that his consti-
tutional rights were violated during the proceedings that resulted in con-
viction. 71S To make a substantial showing, a petitioner must support his
claim with the trial court record or accompanying affidavits. 5 3 A petition-
er's claim, therefore, will be summarily dismissed without an evidentiary
hearing and his allegations held to be merely conclusory if the records and
affidavits do not accompany his petition or are found not to support the
allegations. 5 4
744. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 122-2.1(b) (1987).
745. 122 II. 2d at 85, 521 N.E.2d at 1166.
746. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 122-2.1(a) (1987).
747. 122 Ill. 2d at 82-83, 521 N.E.2d at 1165.
748. Id. at 82, 521 N.E.2d at 1165.
749. Id.
750. Id. at 83, 521 N.E.2d at 1165.
751. People v. Silagy, 116 II. 2d 357, 365, 507 N.E.2d 830, 833 (1987); People v. James,
111 I1. 2d 283, 291-92, 489 N.E.2d 1350, 1354 (1986).
752. E.g., Silagy, 116 Ill. 2d at 365, 507 N.E.2d at 833.
753. Id.; People v. Pierce, 48 Il1. 2d 48, 50, 268 N.E.2d 373, 374 (1971); People v.
Brandon, 157 Ill. App. 3d 835, 845, 510 N.E.2d 1005, 1011 (Ist Dist. 1987). See ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 122-2 (1987). See also People ex rel. Daley v. Fitzgerald, 123 III. 2d 175,
526 N.E.2d 131 (1988) (trial court judge has discretion to permit discovery depositions in a
Post-Conviction Hearing Act proceeding).
754. E.g., James, 111 Ill. 2d at 292, 489 N.E.2d at 1354; Pierce, 48 Ill. 2d at 50, 268
N.E.2d at 374. See also People v. Andson, 73 Il1. App. 3d 700, 705, 392 N.E.2d 358, 362
(1st Dist. 1979) (post-conviction trial court finding will not be set aside on review "unless it
is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.").
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For example, in People v. McGinnis,7"1 the petitioner alleged that he was
denied effective assistance of counsel at trial and that the complaining
witness had given perjured testimony at trial. The court held, however,
that the petitioner was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.7 6 The peti-
tioner had not attached affidavits to his petition and the court stated that,
although this alone was not fatal to his claim, his allegations must then be
uncontradicted and supported by the trial record. 17 The court found that
the record did not support the petitioner's allegations and the trial court's
dismissal of the petition without an evidentiary hearing was affirmed.",
Similarly, in People v. Harris,7" 9 the petitioner alleged that circumstances
surrounding his guilty plea and sentence for murder violated his constitu-
tional rights. The petitioner attached the affidavits of his counsel and of
himself to support his claim. The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal
of the petition without an evidentiary hearing, holding that the record
contradicted the allegations contained in the petition and affidavits. 760
The Illinois Supreme Court has held that, if an evidentiary hearing is
ordered to review a petitioner's allegations, the petitioner is not entitled to
attend such a hearing unless his presence is necessary because factual,
rather than legal, issues must be determined.76' The supreme court has
determined that one of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act's provisions sup-
ports this holding.76 2 This provision provides that "in its discretion the
[trial] court may order the petitioner brought before the court for the
hearing. ' 763 In People v. Hamby,76 the Illinois Supreme Court noted that
this provision was a result of the recognized hazards and expenses that are
always involved in transporting prisoners to court for collateral attack
proceedings.76 15 The court held that the determining factor is whether factual
issues or legal issues must be decided at the hearing.76 The trial court in
this case requested information regarding evidence presented at trial during
the evidentiary hearing. The supreme court held that, when looking at the
request in the context of the entire proceedings, this request was not for
755. 51 11. App. 3d 273, 276-77, 366 N.E.2d 969, 973 (1st Dist. 1977).
756. Id. at 276-77, 366 N.E.2d at 973.
757. Id. at 275, 366 N.E.2d at 972.
758. Id. at 275-76, 366 N.E.2d at 972-73.
759. 91 111. App. 3d 376, 414 N.E.2d 911 (3d Dist. 1980).
760. Id. at 380-81, 414 N.E.2d at 914-15. See also People v. Carbona, 53 III. App. 3d
1022, 369 N.E.2d 197 (lst Dist. 1977) (post-conviction allegations were conclusory in nature
and petitioner was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because affidavits accompanying
petition did not contain legally available factual information).
761. People v. Hamby, 39 Ill. 2d 290, 291-92, 235 N.E.2d 572, 574 (1968); People v.
Sullivan, 6 I11. App. 3d 814, 819, 286 N.E.2d 605, 609 (1st Dist. 1972).
762. Hamby, 39 I11. 2d at 292, 235 N.E.2d at 574 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para.
122-6 (1987)).
763. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 122-6 (1987).
764. 39 Ill. 2d 290, 235 N.E.2d 572 (1968).
765. Id. at 291-92, 235 N.E.2d at 574.
766. Id. at 292, 235 N.E.2d at 574.
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factual information. 76 Therefore, only legal issues were being determined
and the petitioner was not entitled to attend the hearing. 768 The court did
not discuss whether or why this holding and this portion of the Post-
Conviction Hearing Act are also applicable to petitioners not imprisoned
at the time of the hearing.
3. Standing
The Post-Conviction Hearing Act states that it is applicable to "any
person imprisoned in the penitentiary" who makes the requisite showing
that his constitutional rights were substantially violated during the pro-
ceedings that resulted in conviction. 769 Although an early Illinois Supreme
Court ruling held that the Act is available only to incarcerated petitioners,
the rationale articulated by the court stressed the distinction between felons
as serious offenders and other persons convicted of criminality.770 Accord-
ingly, the court found that the purpose of the Act supported its application
only to petitioners actually imprisoned in the penitentiary.1,
In recent years, however, the Illinois Supreme Court has altered its
interpretation of custody as it relates to the Act and, hence, has retreated
from its earlier ruling regarding the standing issue. In People v. Correa,772
the petitioner had pled guilty to delivery of a controlled substance and was
sentenced to three years in the Illinois Department of Corrections. At the
time the petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, he was no longer incar-
cerated but was serving a term of mandatory supervised release as part of
his original sentence. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the petitioner
did have standing to seek relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. 773
The court reasoned that, because he was on mandatory supervised release,
he still was serving part of his original sentence and the Illinois Department
of Corrections retained supervision and custody of him.77 4 Therefore, the
petitioner was still subject to being confined if he violated the conditions
of his release, and this was sufficient to find that he was in custody for
purposes of the Act . 7 5
In People v. Martin-Trigona,7 6 the Illinois Supreme Court extended the
rationale of Correa and held that the petitioner was entitled to seek relief
767. Id. at 294-95, 235 N.E.2d at 575-76.
768. See id.
769. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 122-1 (1987).
770. People v. Dale, 406 III. 238, 246-47, 92 N.E.2d 761, 765-66 (1950).
771. Id.
772. 108 Ill. 2d 541, 485 N.E.2d 307 (1985).
773. Id. at 544-47, 485 N.E.2d at 308-09.
774. Id. at 546, 485 N.E.2d at 309.
775. Id. at 546-47, 485 N.E.2d at 309. See also People v. Meyerowitz, 61 111. 2d 200, 335
N.E.2d 1 (1975) (petitioner on probation entitled to seek relief under the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act).
776. 111 I!1. 2d 295, 489 N.E.2d 1356 (1986).
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under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, even though he avoided incarcer-
ation for his current conviction by posting an appeal bond.77" The court
cited Correa and noted that, while those on bond are at liberty, they
nevertheless are subject to incarceration and, thus, are still under the state's
control. 7 8 The court concluded that a petitioner on appeal bond and not
incarcerated is nonetheless imprisoned in the penitentiary for purposes of
the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. 779
The Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. Warr,'8 was faced with the
issue of whether convicted misdemeanants had standing under the Post-
Conviction Hearing Act. The Court in Warr, while granting relief, chose
not to erode further the Act's imprisoned felon standing requirement.
Instead, the court fashioned a common law remedy for convicted misde-
meanants similar to that provided by the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. In
Warr, the petitioners were sentenced to jail terms following convictions for
various misdemeanor offenses. The court noted that the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act was not an available collateral attack remedy because the
petitioners were not imprisoned felons. 8' The court stated, however, that
a collateral attack remedy should be available to misdemeanants who show
that their constitutional rights were violated during the proceedings that
resulted in conviction.7 82 Accordingly, the court held that, in the exercise
of its supervisory power, and until the Illinois legislature modified the
Post-Conviction Hearing Act, a petitioner convicted of a misdemeanor is
entitled to seek relief by instituting a proceeding that is similar in nature
to a proceeding under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. 783 The court further
held that for a petitioner to be entitled to relief, the petitioner need not
be imprisoned, he is not entitled to appointed counsel if his petition is
without merit, and he must bring his claim within four months if final
judgment was entered upon a guilty plea and within six months if it was
entered following trial.784
The result of the Warr holding is that the provisions of the Post-
Conviction Hearing Act generally are applicable to convicted misdemean-
ants, even though technically the Act is not an available remedy for this
group. The Illinois legislature has not amended the Act to include misde-
meanants, but the Warr holding still provides a similar remedy to those
convicted of misdemeanors.
E. Critical Summary
The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides convicts with a more
broad based collateral attack vehicle than state habeas corpus or coram
777. Id. at 300, 489 N.E.2d at 1358.
778. Id. at 299-300, 489 N.E.2d at 1358.
779. Id. at 300-03, 489 N.E.2d at 1358-59.
780. 54 I11. 2d 487, 298 N.E.2d 164 (1973).
781. Id. at 491-92, 298 N.E.2d at 166.
782. Id. at 492, 298 N.E.2d at 166.
783. Id. at 492.93, 298 N.E.2d at 167.
784. Id. at 493, 298 N.E.2d at 167.
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nobis. Since the Act addresses violations of constitutional rights, which
are 1) the most frequently raised claims, and 2) the most significant
violations because they implicate fundamental rights, the state legislature
has created an important remedy that filled the wide gap of defects not
contemplated by the other two remedies.
However, this enactment and the judicial interpretations of it reveal a
number of flaws. For example, the courts have at times appeared to take
a very narrow view of what constitutes a constitutional violation. The
courts' consideration of claims regarding illegal arrests and detentions
sometimes are rejected on the theory that these claims do not implicate
constitutional rights.78' Obviously, the fourth amendment of the federal
constitution 78 6 and article I, section 6 of the Illinois constitution78' do
govern unreasonable arrests 8  and detentions.8 9 Similarly, since guilty pleas
must be voluntary and intelligent in order to comport with due process, 790
it is not clear as to why violations of Supreme Court Rule 402,'79 which
apparently is designed to address these due process concerns, 92 are not
viewed as cognizable claims under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.
793
In some instances, the courts' refusal to characterize certain claims as
constitutional claims may be defensible but is not adequately explained.
For example, violations of the state speedy trial requirements are viewed
as not cognizable constitutional claims.' 94 Of course, the sixth amendment
785. See supra notes 413-17 and accompanying text. Cf. supra notes 479-91 and accom-
panying text.
786. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
787. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6.
788. See, e.g., Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981) (where police possessed only
an arrest warrant for a third party, entry into defendant's premises in order to search for
and effectuate arrest of the third party is violative of the fourth amendment in absence of
exigent circumstances or consent); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (warrantless
entry into defendant's premises in order to effectuate arrest violative of fourth amendment
in absence of exigent circumstances or consent).
789. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (fourth amendment violated where
state fails to provide arrestee, not formally charged, with a prompt judicial determination
of probable cause to justify cautioned detention of accused); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S.
40 (1968) (stop and frisk of suspect which was not motivated by search for weaponry violative
of fourth amendment).
790. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (failure of trial court to affirmatively
find that defendant's guilty plea was voluntary and intelligent was violative of due process).
791. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. IOA, para. 402 (1987).
792. People v. Billops, 16 Ill. App. 3d 892, 894, 307 N.E.2d 206, 208 (5th Dist. 1974):
"The purpose of these [Rule 402] admonitions is to assure that the defendant fully understands
what he is pleading to, what rights he is waiving by so pleading, and what the results of his
action might be."
793. See, e.g., People v. Turner, 25 111. App. 3d 847, 323 N.E.2d 371 (3d Dist. 1975). To
the extent Rule 402 requires certain procedures not constitutionally required, such as estab-
lishing a factual basis supportive of the plea, the trial court's failure to not scrupulously
honor these aspects of Rule 402 would not implicate constitutional concerns. See People v.
Weathers, 83 111. App. 3d 451, 404 N.E.2d 1011 (3d Dist. 1980).
794. See supra notes 437-46 and accompanying text.
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of the federal constitution795 and article I, section 8 of the Illinois consti-
tution do guarantee defendants the right to a speedy trial. 71 However, the
federal constitutional guarantee was interpreted in one case as having no
application, even after several years had passed in bringing the accused to
trial. 797 Accordingly, the mere passage of only a few months will not create
a federal constitutional problem. 798 In addition, it is true that the Illinois
speedy trial enactment, which normally requires a trial within 120 days if
the defendant remains in custody or within 160 days of a speedy trial
demand if he is not in custody, 799 may require a trial more promptly than
the state constitutional mandate. °° But in any event, the Illinois courts
have not provided useful guidance as to when the state constitution speedy
trial provision becomes operative, nor any opinion as to when the federal
guarantee becomes applicable. Consequently, it is totally unclear as to 1)
where the Illinois courts, faced with an inordinate delay between a charge
and trial, would draw the line between mere statutory violations, not
cognizable under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, and constitutional viol-
ations, which must be addressed by the Act's provision, or 2) whether they
would ever find a lengthy delay worthy of consideration under a consti-
tutional analysis.
A similar criticism can be directed at the case law involving claims of
error in a sentencing proceeding. The extent to which the constitution
demands certain procedural requirements in a sentencing hearing or, in any
event, any type of hearing is not entirely clear. In one opinion, the United
States Supreme Court flatly stated "We [have] held . . . that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not require a judge to
have [sentencing] hearings and to give a convicted person an opportunity
to participate in those hearings when he came to determine sentence." 80'
On the other hand, if the state moves to have a convicted defendant
designated as falling within a certain class of offenders, such as a "sexually
dangerous person"890  or "habitual criminal," 803 which findings normally
795. U.S. CONsT. amend VI.
796. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.
797. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
798. See, e.g., Gray v. King, 724 F.2d 1199 (5th Cir. 1984) (month delay between arrest
and trial of attempted murderer not violative of sixth amendment). But see United States v.
Holyfield, 802 F.2d 846, 848 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (five month delay triggered inquiry
into Barker factors), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1090 (1987).
799. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 103-5 (1987).
800. People v. Stuckey, 34 111. 2d 521, 216 N.E.2d 785 (1966).
801. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 606 (1966) (citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S.
241 (1949)).
802. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 105-1.01 (1987); People v. Studdard, 51 111. 2d 190,
281 N.E.2d 678 (1972) (Sexual Dangerous Person Act finding requires hearing that comports
with due process).
803. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 33B-1 (1987). See also Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S.
554 (1967) and Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980), for illustrations of the workings of
habitual criminal legislation.
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invoke more serious sanctions than those attached to the offense of which
the defendant has just been convicted, a hearing comporting with due
process is required.8s 4 In addition, it has been held that a defendant must
be afforded an opportunity to present any mitigating factors before a death
penalty sentence is imposed""5 and, accordingly, by implication, a sentencing
hearing is required in a capital case. s06 Before a person's probation8 7 or
parole is revoked, 08 he must be afforded a hearing. In Illinois, it could be
argued that the sentencing hearing provisions of the Uniform Code of
Corrections,8" which require a sentencing hearing10 in which full consid-
eration must be given to certain factors in mitigation$" as well as certain
factors in aggravation,8 1 2 implicitly are required by the Illinois constitution
which states "[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to the
seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender
to useful citizenship." ' " Thus, to the extent cases like People v. Scott
814
suggest a sentencing hearing is not mandated by either the federal or state
constitution, these holdings may be simplistic. In any event, the total lack
of any useful analysis or reasoning in connection with such a complicated
and important issue is disturbing.
Not only does the federal and, perhaps, the state constitution require a
sentencing hearing in some, if not all, circumstances, 8" but it also is clear
that certain procedural and substantive protections must attend any sen-
tencing hearing. For example, the United States Supreme Court has ruled
that a defendant should be afforded counsel at a sentencing hearing.1 6 The
Court also has held that it was a constitutional error for a sentencing judge
to rely on erroneous information presented by the government as evidence
in aggravation.1 7 Further, the Court has held that sentences cannot be
disproportionate to the wrong 18 or to other's sentences following similar
804. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1966).
805. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
806. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1 (1987).
807. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
808. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
809. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 1001-1-1 to 1008-6-1 (1987).
810. See id. at para. 1005-4-1.
811. See id. at para. 1005-5-3.1.
812. See id. at para. 1005-5-3.2.
813. Iu. CoNsT. Art I, § 11.
814. See supra notes 451-52 and accompanying text.
815. For a discussion of this important issue, see REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GoALs: COURTS 190-92 (1973).
816. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
817. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
818. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (death penalty for rape was per se dispropor-
tionate and violative of the cruel and unusual punishment provision); Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86 (1958) (denationalization for military desertion constitutes cruel and unusual punish-
ment); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (15 years at hard labor for falsifying
an official document constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth
amendment).
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criminality 19 without violating the eighth amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment.8 20 In addition, Illinois courts have struck
down sentences at odds with article I, section 11 of the Illinois constitution
because they were either excessive in light of the "seriousness of the
offense"8 2' or they were not in accordance with the aim of "restoring the
offender to useful citizenship. 8 22 Thus, when the court in People v.
Blewettl 23 proclaimed that the defendant's constitutional rights were not
violated where the sentencing court refused to consider the sentences given
to his co-defendants, the court ignored the federal and state constitutional
jurisprudence that protects against sentencing disparity. While the result in
Blewett may have been correct, the court offered no principled rationale
to justify its ultimate conclusion.
The Illinois courts' determination that most trial errors do not amount
to constitutional error is likewise quite simplistic. For example, when the
court in People v. Farley02 4 dismissed a petitioner's claim that his speedy
trial rights were violated when an erroneous continuance of his trial
occurred, the court failed to address the federal and state constitutional
rights to a speedy trial that conceivably might have been violated.8 2, When
the trial court in People v. Cox826 possibly erred in admitting incriminating
statements of the petitioner's co-defendant, the reviewing court's statement
that a claim of erroneously admitted evidence was not of constitutional
magnitude ran counter to a large body of case law.1 27 Likewise, some
erroneous jury instructions do give rise to constitutional violations, 2 s
819. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (sentence is constitutionally disproportionate and
violative of the eighth amendment where not proportionate to: 1) the crime; 2) sentences
normally received by defendants in the same jurisdiction for the same or more serious
criminality; and, 3) sentences normally received by defendants in otl'.er jurisdictions for the
same or more serious criminality).
820. U.S. CoNsT. amend VIII.
821. See, e.g., People v. Brown, 27 I1. App. 3d 405, 327 N.E.2d 75 (5th Dist. 1975).
822. See, e.g., People v. Dandrige, 9 III. App. 3d 174, 292 N.E.2d 51 (1973).
823. See supra notes 449-50 and accompanying text.
824, See supra notes 453-56 and accompanying text.
825. See supra notes 795-800 and accompanying text.
826, See supra notes 457-58 and accompanying text.
827. See, e.g., Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (admission of non-testifying
co-defendant's confession implicating defendant violated defendant's sixth amendment right
to confrontation requiring reversal). See also Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965)
(prosecutorial comment about defendant's failure to testify violative of fifth amendment self-
incrimination privilege requiring reversal); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964)
(admission of defendant taken from defendant without counsel is violative of sixth amendment
and is inadmissible, requiring reversal); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)
(fruits of unreasonable search and seizure violative of fourth amendment are inadmissible.
requiring reversal); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (admission of coerced confession
violative of due process, requiring reversal).
828. See, e.g., Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981) (trial court's refusal to give
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notwithstanding Illinois court statements to the contrary. 829
Finally, the Illinois decision of People v. Talley'3" that held in dicta that
not all insufficiency of evidence findings are necessarily of constitutional
magnitude, appears totally at odds with the United State Supreme Court's
view.831 By asserting that certain insufficiency of evidence findings may not
violate due process while conceding other insufficiency findings do, the
court is simply splitting hairs to avoid appropriate collateral review when
insufficient evidence claims are advanced in a Post-Conviction Hearing Act
forum. More important, however, is the fact that this type of error, unlike
unconstitutional procedural irregularities, goes to the very heart of the
fact-finding process. If the evidence supportive of guilt is insufficient as a
matter of law, it is insufficient as a matter of constitutional law. By
injecting into the case law a statement that, beyond sufficient evidence and
unconstitutional insufficient evidence, there exists a third possibility-
insufficient but constitutional evidence-the Talley court reflects judicial
confusion at its worst. Fortunately, the Talley statement can be viewed as
mere dicta and, accordingly, can and should be ignored.
Assuming that the petitioner's claim is not rejected on the theory that it
raises no constitutional question, the petitioner still faces a considerable
burden in order to gain relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. The
breach of a constitutional right must be "substantial" in nature.82 This
language implicitly requires that the petitioner must have been actually
prejudiced by the error in question. 3 In other words, this error must in
all likelihood have altered the outcome of the proceedings. 3'
Moreover, even if a breach of a constitutional right is substantial, the
petitioner is likely to be denied relief on the basis of the doctrines of waiver
and res judicata. Nowhere is the effect of these doctrines better exemplified
than in the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Evidence seized in violation of
the fourth amendment must 1) normally be challenged in a pre-trial motion
to suppress,"' 2) be the subject of a contemporaneous objection at trial if
defendant's instruction regarding his right to not testify, and be free of adverse consequences
by not testifying, violative of privilege against self-incrimination); Taylor v. Kentucky, 436
U.S. 478 (1978) (trial court's refusal to give defendant's requested instruction on presumption
of innocence violated defendant's right to fair trial); Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100
(1972) (instruction telling jury to ignore defense testimony unless it believes it beyond a
reasonable doubt violative of due process, requiring reversal).
829. See supra notes 459-65 and accompanying text.
830. See supra notes 472-75 and accompanying text.
831. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
832. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 122-1 (1987).
833. See People v. Cowherd, 114 I11. App. 3d 894, 449 N.E.2d 589 (2d Dist. 1983); People
v. Graham, 48 II. App. 3d 689, 363 N.E.2d 124 (5th Dist. 1977).
834. See Cowherd, 114 11. App. 3d 894, 449 N.E.2d 589; Graham, 48 Ill. App. 3d 689,
363 N.E.2d 124.
835. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 114-12(c) (1987); People v. Davidson, 116 111. App. 3d
164, 451 N.E.2d 978 (5th Dist. 1983) (trial court should not consider fourth amendment
claim raised for first time at trial where it could have been raised prior to trial).
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no opportunity existed to raise the challenge prior to trial, 836 and 3) be
challenged in a post-trial motion for a new trial s3 7 even if the alleged error
was raised earlier. 38 If the petitioner failed to make his timely challenges
to the evidence allegedly illegally seized, neither the trial court, 3 9 the
appellate court,8 40 nor the collateral attack reviewing court84 ' are required
to consider the constitutional issue, and normally will consider it waived. 4 2
Thus, the waiver doctrine creates a particularly important obstacle in the
path of fourth amendment Post-Conviction Hearing Act petitions. And,
of course, if the petitioner's claim already has been given due consideration,
the principle of res judicata will apply.8 43 These two doctrines-waiver and
res judicata-effectively bar most fourth amendment claims from gaining
Post-Conviction Hearing Act review. As a practical matter, if not as a
legal matter, Illinois courts are saying that, if a petitioner was given a full
and fair opportunity to litigate his fourth amendment claim at the trial
and appellate levels, it is not necessary to give further collateral review to
the claim. 8"
The principles of waiver and res judicata in connection with Post-
Conviction Hearing Act petitions merit further comment. It is the opinion
of the author that these doctrines are the greatest obstacle to gaining
effective collateral review of constitutional irregularities. If the petitioner
has not raised the issue in timely fashion at the trial and appellate levels,
the issue generally is considered to have been waived. If it was raised and
considered prior to collateral attack, the earlier review is normally res
judicata. In a sense, the petitioner is caught between a rock and a hard
place. By invoking one or the other of these doctrines, the petitioned court
normally can avoid any consideration of the merits of the petitioner's
claim. The exceptions of I) fundamental fairness, 2) basis for relief outside
the record, and 3) incompetency of counsel, do inject an element of fairness
and equity into these considerations. However, the courts often are incon-
sistent in their application of these exceptions. In any event, it does appear
836. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 114-12(c) (1987); People v. Grotti, 112 I11. App. 3d
718, 445 N.E.2d 946 (5th Dist. 1983) (consideration of motion to suppress at trial proper
where defense had no opportunity to raise it earlier).
837. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 116-1 (1987).
838. P. PERKO, Appeals And Collateral Remedies, in ILLINOIS CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 387,
422-23 (Ruebner ed. 1987).
839. People v. Rose, 75 111. App. 3d 45, 393 N.E.2d 698 (1st Dist. 1979) (defense failure
to make pre-trial motion to suppress allowed trial court to refuse claim first raised at trial).
840. People v. Moore, 43 111. 2d 102, 251 N.E.2d 181 (1969) (failure of defense to raise
timely motion to suppress constituted waiver for purpose of appeal).
841. People v. Somerville, 42 I1. 2d 1, 245 N.E.2d 461 (1969) (fourth amendment claim
first raised in collateral attack rejected as not timely).
842. Id. at 12; Moore, 43 Ill. 2d at 100, 251 N.E.2d at 184.
843. Cf. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (collateral attack review not warranted
where fourth amendment claims already fully and fairly addressed).
844. See id. (United States Supreme Court articulated the legal barrier in conjunction with
federal habeas corpus claims).
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that the third exception-incompetency of counsel-is a very important
issue and can be raised, where appropriate, to surmount the state's claim
of waiver or res judicata. By shifting the focus to his attorney, a Post-
Conviction Hearing Act petitioner may be able to effectively demonstrate
that he personally did not waive the issue his attorney dismissed or over-
looked. Similarly, if the issue was raised, he may be in a position to argue
that his counsel's ineptness in presenting the issue at trial or on appeal
should defeat the state's res judicata argument. Thus, petitioners pursuing
relief under this Act should be very alert to the possibility of merging an
incompetence of counsel claim into their other substantive grounds for
relief in order to overcome these two doctrines.
Regarding due process claims that involved claims of perjured testimony,
it remains unclear as to whether this is a basis for relief where the state's
witness has perjured himself but the prosecution is unaware of the per-
jury. 4 The inconsistent rulings on this important issue should be addressed
by the state's highest court so that the petitioned trial court enjoys more
direction in resolving such significant claims. More importantly, because
claims of perjury by state witnesses clearly raise questions about the
integrity of a guilty finding, it is certainly arguable that principles of equity
and fairness dictate that a witness' knowledge that his testimony is false
be imputed to the state.
Although particular criticisms could be made at this juncture about the
Illinois courts' consideration of other specific grounds for relief, these
already were noted in the earlier discussion of grounds for relief and need
not be repeated. On the other hand, a final comment must be directed at
the Post-Conviction Hearing Act itself. A review of the statute reveals that
it is only available to convicted felons and not misdemeanants. However,
the United States Supreme Court has made it clear that most constitutional
rights, such as the right to a jury trial,846 the right to counsel,8 4 7 the right
to a fair trial, 48 and the right to a trial transcript for purposes of appeal, 849
are extended to many misdemeanor prosecution situations. When the Illi-
nois legislature responded to the United States Supreme Court criticism of
the Illinois collateral attack framework s 0 and enacted the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act, it provided prospective collateral attack petitioners who had
845. See supra notes 500-19 and accompanying text.
846. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970) (right to jury trial attaches to a charge
carrying a penalty in excess of six months).
847. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (right to counsel violated whenever
defendant is incarcerated following trial without counsel).
848. Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505 (1971) (refusal of request to change venue in order
to avoid prejudicial pre-trial publicity on grounds that case involved a misdemeanor held
violative of right to trial by an impartial jury).
849. Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971) (indigent defendant convicted of an offense
punishable by fine only must be furnished "a record of sufficient completeness for purposes
of appeal").
850. See supra notes 405-06 and accompanying text.
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constitutional claims with only a half a loaf, in the sense that misdemeanor
convictions were not addressed by the statute. Because of the inadequacy
of the Act, the Illinois Supreme Court felt compelled to create a roughly
equivalent remedy for misdemeanants who have constitutional objections
regarding their convictions. 5' While the court must be commended for its
ruling in People v. Warte"2 addressing constitutional problems that the state
legislature chose to ignore, the Warr decision creates protections for mis-
demeanants that are not consistent with the Act's protections for felons.
In Warr, the court set out a four months statute of limitations for filing
petitions following a guilty plea and a six month statute of limitations
following a trial."5 3 Meanwhile, the Act itself currently requires the filing
of a petition within ten years. 81 Furthermore, the Act requires the petitioner
be within the custody of the state,8" while Warr imposes no similar standing
requirement on misdemeanants.856 Why Warr provided more limited pro-
tection in one regard and broader protection in another is not clear. This
disparate treatment of felons and misdemeanants has no logical basis. It
is unfortunate that the state legislature has yet to create an equivalent
collateral attack remedy for misdemeanants. Perhaps, a revision of the
Post-Conviction Hearing Act is in order.
IV. DOCTRINAL RECOMMENDATIONS:
A CALL FOR AN ADEQUATE JURISPRUDENCE
A number of criticisms have been directed at each of the three Illinois
collateral attack remedies in the separate discussions above.8 5 7 The specific
criticisms need not be repeated at this juncture. However, a common thread
running through many of the criticisms is that the case law reflects the
absence of a well developed jurisprudential framework for evaluating col-
lateral attack claims. In other words, there exists a need for useful doctrines
and principles to guide trial court judges in collateral attack forums.
Further, to the extent that some standards do emerge in the case law,
they often are unsupported by logic or reason. For instance, in the habeas
corpus cases, the courts normally refuse to afford relief unless the judgment
or sentence is deemed "void."" 8 Where the charge upon which a conviction
is based859 or the sentence following conviction' 60 merely is "erroneous,"
851. See supra notes 780-84 and accompanying text.
852. 54 I1. 2d 487, 298 N.E.2d 164 (1973).
853. Id. at 493, 298 N.E.2d at 167.
854. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 122-1 (1987).
855. Id.
856. See 54 Ill. 2d at 493, 298 N.E.2d at 167.
857. See supra Part IC, page 231 (critical summary of habeas corpus); Part lID, page 248
(critical summary of coram nobis); Part IIIE, page 298 (critical summary of Post-Conviction
Hearing Act).
858. See supra notes 38-90 and accompanying text.
859. See supra notes 38-70 and accompanying text.
860. See supra notes 71-86 and accompanying text.
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it is not necessarily void. These resolutions involve little more than an
exercise in semantics and unprincipled characterization. Similarly, a "sub-
sequent event" operates to invoke the habeas corpus remedy only where
the occurrence would entitle the petitioner to immediate release. 861 The
opinions addressing this issue articulate no principle or rationale as to why
illegal subsequent occurrences should be ignored where the petitioner is
not entitled to immediate release or is not in "custody."
In addition, the standards that do exist often are cast in very general,
and therefore, unhelpful, terms. For example, the coram nobis case law
promises that where ever necessary, the petitioned court will invoke its
"equitable powers to prevent enforcement of a judgment that is "unfair
or unjust. ' s62 This is not a particularly useful guiding principle.
Similarly, the Post-Conviction Hearing Act states that relief is available
to petitioners who point to "substantial" violations of their constitutional
rights. 63 Yet, the courts have made no apparent effort to define what
constitutes a substantial violation. The Post-Conviction Hearing Act has
been interpreted as affording relief where ever "fundamental fairness"
dictates that relief is warranted.86 However, the courts offer no criteria
for determining when the petitioner was deprived of fundamental fairness.
Occasionally, the courts indicate that the "ends of justice" 86 may require
the collateral attack reviewing court to take certain action under the Post-
Conviction Hearing Act. Nonetheless, the courts routinely ignore claims
raised under the Act because of waiver or res judicata.86 6 Finally, in some
cases, the courts state that a petitioner has a right to a "meaningful
opportunity to be heard" when advancing a claim under the Act,867 while
in other cases, the petitioner is given no right to a hearing.8 6
In order to bring some semblance of clarity to the collateral attack
remedy jurisprudence, the following suggestions are offered. First, the
reviewing courts should state that all collateral attack remedies are "ex-
traordinary" equitable remedies.8 69 Historically, courts of chancery only
invoked their authority to issue equitable remedies in circumstances where
the regular courts of common law were powerless, given the substantive
and procedural rules that they were required to follow, to grant the
petitioner redress. Where the courts of law had the capacity to afford a
claimant appropriate relief, the court of equity would never intervene.
861. See supra notes 111-80 and accompanying text.
862. See supra note 278.
863. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 122-1 (1987).
864. See supra notes 664-75 and accompanying text.
865. See People v. Mass, 9 Ill. App. 3d 67, 68-69, 292 N.E.2d 33, 34 (2d Dist. 1972).
866. See People v. Stewart, 66 Ill. App. 3d 342, 351-53, 383 N.E.2d 1179, 1186-87 (1st
Dist. 1978).
867. See People v. Porter, 122 I11. 2d 64, 74, 521 N.E.2d 1158, 1161 (1988).
868. See supra notes 751-68 and accompanying text.
869. See United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 511 (1954) (characterization of federal
coram nobis).
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Hence, when the chancery court was faced with that rare case where 1)
the courts of law did not have an adequate remedy, and 2) the relief sought
was warranted, the court would issue its "extraordinary" writ.70 This
dichotomy between legal remedies and equitable remedies provides a useful
perspective for analyzing collateral attack claims. Where, for example, a
claimant could have invoked the trial and appellate courts' legal remedies,
but chose not to do so, the collateral attack reviewing court could refuse
to invoke its equitable powers. Thus, where the petitioner could have raised
his constitutional claim on direct appeal but did not, Post-Conviction
Hearing Act review might be deemed an inappropriate vehicle for consid-
eration of the claim. On the other hand, where the claim for relief from
a violation of constitutional rights involves a novel claim not available
when the appeal was taken or when the appeal could have been taken,
redress of the petitioner's grievance might be appropriate through a col-
lateral attack remedy. Similarly, where a petitioner's claim of state witness
perjury was raised in the trial court and rejected, the coram nobis petitioner
who is attempting to resurrect his claim has already had his day in court.
However, if the coram nobis petitioner has only recently uncovered evidence
of such perjury, then the intervention of the court of equity would be
necessary. And, where a petitioner pointed to some fundamental error long
after trial and appeal, such as the trial court's lack of subject matter
jurisdiction or clear insufficiency of evidence to convict, equitable consid-
erations would militate in favor of an "extraordinary" remedy. In any
event, this characterization would immediately send a signal to prospective
petitioners and their counsel that these remedies are not casually used to
extend relief or routinely invoked by the reviewing courts.
Second, the courts should make it clear that none of'the collateral attack
remedies are available unless the claim of error would have in all probability
altered the outcome of the proceeding in question . 7' Normally, this will
mean that the petitioner will be required to show that, without the error
870. H. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 46-49 (2d ed. 1948).
871. The United States Supreme Court has indicated that even where the petitioner is
responsible for a procedural default in state court, a federal habeas corpus forum should be
available when the petitioner may have been innocent of the charge. Murray v. Carrier, 477
U.S. 478 (1986). The Court stated: "(l~n an extraordinary case, where a constitutional
violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal
habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause for the procedural
default." Id. at 496. In addition, in Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986), the Supreme
Court noted that where the petitioner claimed he was "unjustly incarcerated," he would
have to demonstrate that he was "actually" innocent rather than "legally" innocent before
his procedural default would be excused. Id. at 537-38. In that case, the Court held that the
erroneous admission of the petitioner made during an earlier psychiatric examination did not
support the conclusion that he was actually innocent of the charge of which he was convicted
at trial. Id. at 537-39. In an earlier case, the Supreme Court had stated: "any prisoner
bringing a constitutional claim to the federal courthouse after a state procedural default must
demonstrate cause [for the procedural default] and actual prejudice before obtaining relief."
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in question, he never would have been convicted. In other words, the
petitioner will have to demonstrate actual prejudice and, if he cannot do
so, the reviewing courts will be in a position to hold that the alleged error
constituted harmless error.8 72 Thus, under habeas corpus, where a court
was entirely without jurisdiction over the proceeding in that, for example,
the offense occurred in another jurisdiction, a convicted petitioner could
successfully argue actual prejudice. In contrast, where the petitioner's
conviction rests on a claim of a faulty charging instrument, the reviewing
court could respond that the error was harmless where the petitioner was
unable to demonstrate how he was prejudiced in presenting a defense at
trial or in warding off successive prosecutions for the same offense. Sim-
ilarly, where a coram nobis petitioner presented evidence of perjury by a
state witness, he would be accorded relief if the witness' testimony was
crucial to the finding of guilt. On the other hand, if the perjured testimony
was not material to the issue of guilt or innocence or where there existed
other evidence that overwhelmingly supported the petitioner's guilt, the
court could rule that the admission of the perjured testimony was not
actually prejudicial and, at best, was harmless. Finally, where a Post-
Conviction Hearing Act petitioner proved that the evidence offered at trial
was legally insufficient to support a guilty verdict, a remedy of reversal of
the conviction obviously would be warranted. However, if he pointed to
some type of procedural irregularity, such as police non-compliance with
the warrant clause of the fourth amendment in a residential search situation,
which in no way would have altered the outcome of the trial given other
constitutionally seized evidence that clearly supported the petitioner's guilt,
the reviewing court could hold that the admission of the evidence wrongfully
seized from the residence without a warrant was harmless error.
Of course, there might be situations where the claim of constitutional
error had no bearing on the petitioner's guilt but nonetheless still would
be cognizable in a collateral attack forum. For instance, where a trial court
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 129 (1982). See also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977)
(federal habeas corpus petitioner must show cause for the procedural default and prejudice
resulting from this default in order to obtain review of his claim). Thus, actual innocence is
an exception to the Engle procedural default mandate.
One of the conditions of federal coram nobis relief is that the petitioner must show that
the error in question would have altered the outcome of the proceeding in question. United
States v. Stimac, 684 F. Supp. 545, 547 (N.D. Il1. 1988) ("The petitioner must demonstrate
that 'but for the fundamental errors committed a more favorable judgment would have been
rendered."'). See infra note 929 for additional requirements of coram nobis relief. See also
Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Cm. L.
REv. 142 (1970) (proposes that collateral attack relief should only be available where claim
of innocence attaches to constitutional claim).
872. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (discussion of actual prejudice
resulting from ineffective counsel in violation of the sixth amendment); Chapman v. Cali-
fornia, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (discussion of the harmless error doctrine related to the fifth
amendment protection against self-incrimination).
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summarily refused to conduct a fitness hearing to determine whether the
petitioner was competent to stand trial, a collateral attack remedy would
be warranted. However, since most collateral attack claims involve alleged
procedural errors that may have had no bearing on the petitioner's factual
innocence, this proposed actual prejudice doctrine would provide a useful
mechanism for rejecting many unwarranted collateral claims.
Third, and vitally important, the Illinois courts should routinely incor-
porate a principle or presumption of finality of trial and appellate court
decisions into the collateral attack doctrine. Occasionally, the Illinois courts
implicitly use such a principle. For instance, one opinion referred to a
"policy of prohibiting piece-meal invocation of post-conviction reme-
dies. ' 871 In another case, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that further
consideration of a particular claim in a collateral attack forum "would
only serve to prolong this proceeding interminably." '87 ' In a few cases, the
Illinois courts have explicitly pointed out that consideration of a "defen-
dant's procedurally defaulted claims in a post-conviction proceeding ...
would deny the State's legitimate interest in the finality of the defendant's
convictions. . . . ",87 In a few others, the courts have indicated that peti-
tioners' claims could not be rejected due to the "objective of finality"
where fundamental fairness required consideration of the claim. 76 Not-
withstanding, the Illinois courts do not regularly employ a principle of
finality in their collateral attack decisions.
In sharp contrast, the federal courts routinely make reference to a
principle or presumption of finality in connection with federal collateral
attacks. 7  While the author personally agrees with many of the criticisms
directed at the case law which has narrowed the availability of federal
collateral relief,"8 it seems that the doctrinal underpinnings of Illinois
collateral attack case law should coincide with the practical realities of the
scope and actual availability of Illinois collateral attack relief. As has been
stressed throughout this Article, collateral relief is rarely extended to Illinois
873. People v. Talley, 97 Ill. App. 3d 439, 446, 422 N.E.2d 1084, 1090 (1st Dist. 1981).
874. People v. Mamolella, 42 II1. 2d 69, 73, 245 N.E.2d 485, 487 (1969). See also People
v. Carlisle, 174 Ill. App. 3d 454, 528 N.E.2d 1029 (4th Dist. 1988) (when issue could have
been raised but was not, to consider it on a third collateral attack could continue the post-
conviction process indefinitely).
875. People v. Free, 122 11. 2d 367, 378, 522 N.E.2d 1184, 1189 (1988).
876. People v. Slaughter, 39 I1. 2d 278, 285, 235 N.E.2d 566, 570 (1968).
877. See infra notes 879-928 and accompanying text; Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and
Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARv. L. REv. 441 (1963).
878. See Rosenberg, Constricting Federal Habeas Corpus: From Great Writ to Exceptional
Remedy, 12 HASTOS CONST. L.Q. 597 (1985); Note, Engle v. Isaac: The End of Innocence
on Collateral Review, AM. U.L. REv. 1183 (1983).
On the other hand, some commentators have more or less applauded the Supreme Court's
narrowing of the availability of federal habeas corpus, but indicate that further erosion is
inadvisable. See Wechsler, Habeas Corpus and the Supreme Court: Reconsidering the Reach
of the Great Writ, 59 U. CoLo. L. REV. 167, 182 (1988).
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petitioners. After trial and appellate procedures have run their course, the
reviewing courts are not very receptive to post-appeal claims and, indeed,
seem to avail themselves of every escape hatch possible. In the habeas
corpus case law, the courts routinely refuse to characterize the claim of
error as a jurisdictional defect that voids the judgment of conviction. So
too, the habeas corpus decisions often invoke the escape hatch that relief
is not available because the petitioner will not be entitled to immediate
release. In the coram nobis cases, the courts most often conclude that new
evidence of fraud, duress, perjury, or the like is not material to the issue
of guilt, or is overcome by cumulative evidence of guilt. In Post-Conviction
Hearing Act decisions, the doctrines of waiver and res judicata effectively
bar petitioners from advancing post-appeal claims regarding violations of
constitutional rights. Accordingly, because the factual reality is that col-
lateral attack reviewing courts attach presumed finality to trial and appellate
judgments, these same courts should articulate in their holdings a legal
presumption which reflects this finality concern. Such a principle would
go a long way in clarifying the true scope of Illinois collateral relief. It
would allow collateral attack reviewing courts to deny relief where appro-
priate without adopting a very narrow view of 1) what is a jurisdictional
error, 2) what are newly discovered facts warranting relief, and 3) what
are substantial violations of constitutional rights. A principle or presump-
tion of finality would symbolize the importance that the reviewing courts
place on a petitioner's failure to raise claims of trial court error on direct
appeal. Finally, it would eliminate the false promises many of the collateral
attack decisions reflect in their repeated references, usually in dicta, to
concerns of equity, fundamental fairness, justice, and the like, and educate
inmates and inexperienced attorneys to not hold false hopes that collateral
attack remedies provide equivalent relief to that afforded on direct review.
The federal collateral attack case law reflects a useful frame of reference
for Illinois courts in developing a principle of finality. For example, in
Reed v. Ross,879 the United States Supreme Court stated that a procedural
default in not raising violations of constitutional rights in state court could
be a basis for denying federal habeas corpus relief in federal court. 8" The
Court stated that "there is the state's interest in the integrity of its rules
and proceedings and the finality of its judgments, an interest that would
be undermined if the federal courts were too free to ignore procedural
forfeitures in state court."88' The Court pointed out that if a constitutional
claim was first raised in a federal habeas corpus forum long after trial,
evidence might no longer be available to evaluate the petitioner's consti-
tutional claim.112 In addition, if the petitioner was to succeed with his claim
879. 468 U.S. 1 (1984).
880. Id. at 9-11.
881. Id. at 10.
882. Id. at 11.
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of error requiring a reversal, it might be too late to effectively retry the
petitioner."' Thus, the Court indicated that a defense attorney would not
be allowed to ignore the state's procedural rules in the expectation that his
client's claims could be raised at a later date in federal court .8 4 Similarly,
the Court stated that a petitioner may not use the possibility of federal
relief to hedge against strategic risks he takes in state court."s On the other
hand, the Court pointed out that where the petitioner raises a claim that
is so novel that it could not have been available to the petitioner earlier,
then he might be excused from raising it earlier in the state courts . 6
In Murray v. Carrier,8 7 the Court discussed this principle of finality in
conjunction with a state procedural default. 88 The Court noted that a
procedural default by the petitioner normally deprives the trial court of an
opportunity to correct the error without a retrial, gives the appellate court
no chance to review trial errors, and exacts an extra charge by undercutting
the state's ability to enforce its procedural rules.8 9 Therefore, the default
should be ignored only where the error probably resulted in a conviction
of an innocent person.
On the other hand, in various cases, including Duckworth v. Serrano,810
the Court has held that the failure of a state petitioner to exhaust all state
remedies is not an absolute bar to collateral relief.8 9' In Duckworth, the
Court stated that, if there existed no opportunity to obtain redress in state
court or if the corrective process was so obviously deficient as to render
futile any effort to obtain relief, the federal courts could intervene. 92
However, in Engle v. Isaac,8 91 the Court undercut the utility of the "fu-
tility" doctrine by stating that a petitioner's perception that it would be
futile to raise a particular issue in state court does not excuse his procedural
default in state court. 894
883. Id.
884. Id. at 13-14.
885. Id.
886. Id. at 16.
887. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
888. Id. at 485-92.
889. Id. at 487 (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 129 (1982)).
890. 454 U.S. 1 (1981).
891. Id. at 3-4.
892. Id. at 3. See also Engle, 456 U.S. at 135 ("In appropriate cases those principles must
yield to the imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration.") See also supra
note 871 for a complete discussion of Engle and its exceptions.
893. 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
894. Id. at 130. The Court stated:
We note at the outset that the futility of presenting an objection to the state
courts cannot alone constitute cause for a failure to object at trial. If a defendant
perceives a constitutional claim and believes it may find favor in the federal
courts, he may not bypass the state courts simply because be thinks they will be
unsympathetic to the claim. Even a state court that has previously rejected a
constitutional argument may decide, upon reflection, that the contention is valid.
Id. at 130 (footnote omitted).
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When the federal courts are faced with successive collateral attack peti-
tions, they also will invoke the principle of finality. In Kuhlmann v.
Wilson," ' the United States Supreme Court attempted to clarify its previous
holding9 6 as to when successive petitions constitute an abuse of the writ
of habeas corpus. In Kuhlmann, the Court ruled that the petitioner as well
as the state has an interest in "according finality to the prior judgment. ' 97
First, the Court stated that while the petitioner may have an obvious
interest in avoiding finality in his judgment of guilty where he was innocent
of the charge, he also has an interest "that comes with an end to litigation,"
namely, that "attention will ultimately be focused not on whether a con-
viction was free from error but rather on whether the prisoner can be
restored to a useful place in the community."898 In addition, the Court
stated that "finality" serves many state interests.19 These include deterring
crime, an interest which is frustrated by a perception that collateral relief
may afford persons a way of escaping punishment.9 Similarly, finality
serves the goal of rehabilitating convicts, which is best accomplished when
the defendant ultimately realizes that he is justly subject to the sanction
received following his conviction.9' Finality serves the state's legitimate
punitive interests because, if a petitioner is freed on a successive petition,
the state may be unsuccessful in its effort to retry him given the passage
of time, lost witnesses, and cloudy memories.9 2 Thus, the Court held that
unless the petitioner can establish that "under the probative evidence he
has a colorable claim of factual innocence," he should be denied relief;
such a "colorable claim of factual innocence," the Court opined, would
be the "rare" case.9 3 As Justice O'Connor stated in United States v.
Frady, where a federal convict was challenging his conviction in a section
2255 petition:
Once the defendant's chance to appeal has been waived or exhausted,
however, we are entitled to presume he stands fairly and finally convicted,
especially when, as here, he already has had a fair opportunity to present
his federal claims to a federal forum. Our trial and appellate procedures
are not so unreliable that we may not afford their completed operation
any binding effect beyond the next in a series of endless post-conviction
collateral attacks. To the contrary, a final judgment commands respect.903
895. 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
896. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
897. 477 U.S. at 452.
898. Id. (quoting Sanders, 373 U.S. at 24-25 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
899. Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 452. The Court noted "objective factors" that would excuse
nonexhaustion of state remedies such as the novelty of the claim, interference by state
officials in a petitioner's effort to gain redress, and incompetent counsel. Id.
900. Id. at 452-53.
901. Id. at 453.
902. Id.
903. Id. at 454.
904. 456 U.S. 152 (1982).
905. Id. at 164-65.
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
Throughout these cases, the United States Supreme Court has indicated
that federal collateral attack remedies should not be viewed as a substitute
for direct review. The Court has stated that direct review is the "primary
avenue for review" 9' and when the "process of direct review ... comes
to an end, a presumption of finality and legality attaches to the conviction
and sentence."90 Even the fact that the petitioner is faced with the death
penalty does not create an exception to these rules.m As the Frady Court
stated, "We reaffirm the well-settled principle that to obtain collateral
relief a prisoner must clear a significantly higher hurdle than would exist
on direct appeal."'' In another case, the Court noted that "[c]ollateral
review of a final judgment is not an endeavour to be undertaken lightly."910
For example, in United States v. Timmreck,"' a petitioner argued in
pursuit of a writ of habeas corpus that the trial court failed to explain to
him the sanction he would receive after he entered his plea of guilty. While
the Court intimated it would have afforded relief to the petitioner had he
raised his claim on direct appeal,911 the Court refused to give the petitioner
the remedy he desired because, among other considerations, "the concern
with finality served by the limitation on collateral attack has special force
with respect to convictions based on guilty pleas.""'9
In an area related to collateral attack, the retroactive application of
court decisions, it often has been held that the retroactive application
should only extend to those cases which are pending on direct review." 4
In Shea v. Louisiana,9"' for example, the Supreme Court held that its
decision in Edwards v. Arizona,916 which held that it is violative of the
defendant's fifth and fourteenth amendment rights to initiate an interro-
gation of a defendant after he has invoked his Miranda protections, would
be given retroactive application only in those cases pending on direct
review. 9 7 The Court cited finality concerns as the basis for its determination
not to give the Edwards doctrine retroactive application to cases involving
collateral claims. 9"8
906. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983).
907. Id.
908. Id.
909. 456 U.S. 152, 166 (1982).
910. Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 633 n.13 (1982).
911. 441 U.S. 780 (1979).
912. Id. at 784 (citing McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969)).
913. Id.
914. See, e.g., Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987) (Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79 (1986), barrier against discriminatory use of prosecutor's peremptory challenges given
retroactive application to cases pending on direct review or to cases not yet final).
915. 470 U.S. 51 (1985).
916. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
917. 470 U.S. at 54-61.
918. Id. at 59-60. The Court reasoned as follows:
[lit is said that drawing a distinction between a case pending on direct review
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Nowhere is it more clear as to how the Supreme Court distinguishes
collateral attack claims from direct appeal claims than in Stone v. Powell.919
In that case, the Court removed from the reach of federal habeas corpus
a state petitioner's claims "that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional
search or seizure was introduced at his trial" unless the petitioner could
demonstrate that the state did not provide him with "an opportunity for
full and fair litigation" of his fourth amendment claim.920 The Court
reasoned that any "advance of the legitimate goal of furthering Fourth
Amendment rights" through application of the judicially created exclu-
sionary rule on federal habeas corpus was "outweighed by the acknowl-
edged costs to other values vital to a rational system of criminal justice." 921
Thus, in Stone, the interest of deterring the police from violations of citizen
rights was outweighed by the consumption of scarce judicial resources and,
among other things, the interest in finality in criminal proceedings. 922
Although the Court has not extended Stone to contexts beyond the fourth
amendment, 92 it is certainly conceivable that it might do so in the future. 92
More importantly, the Stone doctrine could be employed in connection
with, for example, all Post-Conviction Hearing Act claims where the
petitioner was given a full and fair opportunity to litigate his constitutional
claims at the trial and appellate levels.
It is important, however, to point out that the Supreme Court refuses
to use the finality principle where the federal habeas corpus petitioner
alleges that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support a
and a case on collateral attack produces inequities and injustices .... The ar-
gument is that the litigant whose Edwards claim will not be considered because
it is presented on collateral review will be just as unfairly treated as the direct-
review litigant whose claim would be bypassed were Edwards not the law. The
distinction, however, properly rests on considerations of finality in the judicial
process. The one litigant already has taken his case through the primary system.
The other has not. For the latter, the curtain of finality has not been drawn.
Somewhere, the closing must come.
Id.
919. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
920. Id. at 494.
921. Id.
922. Id. at 492-95. However, in Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986), the Court
indicated that Stone would not apply where counsel was inept in raising the fourth amendment
claim.
923. See, e.g., Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979) (grand jury discrimination claims
allegedly violative of equal protection); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (insufficiency
of evidence claims cognizable under due process). See also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387,
420-29 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that Stone should be extended to sixth
amendment claims regarding violation of the right to counsel, although majority refused to
do so).
924. See Brewer, 430 U.S. at 420-29 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Remington, Change in the
Availability of Federal Habeas Corpus: Its Significance for State Prisoners and State Cor-
rectional Programs, 85 MicH. L. REv. 570 (1987); Rosenberg, Constricting Federal Habeas
Corpus From Great Writ to Exceptional Remedy, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 597 (1985).
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conviction.92" In Jackson v. Virginia,926 the state argued that federal con-
sideration of a state petitioner's insufficiency claim would "disserve the
societal interest in the finality of state criminal proceedings .... 17 The
Court responded by pointing out that the constitutional lack of evidence
issue is far different from a claim of an unconstitutional procedural irreg-
ularity, for insufficiency goes to the very heart of the basic question of
guilt or innocence. 92
In any event, a presumption of finality should be introduced into Illinois
collateral attack remedies. The various arguments offered in support of
such a principle-scarcity of judicial resources, deterrence, rehabilitation
of offenders, difficulty in retrying successful petitioners, and the like-
could be borrowed from federal collateral attack case law. This presumption
could then be rejected in contexts where it would be inappropriate, such
as where the petitioner's claim involves the basic question of guilt or
innocence. In other appropriate contexts, it would have to be clearly
understood that this presumption could be rebutted where, for example,
the procedural irregularity raised serious questions about the integrity of
the fact-finding process. Thus, where a petitioner's defense was undercut
by his counsel's ineptness in presenting the defense or where a petitioner
was frustrated by the trial court's refusal to give him an ample opportunity
to cross examine the state's witnesses, the collateral attack court could
offer appropriate redress.
A fourth doctrine that the Illinois courts should develop in conjunction
with collateral attack claims is a presumption of correct factual determi-
nations. Like the presumption of finality, a presumption of factual cor-
rectness has been incorporated into the federal collateral attack doctrine. 929
In actuality, this presumption of correct factual resolutions had its genesis
925. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321-24 (1979).
926. Id.
927. Id. at 321.
928. Id. at 323.
929. See Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 84-87 (1983); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209
(1982); Annotation, Supreme Court's Construction and Application of 28 USCS § 2254(d),
Which Provides That In Federal Habeas Corpus Proceedings, State Court's Factual Deter-
minations Must Be Presumed to Be Correct, 88 L.Ed.2d 963 (1988).
In addition to the utilization of the presumption of correctness in federal habeas corpus,
the same principle is used in connection with federal corar nobis. See United States v.
Stimac, 684 F. Supp. 545, 547 (N.D. I11. 1988) (citing United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S.
502, 512 (1954)). Federal corarn nobis relief is subject to the following limitations: 1) it is
presumed that the proceedings were correct and the burden is on the petitioner to show
otherwise; 2) the petitioner must show, but for the error, a more favorable judgment would
have been rendered; 3) the petitioner must satisfy the "case or controversy" requirement of
Article III; and, 4) relief should be granted only where such is compelled to "achieve justice"
and only where "sound reasons" exist for failing to seek appropriate relief earlier. Id.
(quoting Morgan, 346 U.S. at 511-12).
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in a congressional enactment. 90 In pertinent part, the statute provides that
"a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by
a state court of competent jurisdiction ... evidenced by [an appropriate
record] ... shall be presumed to be correct . . . . ,,93" This presumption
is then subject to certain exceptions, such as where the merits of the factual
dispute were not resolved in state court, were not adequately developed in
the state forum, or were not resolved in a fair forum. 92 Finally, the
petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating incorrect factual resolutions
by "convincing evidence." 933
930. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982):
(d) In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ
of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court, a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by
a State court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant
for the writ and the State or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced
by a written finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written
indicia, shall be presumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall establish or it
shall otherwise appear, or the respondent shall admit-
(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State court
hearing;
(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not ade-
quate to afford a full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the State court
hearing;
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or over the
person of the applicant in the State court proceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in deprivation of
his constitutional right, failed to appoint counsel to represent him in the State
court proceeding;
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the
State court proceeding; or
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the state
court proceeding;
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in which
the determination of such factual issue was made, pertinent to a determination
of the sufficiency of the evidence to support such factual determination, is
produced as provided for hereinafter, and the Federal court on a consideration
of such part of the record as a whole concludes that such factual determination
is not fairly supported by the record:
And in an evidentiary hearing in the proceeding in the Federal court, when due
proof of such factual determination has been made, unless the existence of one
or more of the circumstances respectively set forth in paragraphs numbered (1)
to (7), inclusive, is shown by the applicant, otherwise appears, or is admitted by
the respondent, or unless the court concludes pursuant to the provisions of
paragraph numbered (8) that the record in the State court proceeding, considered
as a whole, does not fairly support such factual determination, the burden shall
rest upon the applicant to establish by convincing evidence that the factual
determination by the State court was erroneous.
Id.
931. 684 F. Supp. at 547.
932. Id.
933. Id.
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This federal statute and its subsequent interpretations provide a useful
frame of reference for development of such a principle in connection with
Illinois collateral attacks.9 14 The United State Supreme Court has employed
the presumption of factual correctness in a number of settings. These
include a trial courts' determination that a prospective juror in a capital
case was properly excluded for cause, 95 that an individual juror was
impartial, 96 of the effect of an ex parte communication on impartiality of
an individual juror,93 7 of a defendant's competence to stand trial,98 and
that the defendant received and understood sufficient notice of charges
against him to render his guilty plea voluntary and intelligent. 9 9 In addition,
the Court has ruled that this presumption applies not only to resolutions
of fact by a trial court, but also to factual findings by an appellate court. 940
The presumption of factual correctness only applies to a determination
of "historic facts" as opposed to issues of law or "a mixed determination
of law and fact that requires the application of legal principles to the
historic facts." 941 Thus, where the petitioner alleged that his counsel had
a conflict of interest in the simultaneous representation of three co-defen-
dants, this was considered a mixed determination of fact and law that
dictated the rejection of the presumption of correctness. 942 Similarly, the
Supreme Court has ruled that the question of whether a confession was
voluntary is a question of law not susceptible to the presumption of
correctness .
41
While the Court has conceded that the fact versus law distinction may
be, "to say the least, elusive, '944 the courts could deal with this issue on
934. This development could be through a legislative enactment or case law. While a
legislative proposal will be developed later in this Article, see infra notes 947-99 and accom-
panying text, it seems that the Illinois Supreme Court could invoke its supervisory powers
over the inferior courts, as it did in People v. Warr, 54 I11. 2d 487, 298 N.E.2d 164 (1973),
when it developed a collateral attack mechanism to addresss constitutional violations in
misdemeanor cases. In addition, in other contexts, the United States Supreme Court has
indicated that reviewing courts should defer to the factual resolutions of a trial court unless
there was a clear abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)
(reviewing courts should defer to a trial court's determination that there existed sufficient
facts to support a finding of probable cause to issue a search warrant).
935. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 426-30 (1985).
936. Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1036-40 (1984).
937. Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114 (1983) (per curiam).
938. Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111 (1983) (per curiam).
939. Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 436-38 (1983).
940. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981) (California Court of Appeal's factual finding
that photographic identification employed by police was not unfair in violation of due
process), on remand, 649 F.2d 713, vacated, 455 U.S. 591 (1982) (per curiam) (lower court
erred in remand in concluding § 2254(d) was inapplicable).
941. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 341-42 (1980) (counsel's conflict of interest);
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984) (incompetent counsel).
942. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
943. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985).
944. Id. at 113.
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a case-by-case basis by looking at various considerations, including how
the issue has been treated historically. 45 Presumably, a subject matter
jurisdiction problem would be treated as a legal issue, in which case the
presumption of correctness would be inoperable in the state habeas corpus
forum. In addition, where newly discovered evidence of fraud, duress, or
perjury is presented in a state coram nobis context, it would be impossible
to invoke the presumption of factual correctness since the issue in question
has never been previously litigated. On the other hand, as the federal
habeas corpus case law discussed previously reflects, constitutional issues
raised under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act might, in some cases, involve
only factual disputes and may, in other situations, involve mixed deter-
minations of fact and law.
Of course, the collateral attack reviewing court would not only be
required to determine that a factual finding has occurred that was adverse
to the interests of the petitioner, it also would have to be alert to the
adequacy of the fact-finding process. If the fact-finding process was not
adequate to afford a full and fair hearing on the factual issue or the
material facts were not adequately developed in the forum in question,
then the presumption of factual correctness could not be utilized in the
collateral attack review of the claim in question.9 46
In conclusion, there are several doctrines or principles that could be
invoked under the existing Illinois legislation that would inject some reason
and logic into the courts' rulings. These concepts would not in any way
radically alter existing results, but rather, would make these results more
intellectually and legally palatable. First, the courts could emphasis that
collateral attack vehicles are equitable in nature and remedies are granted
in only those rare circumstances where relief is warranted. This position
would make it patently clear that collateral attack remedies are no substitute
for direct appeal. Second, the courts could insist that these remedies be
invoked only where a serious question about the accused's factual guilt
exists, either because the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction
or because the process afforded the petitioner did not lend itself to appro-
priate consideration of the petitioner's claim of innocence. Third, the courts
could borrow from the federal courts a principle or presumption of finality
that would clarify that review of a criminal conviction normally ends, with
few exceptions, at the direct appeal stage. Finally, the courts could develop
a rebuttable presumption of correct resolution of facts at the trial and
appellate levels.
945. See id. at 113-18 (voluntariness of a confession historically has been treated as
comprising a question of law).
946. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411-18 (1986) (state procedure for determining
sanity of death row prisoner scheduled for execution was inadequate and presumption of
correctness therefore not operable).
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V. STATUTORY RECOMMIENDATIONS: A CALL FOR A SINGLE
COMPREHENSIVE POST-CONVICTION COLLATERAL ATTACK ENACTMENT
It might be said that the doctrinal weaknesses of Illinois case law are
somewhat understandable given the almost unintelligible legislative direc-
tives in the state collateral relief statutes. The statutory sources of collateral
attack relief currently are scattered throughout the Illinois code. State
habeas corpus protections exist in the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, 94'
the state coram nobis protections appear in a different part of the same
code,948 and the Post-Conviction Hearing Act is found in the Code of
Criminal Procedure. 949 It makes little sense that the post-appeal remedies
for criminal cases are entirely disconnected and not part of a comprehen-
sive, unified legislative package.
In addition, two of the three enactments either are facially indecipherable
or contain sections that, as applied in the case law, are quite useless or
irrelevant. For example, although the state habeas corpus legislation lists
seven grounds for relief, 9 0 there are in actuality only two grounds for relief
recognized in the case law. 95' The coram nobis statute, on the other hand,
is cast in such general terms 9 2 that it appears facially meaningless. While
the Post-Conviction Hearing Act cannot be criticized on these grounds,
the scope of that enactment is unduly narrow in that it affords no relief
for misdemeanants. 953 The net effect of this latter legislative oversight
resulted in the Illinois Supreme Court's creation of a fourth, common law
collateral attack remedy designed to address a misdemeanant's claim of
violation of a constitutional right. 9 4 Moreover, each of these collateral
attack vehicles contain certain procedural barriers which are not necessarily
consistent with one another. The habeas corpus legislation contains no
statute of limitation period during which a petition should be filed,9" the
coram nobis proscriptions contain a two year statute of limitations, which
is subject to certain exceptions," 6 the Post-Conviction Hearing Act contains
a ten year statute of limitations period, which is subject to no apparent
exceptions, 9"7 and the judicially created remedy for misdemeanants alleging
constitutional errors involves a four month statute of limitations following
a guilty plea and a six month period following a trial. '
947. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 10-101 to -137 (1987).
948. Id. at 2-1401 (1987).
949. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 122-1 to -8 (1987).
950. See supra note 35.
951. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
952. See supra note 273.
953. See ILL. Rnv. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 122-1 to -8 (1987).
954. People v. Warr, 54 III. 2d 487, 298 N.E.2d 164 (1973).
955. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
956. See supra notes 380-85 and accompanying text.
957. See supra notes 702-11 and accompanying text.
958. See supra note 784 and accompanying text.
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Habeas corpus contains a custody requirement that has been interpreted,
in some cases, as actual confinement and, in other cases, as some type of
restraint on the petitioner's liberty not suffered by the public at large.959
Coram nobis has no custody requirement.960 The Post-Conviction Hearing
Act includes a custody requirement, but it has been interpreted as not
requiring actual confinement.9 61 Meanwhile, the Warr decision imposes no
custody showing on misdemeanants who raise constitutional irregularities.9 6
The habeas corpus petitioner never is entitled to appointed counsel, 963
the coram nobis case law offers no directive on this issue, the Post-
Conviction Hearing Act requires no counsel if the petition is frivolous, but
does require counsel if it is not,964 and the Warr decision provides that the
petitioner is not entitled to appointed counsel if his petition is without
merit.96- Such inconsistent approaches to procedural protections are not
supported by principle or logic.
In contrast to the Illinois approach, the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated a Uniform Post-Conviction
Procedure Act in 1955;966 it was revised in 1966967 and again in 1980.961
The revision in 1980 was designed to accommodate recommendations re-
flected in the A.B.A. Standards. 969 The avowed purpose of this legislative
proposal, designed for state enactment, was "to bring together and con-
solidate into one simple statute all the [collateral] remedies. ' 970 The Uni-
form Post-Conviction Procedure Act of 198071 states that a petitioner
should be afforded relief where 1) his conviction or sentence was violative
of the federal or state constitution,9 72 2) the conviction occurred under an
unconstitutional statute, 97- 3) the trial court was without jurisdiction over
the person or the subject matter,974 4) the sentence was not authorized by
law,9 73 5) new evidence, previously not available, requires vacating the
judgment, 976 6) a significant change in procedural or substantive law has
959. See supra notes 189-206 and accompanying text.
960. See supra note 377 and accompanying text.
961. See supra notes 769-79 and accompanying text.
962. See supra notes 780-84 and accompanying text.
963. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
964. See supra notes 726-37 and accompanying text.
965. See supra note 784 and accompanying text.
966. See UNIFoR, POST-CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT, Historical Note, 11 U.L.A. 477-79
(1974).
967. See id. §§ 1-14, 11 U.L.A. 485-540.
968. See id. §§ 1-19, 11 U.L.A. 232-41 (1988 Supp.).
969. See 4 A.B.A. STANDARD FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 21-1.1 (2d ed. 1980).
970. See UNIFORM POST-CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT, Commissioner's Comment, 11 U.L.A.
486 (1974).
971. Id. §§ 1-19, 232-41 (1988 Supp.).
972. Id. § l(a)(l).
973. Id. § 1(a)(2).
974. Id. § l(a)(3).
975. Id. § 1(a)(4).
976. Id. § 1(a)(5).
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occurred and requires retroactive application, 977 7) the sentence has expired,
probation or parole or other conditional release was illegally revoked, or
the petitioner is otherwise unlawfully confined, 97 or, 8) the petitioner was
entitled to relief under any ground provided in the previously existing
collateral attack remedies that were available to the petitioner before the
passage of the Act. 97 9 The Act makes clear that proceedings provided by
it shall not be considered a substitute for direct review.98 0 The Act does
not reflect a "custody" requirement, 98' no statute of limitations period is
imposed 98 2 and appointment of counsel is guaranteed. 83 The Act outlines
the required contents of the petition for collateral reliel' 84 and the require-
ments for a timely response from the state.98 ' It provides for amended
pleadings, 98 6 discovery, 98 7 summary disposition on the pleadings of record
if there exists "no genuine issue as to any material fact and [either] moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law," 988 an evidentiary
hearing where necessary, 98 9 and explicit findings by the petitioned court."
The Act states that an application for collateral relief may be rejected
where the claim or claims in question were "fully and finally" adjudicated
in a prior proceeding.9 9' The petitioned court also can deny relief where
there exists a "misuse of process.1 992 Misuse of process arises where the
petitioner 1) "inexcusably failed" to raise the claim at the trial level or
"in a previous post-conviction proceeding," 993 or, 2) presents a frivolous
claim.994 Res judicata or misuse of process is an affirmative defense which
the state has the burden of demonstrating.9" However, where the petitioner
has failed to raise a defense or objection at a specified stage of a criminal
prosecution as required by a statute or rule, he must "show good cause
for non-compliance with the statute or rule."' 9 6 The final judgment of the
petitioned court is subject to appeal. 997
977. Id. § 1(a)(6).
978. Id. § 1(a)(7).
979. Id. § 1(a)(8).
980. Id. § 1(b).
981. Id. Comment, I I U.L.A. 233.
982. Id. § 3.
983. Id. § 5.
984. Id. § 4.
985. Id. § 6 (30 days).
986. Id. § 7.
987. Id. § 8.
988. Id. § 9(a).
989. Id. § 10.
990. Id. § 11.
991. Id. § 12(a).
992. Id. § 12(b).
993. Id. § 12(b)(1).
994. Id. § 12(b)(2).
995. Id. § 12(c).
996. Id.
997. Id. § 14.
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This Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act of 1980918 and the federal
habeas corpus legislation 999 provide useful guidelines in the creation of a
comprehensive post-conviction collateral attack enactment in Illinois. Ac-
cordingly, this Article will conclude by setting forth a suggested statutory
scheme for Illinois, using both of these collateral attack schemes as models.
However, because the Illinois case law provides, in certain instances, pro-
tections and procedures somewhat different than the Uniform Act and
federal habeas corpus, this proposed statute will be modified to more
closely track existing Illinois collateral attack law. Like the Uniform Act,
it will incorporate all collateral attack remedies under a single legislative
umbrella. Like federal habeas corpus, it will include a statutory presump-
tion of correct factual resolutions and a presumption of finality. Consistent
with the recommendations previously suggested for adoption into the case
law, these remedies will be deemed "extraordinary" and normally will be
available only where the alleged error would have altered the outcome of
the earlier proceeding. The proposed enactment might appear in the Illinois
Code as follows.
VI. ILLINOIS POST-CONVICTION COLLATERAL RELIEF ACT
§ 1 [SHORT TITLE]
Tins ACT SHALL BE KNOWN AND MAY BE CITED AS THE ILLINOIS POST-
CONVICTION COLLATERAL RELIEF ACT.
Commentary
This enactment is given a title that clearly indicates that it relates to
collateral attacks rather than to direct appeals. The title, Post-Conviction
Hearing Act, previously existing in Illinois, was rejected because this Act,
like the prior Post-Conviction Hearing Act, does not invariably require a
hearing. Also a "Post-Conviction Act," without further clarification, would
suggest that it considers all post-conviction matters, such as post-trial
motions and direct appeals.
§ 2 [LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE]
THE PURPOSE OF THIS ACT IS TO CREATE AN EXTRAORDINARY REMEDY
AVAILABLE TO ONLY THOSE POST-CONVICTION PETITIONERS WHO CAN DEMON-
STRATE THAT A SUBSTANTIAL ERROR OCCURRED DURING EITHER THE TRIAL OR
DIRECT APPEAL STAGE, WHICH ERROR IN ALL LIKELIHOOD ALTERED THE OUT-
COME OF THE PROCEEDING. ALL JUDGMENTS OF CONVICTION THAT HAVE BEEN
AFFIRMED ON APPEAL OR THAT HAVE NOT BEEN APPEALED ARE PRESUMED
FINAL AND THE PETITIONER BEARS THE BURDEN OF DEMONSTRATING TO THE
PETITIONED COURT THE NECESSITY THAT THE PRESUMPTION OF FINALITY SHALL
NOT BE OPERATIVE BECAUSE OF THE SUBSTANTIAL ERROR OR ERRORS IN QUES-
998. Id. §§ 1-19.
999. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-55 (1982).
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TION. THE RELIEF AFFORDED UNDER THIS ACT SHALL NOT BE DEEMED A
SUBSTITUTE FOR DIRECT APPEAL.
Commentary
It should be clearly understood that this Act provides only extraordinary
relief consistent with principles of equity. Accordingly, the petitioner is
required to show that the alleged error was "substantial," consistent with
the prior Post-Conviction Hearing Act. An error is substantial only if it
in all probability would have altered the outcome of the proceeding.
Consistent with federal habeas corpus, all convictions are presumed to be
final beyond the direct appeal stage. Finally, this Act explicitly states that
the redress offered under it Act is not viewed as a substitute for taking an
appeal. This section rather stridently projects the notion that a petitioner
under this Act has a significant hurdle to overcome before he will gain a
redress of his grievances. At a very minimum, he will have to demonstrate
that he was actually prejudiced when the court imposed judgment and
sentence. In other words, factual innocence will be the keystone of suc-
cessful claims under this Act.
§ 3 [REMEDY-To WHOM AVAILABLE-CONDITIONS]
ANY PERSON WHO HAS BEEN CONVICTED AND SENTENCED FOR HAVING
COMMITTED A CRIME MAY INSTITUTE A PROCEEDING FOR RELIEF UNDER THIS
ACT UPON THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS:
(A) THE CONVICTION WAS OBTAINED OR THE SENTENCE WAS IMPOSED IN
CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THERE WAS A SUBSTANTIAL VIOLATION OF EITHER
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OR THE STATE OF ILLINOIS;
(B) THE CONVICTION OR SENTENCE WAS IMPOSED UNDER A STATUTE THAT
WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER EITHER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES OR THE STATE OF ILLINOIS;
(C) THE COURT THAT RENDERED THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND SEN-
TENCE WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE PETITIONER
OR THE SUBJECT MATTER;
(D) THE SENTENCE IMPOSED WAS NOT AUTHORIZED BY LAW;
(E) EVIDENCE EXISTS, NOT PREVIOUSLY PRESENTED AND HEARD, REQUIRING
VACATION OF THE CONVICTION OR SENTENCE BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE IN ALL
LIKELIHOOD WOULD HAVE ALTERED THE JUDGMENT OR SENTENCE HAD IT
BEEN AVAILABLE EARLIER;
(F) A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN SUBSTANTIVE OR PROCEDURAL LAW HAS OC-
CURRED WHICH, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, SHOULD BE APPLIED RETRO-
ACTIVELY;
(a) THE SENTENCE HAS EXPIRED, OR THE PROBATION, MANDATORY SUPER-
VISED RELEASE, OR OTHER CONDITIONAL RELEASE WAS UNLAWFULLY RE-
VOKED, OR THE APPLICANT IS OTHERWISE UNLAWFULLY IN CUSTODY OR
RESTRAINED; OR,
(H) THE CONVICTION OR SENTENCE IS OTHERWISE SUBJECT TO COLLATERAL
ATTACK UPON ANY GROUND OF ALLEGED ERROR AVAILABLE TO THE PETI-
TIONER BEFORE THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS ACT.
Commentary
The relief afforded under this Act is available to any person convicted
of a state offense. There exists no custody requirement for persons wrongly
convicted of a crime punishable by some non-penal sanction or those who
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have already served their sentence of incarceration, as these groups also
should enjoy the right to collaterally attack their erroneous convictions.
Subsection (a), like the prior Post-Conviction Hearing Act, takes into
account only substantial constitutional violations. The implication of this
term is that a petitioner has no right to a judgment entirely free of
constitutional error. Rather, the constitutional error must have actually
prejudiced the outcome of the trial, sentence, or appeal.
Subsection (b) provides for relief from those convictions or sentences
that are based on constitutionally faulty laws. Principles of equity and
fairness require no less. The "subsequent occurrences" case law under the
prior state habeas corpus enactment offered parallel relief.
Subsection (c) addresses those jurisdictional concerns previously ad-
dressed under state habeas corpus. However, the arcane principle that relief
was available only to those entitled to immediate release, which was central
to the prior state habeas corpus case law, is rejected.
Subsection (d) can be used to challenge any erroneous, unauthorized
sentence. These problems previously were addressed under the jurisdictional
theory of state habeas corpus. No distinction, however, remains between
erroneous sentences and void sentences, for both are deserving of condem-
nation.
Subsection (e) focuses on newly discovered evidence that supports the
petitioner's claim of innocence or excessive sentence. These claims previ-
ously were addressed under state coram nobis. Thus, evidence of fraud,
duress, state witness perjury, and the petitioner's unfitness to stand trial
would continue to provide a basis for relief. This evidence would have to
be sufficient enough to alter the outcome of the proceeding had it been
available earlier. In other words, the petitioner will be required to show
that the unavailability of the evidence in question actually prejudiced his
case. Thus, where the evidence in question was merely cumulative, it would
not form a basis for relief under this Act.
Subsection (f) provides claimants with the benefits of retroactive appli-
cation of new substantive or procedural protections. Similar relief was
provided state habeas corpus petitioners under the "subsequent occurr-
ences" rationale.
Subsection (g) essentially addresses three problems. First, where the
sentence has expired, relief is afforded. Under habeas corpus, the incor-
poration of this ground of relief was accomplished under the subsequent
occurrence rationale; it is presently incorporated in this statute. Second,
this Act provides relief from the erroneous revocation of probation, su-
pervision, mandatory supervised release, and the like. Here, relief was not
previously afforded to claimants under state habeas corpus. While this
might have been deemed an illegal subsequent occurrence, it was not an
occurrence that would entitle the petitioner to immediate, unconditional
release. Because collateral relief under this Act no longer is subject to an
unconditional release requirement, such a claim of error is now cognizable.
Moreover, since due process now requires the state to prove the existence
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of a violation of the conditions of release in a fair hearing before either
probation or parole are revoked, it could be argued that the sentence
imposed after an illegal revocation was at odds with the federal constitution.
The third part of subsection (g) provides a useful catch-all. For example,
if a petitioner were restrained by the police without the usual judicial
reviews of the detention, this section would operate similar to common
law habeas corpus. So too, to the extent a delay in execution of a sentence
previously remained a viable approach to arguing that a subsequent oc-
currence had occurred justifying state habeas corpus relief, this language
contemplates that possibility as well.
Subsection (h) addresses those transitional problems that occur with any
new enactment. Thus, to the extent there previously existed avenues of
collateral relief not contemplated by this Act, those bases of relief are not
eliminated as to those petitioners who enjoyed such grounds for relief
before the passage of this enactment, but had not yet pursued their rem-
edies.
§ 4 [COMMENCEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS]
(A) A PROCEEDING IS COMMENCED BY FILING A PETITION WITH THE CLERK
OF THE COURT IN WHICH THE CONVICTION AND SENTENCE TOOK PLACE.
THE STATE MUST BE NAMED AS RESPONDENT.
(B) A PETITION MUST BE FILED WITHIN TEN YEARS OF THE ENTERING OF
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION UNLESS:
(I) THE CLAIM INVOLVES THE ABSENCE OF JURISDICTION OVER THE
SUBJECT MATTER OR PERSON OF THE PETITIONER, IN WHICH CASE
THE CLAIM CAN BE RAISED AT ANY TIME; OR,
(II) THE BASIS OF THE CLAIM WAS NOT PREVIOUSLY AVAILABLE TO
THE PETITIONER, IN WHICH CASE THE CLAIM CAN BE RAISED WITH
TEN YEARS OF THE TIME THAT THE BASIS OF THE CLAIM BECAME
AVAILABLE TO THE PETITIONER.
(C) IF THE PETITION IS FILED BEFORE THE TIME FOR DIRECT APPEAL FROM
THE JUDGMENT OR SENTENCE HAS EXPIRED, THE COURT MAY DEFER FURTHER
ACTION ON THE PETITION UNTIL THE DIRECT APPEAL PROCESS HAS BECOME
FINAL OR THE TIME FOR APPEAL HAS EXPIRED.
(D) THE PETITION MAY BE CONSIDERED BY ANY JUDGE O1 THE COURT IN
WHICH THE CONVICTION TOOK PLACE.
Commentary
Subsection (a) follows the normal collateral review process of initiating
review in the court of original jurisdiction where the judgment of conviction
and sentence occurred.
Subsection (b) sets out a statute of limitations period that roughly
parallels the previously existing collateral review enactments. The ten year
period previously used in connection with the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
provides the normal rule of thumb for constitutional claims raised under
sections 3(a) and 3(b). However, the jurisdictional problems contemplated
by sections 3(c) and 3(d) previously have been exempt from statute of
limitations concerns and remain so here. In addition, the statute should
not commence to run in connection with those claims that involve devel-
opments or irregularities that might not occur until the normal statute of
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limitations period has expired. These would include newly discovered evi-
dence claims raised under section 3(e), significant changes in the law
addressed by section 3(f), and expiration of sentence or revocation of
conditional release reviewable under section 3(g). A section 3(g) claim that
the petitioner is "otherwise unlawfully in custody" is best viewed as a
jurisdictional problem over the petitioner's person and, hence, not subject
to a statute of limitations period. Finally, a section 3(h) claim is to be
governed by the earlier enactments. Subsection (4)(c) normally would
allow the direct appeal process, if yet available, to run its course before
collateral review would occur. Here, the usual principles of equity would
not permit invocation of the extraordinary collateral remedies where an
adequate legal remedy, namely direct appeal, remains an option.
Subsection (4)(d) is consistent with prior case law that found unconsti-
tutional an earlier legislative mandate that a judge, other than the original
trial judge, handle the petition. Thus, assignment of this matter would be
handled in the same fashion as other assignments of civil and criminal
cases to circuit court judges.
§ 5 [CONTENTS OF PETITION, SERVICE, RESPONSIVE PLEADINGS, AMENDED
AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS, DISCOVERY, SUMMARY DISPOSITION, COUN-
SEL, HEARING, FINDINGS, ORDERS, APPEAL]
(A) EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR HEREIN, THE RULES REGARDING
CONTENTS OF THE PETITION, SERVICE, RESPONSIVE PLEADINGS, AMENDED
AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS, DISCOVERY, SUMMARY DISPOSITION, HEAR-
ING, FINDINGS, ORDERS, AND APPEALS FROM SAID ORDERS, SHALL BE IN
ACCORDANCE WITH CHAPTER 110 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
(B) A PETITION FOR RELIEF UNDER THIS ACT CONTAINING A CLAIM SO
LACKING IN FACTUAL SUPPORT OR LEGAL BASIS AS TO BE FRIVOLOUS, MAY
BE DISMISSED WITHOUT FURTHER REVIEW AND WITHOUT AFFORDING THE
PETITIONER APPOINTED COUNSEL. AN ALLEGATION THAT THE CLAIM IS FRIV-
OLOUS IS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO BE PLED BY THE STATE. A PETITION
THAT IS NOT FRIVOLOUS MAY NOT BE DISMISSED WITHOUT FURTHER REVIEW,
NOR WITHOUT PROVIDING THE PETITIONER, IF INDIGENT, WITH APPOINTED
COUNSEL.
(c) A PETITION FOR RELIEF UNDER THIS ACT MAY BE DENIED ON THE
GROUND THAT THE SAME CLAIM OR CLAIMS WERE FULLY AND FINALLY
DETERMINED IN A PREVIOUS PROCEEDING. RES JUDICATA IS AN AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSE TO BE PLED BY THE STATE.
(D) A PETITION FOR RELIEF UNDER THIS ACT MAY BE DENIED WHERE THE
PETITIONER PRESENTS A CLAIM WHICH HE INEXCUSABLY FAILED TO RAISE
EITHER IN A PROCEEDING LEADING TO JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND
SENTENCE, OR ON DIRECT APPEAL, OR IN A PREVIOUS PROCEEDING UNDER
THIS ACT. WAIVER IS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO BE PLED BY THE STATE.
Commentary
Rather than develop a separate procedural mechanism for reviewing
collateral claims, subsection (a) simply requires that these civil collateral
claims be reviewed in accordance with the already existing Code of Civil
Procedure. Subsection (b) unequivocally provides, in accordance with prior
collateral attack case law, that frivolous claims may be summarily dismissed
without counsel. However, non-frivolous claims obviously cannot be sum-
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marily rejected and, more importantly, the right to counsel should attach
at that point.
Subsections (c) and (d) present the doctrines of res judicata and waiver
respectively. These doctrines reinforce the principle of finality that is central
to this enactment. However, because the trial court normally assesses the
merits of a petitioner's claim before invoking either res judicata or waiver,
it would seem that the petitioner needs the guiding hand of counsel in this
type of inquiry and during any further hearings on his petition.
§ 6 [PRESUMPTION OF CORRECT RESOLUTION OF FACTUAL ISSUES]
(A) IN A PROCEEDING INITIATED BY A PETITION UNDER THIS ACT, A DETER-
MINATION AFTER A JUDICIAL HEARING ON THE MERITS OF A FACTUAL DISPUTE
EVIDENCED BY A WRITTEN FINDING, ORDER OR OPINION, OR OTHER RELIABLE
AND ADEQUATE WRITTEN INDICIA, SHALL BE PRESUMED TO BE CORRECT,
UNLESS THE PETITIONER SHALL ESTABLISH, OR THE RESPONDENT SHALL AD-
MIT, OR IT SHALL OTHERWISE APPEAR THAT:
(I) THE MERITS OF THE FACTUAL DISPUTE WERE NOT RESOLVED IN
THE EARLIER HEARING;
(II) THE FACT FINDING PROCEDURE EMPLOYED IN THE HEARING WAS
NOT ADEQUATE TO AFFORD A FULL, FAIR AND ADEQUATE RESOLUTION
OF THE FACTUAL DISPUTE; OR,
(M) THE MATERIAL FACTS WERE NOT ADEQUATELY DEVELOPED AT
THE HEARING.
(B) THE PETITIONER BEARS THE BURDEN OF DEMONSTRATING BY A PREPON-
DERANCE OF EVIDENCE THAT THE RECORD AS A WHOLE DOES NOT FAIRLY
SUPPORT THE FACTUAL DETERMINATION OF THE EARLIER HEARING.
(c) THIS SECTION APPLIES ONLY TO ISSUES OF FACT AND THE PRESUMPTION
OF CORRECT RESOLUTION OF FACTUAL ISSUES HAS NO OPERATIVE EFFECT AS
TO QUESTIONS OF LAW OR MIXED DETERMINATIONS OF LAW AND FACT.
Commentary
Following the lead of federal habeas corpus legislation, this section of
the Act introduces into Illinois collateral attack proceedings a presumption
of the correct resolution of factual disputes in earlier hearings. While the
doctrine of res judicata points in the same direction, this section reinforces
the notion that collateral review forums need not continuously relitigate
factual disputes and will, in its own way, inject a degree of finality into
the post-conviction review process.
